Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (English) (XML Header) [word count] [lemma count] [Diog. Laert.].
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7.1.52

The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation ( αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways : some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety.

7.1.53

By incidence or direct contact have come our notions of sensible things ; by resemblance notions whose origin is something before us, as the notion of Socrates which we get from his bust ; while under notions derived from analogy come those which we get (1) by way of enlargement, like that of Tityos or the Cyclops, or (2) by way of diminution, like that of the Pygmy. And thus, too, the centre of the earth was originally conceived on the analogy of smaller spheres. Of notions obtained by transposition creatures with eyes on the chest would be an instance, while the centaur exemplifies those reached by composition, and death those due to contrariety. Furthermore, there are notions which imply a sort of transition to the realm of the imperceptible : such are those of space and of the meaning of terms. The notions of justice and goodness come by nature. Again, privation originates notions ; for instance, that of the man without hands. Such are their tenets concerning presentation, sensation, and thought.

7.1.54

The standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object - according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics and to Antipater and Apollodorus. Boëthus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of standards, namely intelligence, senseperception, appetency, and knowledge ; while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and preconception are the only standards, preconception being a general notion which comes by the gift of nature (an innate conception of universals or general concepts). Again, certain others of the older Stoics make Right Reason the standard ; so also does Posidonius in his treatise On the Standard.

7.1.55

In their theory of dialectic most of them see fit to take as their starting-point the topic of voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his handbook On Voice. While the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man's voice is articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at the age of fourteen. Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal : I may cite for this Archedemus in his treatise On Voice, Diogenes, Antipater and Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics. 7.1.56 For whatever produces an effect is body ; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. Reduced to writing, what was voice becomes a verbal expression, as "day"; so says Diogenes. A statement or proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. "It is day." Dialect (διά- λεκτος ) means a variety of speech which is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other races ; or, again, it means a form peculiar to some particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality ; e.g. in Attic the word for "sea" is not θάλασσα but θάλαττα, and in Ionic "day" is not ἡμέρα but ἡμέρη.

Elements of language are the four-and-twenty letters. "Letter," however, has three meanings : (1) the particular sound or element of speech ; (2) its written symbol or character ; (3) its name, as Alpha is the name of the sound A. 7.1.57 Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech ; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible - which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse.

There are, as stated by Diogenes note in his treatise on Language and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech : proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article. To these Antipater in his work On Words and their Meaning adds another part, the "mean." note



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