Greek Texts & Translations

A notion or object of thought is a presentation to the intellect, which though not really substance nor attribute is quasi-substance or quasi-attribute. ^note Thus an image of a horse may rise before the mind, although there is no horse present.

Species is that which is comprehended under genus : thus Man is included under Animal. The highest or most universal genus is that which, being itself a genus, has no genus above : namely, reality or the real ; and the lowest and most particular species is that which, being itself a species, has no species below it, e.g. Socrates.

Division of a genus means dissection of it into its proximate species, thus : Animals are either rational or irrational (dichotomy). Contrary division dissects the genus into species by contrary qualities : for example, by means of negation, as when all things that are are divided into good and not good. Subdivision is division applied to a previous division : for instance, after saying, "Of things that are some are good, some are not good," we proceed, "and of the not good some are bad, some are neither good nor bad (morally indifferent)."

Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads : for instance, Of goods some are mental, others bodily.

Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses : e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that "A house has three times" fallen, in the other that "a dancing-girl" has fallen.

Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true nor false ; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language.

To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed. ^note

By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. Of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. "writes," for we inquire "Who ?" Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as "Socrates writes." And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.

A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something ; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects ; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. Of predicates some are adjectival [and so have personal subjects], as e.g. "to sail through rocks." ^note Again, some predicates are direct, some reversed, some neither. Now direct predicates are those that are constructed with one of the oblique cases, as "hears," "sees," "converses"; while reversed are those constructed with the passive voice, as "I am heard," "I am seen." Neutral are such as correspond to neither of these, as "thinks," "walks." Reflexive predicates are those among the passive, which, although in form passive, are yet active operations, ^{note note}: 7.1.65 for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.

A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions : "A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.'" The Greek word for judgement ( ἀξίωμα ) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection ; for when you say "It is day," you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.1.66 There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true : an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. "Is it day ?" and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus "It is day" is a judgement ; "Is it day ?" an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation ; but you must express the answer in words, "He lives in this or that place."