Greek Texts & Translations

3.30Again, an urgent request came to us from Syracuse; she was ready to end our differences by a pact of friendship, to end war by peace; and she pointed out the advantages of an alliance with herself, if only we would consent to it, over those of the existing alliance with Segesta and Catana. ^note But once more we chose war instead of peace, Segesta instead of Syracuse; instead of staying at home as the allies of Syracuse, we chose to send an armament to Sicily. The result was the loss of a large part of the Athenian and allied forces, the bravest being the first to fall; a reckless waste of ships, money, and resources: and the return of the survivors in disgrace.

3.31Later, ^note the same Argives who are here today to persuade us to continue the war, induced us to arouse Sparta's anger by making a naval descent upon Laconia while at peace with her, an act which was responsible for endless disasters; from it sprang a war which ended with our being forced to demolish our walls, to surrender our fleet, and to restore our exiles. Yet what help did we receive in our misfortunes from Argos who had drawn us into the war? What danger did she brave for Athens?

3.32Today, then, it remains for us to choose war instead of peace once again, the Argive instead of the Boeotian alliance, the present masters of Corinth instead of Sparta. Gentlemen, I trust that no one will induce us to choose such a course. The examples furnished by our past mistakes are enough to prevent men of sense from repeating them.

3.33A number of you are extremely anxious to see peace concluded as quickly as possible. In fact, according to those in question, the forty days allowed you for consideration are a waste of time and a concession which we delegates have done wrong to obtain, as the one object of our being sent to Sparta with full powers was to avoid any further reference of the matter to the Assembly. Our desire to secure our position by such a reference they call nervousness, since no one, they argue, has ever yet saved the Athenian people by open persuasion: measures for its good must be secret or disguised.

3.34Now I cannot praise this reasoning. I admit, gentlemen, that in time of war a patriotic and experienced general should employ secrecy or deception in leading the majority of men into danger; but when a peace to include the entire nation is being negotiated, an agreement to which sworn assent will be given and which will be recorded on public monuments, I deny that the negotiators should practise secrecy or deception. I maintain that we deserve praise much more than blame, if, in spite of our full powers of discretion, we still refer the question to you for consideration. Decisions should be reached with all the caution possible; then, once we have made our sworn compact, we should abide by it.

3.35As delegates, we must be guided not only by your written instructions, but by your character, gentlemen. You have a way of suspecting and being dissatisfied with a thing if you can have it: while if there is anything which you have not, you airily talk as though it lay ready to your hand. If it is your duty to go to war, you want peace; if peace is arranged for you, you count up the benefits which war has brought you. 3.36Thus there are those who are already complaining that they cannot see the meaning of the treaty, if it is walls and ships which Athens is to recover. They are not recovering their own private property from abroad: and walls cannot feed them. This objection also requires an answer.

3.37There was once a time, gentlemen, when we had no walls or fleet: but it was when we acquired them that our prosperity began. If you have a similar desire for prosperity today, then make sure of your walls and your ships. It was with them that our forefathers started; and, partly by persuasion, partly by stealth, partly by bribery, and partly by force, they won for Athens a greater empire than any other state has ever gained.