Greek Texts & Translations

A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions : "A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.'" The Greek word for judgement ( ἀξίωμα ) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection ; for when you say "It is day," you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.1.66 There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true : an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. "Is it day ?" and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus "It is day" is a judgement ; "Is it day ?" an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation ; but you must express the answer in words, "He lives in this or that place."

An imperative is something which conveys a command : e.g.

Go thou to the waters of Inachus. ^note

An adjurative utterance is something ... A vocative utterance is something the use of which implies that you are addressing some one ; for instance :

Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon, lord of men. ^note

A quasi-proposition is that which, having the enunciation of a judgement, yet in consequence of the intensified tone or emotion of one of its parts falls outside the class of judgements proper, e.g.

Yea, fair indeed the Parthenon !

How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is! ^note

There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.

Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin ?

Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.

The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as "It is day." Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions. 7.1.69 They may, that is, consist either of a single ambiguous proposition, e.g. "If it is day, it is day," or of more than one proposition, e.g. "If it is day, it is light."

With simple propositions are classed those of negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definitive and the indefinitive ; with those that are not simple the hypothetical, the inferential, the coupled or complex, the disjunctive, the causal, and that which indicates more or less. An example of a negative proposition is "It is not day." Of the negative proposition one species is the double negative. By double negative is meant the negation of a negation, e.g. "It is not not-day." Now this presupposes that it is day.

A denial contains a negative part or particle and a predication : such as this, "No one is walking." A privative proposition is one that contains a privative particle reversing the effect of a judgement, as, for example, "This man is unkind." An affirmative or assertory proposition is one that consists of a noun in the nominative case and a predicate, as "Dion is walking." A definitive proposition is one that consists of a demonstrative in the nominative case and a predicate, as "This man is walking." An indefinitive proposition is one that consists of an indefinite word or words and a predicate, e.g. "Some one is walking," or "There's some one walking"; "He is in motion."

Of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction "If." Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, "If it is day, it is light." An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction "Since" and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion ; for example, "Since it is day-time, it is light." This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact.