Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (English) (XML Header) [word count] [lemma count] [Diog. Laert.].
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7.1.111 They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions : avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.

And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering ; envy, grief at others' prosperity ; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself ; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.1.112 Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole. Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions : terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright ; shame is fear of disgrace ; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act ; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence ; 7.1.113 panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound ; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.

Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states : want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship ; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free ; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.1.114 Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines note :

Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.

Resentment is anger in an early stage.

Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy ; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek ( τέρψις ) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue.

7.1.115

And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness ; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like.

7.1.116

Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation ; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance ; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection ; under caution, reverence and modesty ; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.

7.1.117

Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless. Further, the wise man is said to be free from vanity ; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have. The term harsh is applied, however, to others as well, and in much the same sense as a wine is said to be harsh when it is employed medicinally and not for drinking at all.



Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (English) (XML Header) [word count] [lemma count] [Diog. Laert.].
<<Diog. Laert. 7.1.107 Diog. Laert. 7.1.114 (Greek) >>Diog. Laert. 7.1.120

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