Greek Texts & Translations

Prognostics of Storms, one book.

Concerning Astronomy, one book.

Concerning Optics, one book.

On Motion, one book.

On Music, one book.

Concerning Memory, one book.

Six books of Homeric Problems.

Poetics, one book.

Thirty - eight books of Physics according to the lettering.

Two books of Problems which have been examined.

Two books of Routine Instruction.

Mechanics, one book.

Problems taken from the works of Democritus, two books.

On the Magnet, one book.

Analogies, one book.

Miscellaneous Notes, twelve books.

Descriptions of Genera, fourteen books.

Claims advanced, one book.

Victors at Olympia, one book.

Victors at the Pythian Games, one book.

On Music, one book.

Concerning Delphi, one book.

Criticism of the List of Pythian Victors, one book.

Dramatic Victories at the Dionysia, one book.

Of Tragedies, one book.

Dramatic Records, one book.

Proverbs, one book.

Laws of the Mess-table, one book.

Four books of Laws.

Categories, one book.

De Interpretatione, one book.

Constitutions of 158 Cities, in general and in particular, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, tyrannical.

Letters to Philip.

Letters of Selymbrians.

Letters to Alexander, four books.

Letters to Antipater, nine books.

To Mentor, one book.

To Ariston, one book.

To Olympias, one book.

To Hephaestion, one book.

To Themistagoras, one book.

To Philoxenus, one book.

In reply to Democritus, one book.

Verses beginning Ἁγνὲ θεῶν πρέσβισθʼ ἑκατηβόλε ("Holy One and Chiefest of Gods, far-darting").

Elegiac verses beginning Καλλιτέκνου μητρὸς θύγατερ ("Daughter of a Mother blessed with fair offspring").

In all 445,270 lines.

Such is the number of the works written by him. And in them he puts forward the following views. There are two divisions of philosophy, the practical and the theoretical. The practical part includes ethics and politics, and in the latter not only the doctrine of the state but also that of the household is sketched. The theoretical part includes physics and logic, although logic is not an independent science, but is elaborated as an instrument to the rest of science. And he clearly laid down that it has a twofold aim, probability and truth. For each of these he employed two faculties, dialectic and rhetoric where probability is aimed at, analytic and philosophy where the end is truth; he neglects nothing which makes either for discovery or for judgement or for utility. 5.1.29 As making for discovery he left in the Topics and Methodics a number of propositions, whereby the student can be well supplied with probable arguments for the solution of problems. As an aid to judgement he left the Prior and Posterior Analytics. By the Prior Analytics the premisses are judged, by the Posterior the process of inference is tested. For practical use there are the precepts on controversy and the works dealing with question and answer, with sophistical fallacies, syllogisms and the like. The test of truth which he put forward was sensation in the sphere of objects actually presented, but in the sphere of morals dealing with the state, the household and the laws, it was reason.

The one ethical end he held to be the exercise of virtue in a completed life. And happiness he maintained to be made up of goods of three sorts: goods of the soul, which indeed he designates as of the highest value; in the second place bodily goods, health and strength, beauty and the like; and thirdly external goods, such as wealth, good birth, reputation and the like. And he regarded virtue as not of itself sufficient to ensure happiness; bodily goods and external goods were also necessary, for the wise man would be miserable if he lived in the midst of pains, poverty, and similar circumstances. Vice, however, is sufficient in itself to secure misery, even if it be ever so abundantly furnished with corporeal and external goods. 5.1.31 He held that the virtues are not mutually interdependent. For a man might be prudent, or again just, and at the same time profligate and unable to control his passions. He said too that the wise man was not exempt from all passions, but indulged them in moderation.

He defined friendship as an equality of reciprocal good-will, including under the term as one species the friendship of kinsmen, as another that of lovers, and as a third that of host and guest. ^note The end of love was not merely intercourse but also philosophy. According to him the wise man would fall in love and take part in politics; furthermore he would marry and reside at a king's court. Of three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the pleasure-loving life, he gave the preference to the contemplative. He held that the studies which make up the ordinary education are of service for the attainment of virtue.