Plato, Laws (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose] [word count] [lemma count] [Pl. Leg.].
<<Pl. Leg. 661c Pl. Leg. 663d (Greek) >>Pl. Leg. 665d

662eimagine, then, that the questions I have put have been put to an ancestor and lawgiver, and that he has stated that the man who lives the most pleasant life is the happiest. In the next place I would say to him this: “O father, did you not desire me to live as happily as possible? Yet you never ceased bidding me constantly to live as justly as possible.” And hereby, as I think, our lawgiver or ancestor would be shown up as illogical and incapable of speaking consistently with himself, but if, on the other hand, he were to declare the most just life to be the happiest, everyone who heard him would, I suppose, enquire what is the good and charm it contains which is superior to pleasure, for which the lawgiver praises it. 663aFor, apart from pleasure, what good could accrue to a just man? “Come, tell me, is fair fame and praise from the mouths of men and gods a noble and good thing, but unpleasant, while ill-fame is the opposite?” “By no means, my dear lawgiver,” we shall say. And is it unpleasant, but noble and good, neither to injure anyone nor be injured by anyone, while the opposite is pleasant, but ignoble and bad?

Clinias

By no means.

Athenian

So then the teaching which refuses to separate the pleasant from the just helps, 663bif nothing else, to induce a man to live the holy and just life, so that any doctrine which denies this truth is, in the eyes of the lawgiver, most shameful and most hateful; for no one would voluntarily consent to be induced to commit an act, unless it involves as its consequence more pleasure than pain. Now distance has the effect of befogging the vision of nearly everybody, and of children especially; but our lawgiver will reverse the appearance by removing the fog, note 663cand by one means or another—habituation, commendation, or argument—will persuade people that their notions of justice and injustice are illusory pictures, unjust objects appearing pleasant and just objects most unpleasant to him who is opposed to justice, through being viewed from his own unjust and evil standpoint, but when seen from the standpoint of justice, both of them appear in all ways entirely the opposite.

Clinias

So it appears.

Athenian

In point of truth, which of the two judgements shall we say is the more authoritative,—that of the worse soul or that of the better.

Clinias

That of the better, undoubtedly. 663d

Athenian

Undoubtedly, then, the unjust life is not only more base and ignoble, but also in very truth more unpleasant, than the just and holy life.

Clinias

It would seem so, my friends, from our present argument.

Athenian

And even if the state of the case were different from what it has now been proved to be by our argument, could a lawgiver who was worth his salt find any more useful fiction than this (if he dared to use any fiction at all in addressing the youths for their good), or one more effective in persuading all men to act justly in all things 663ewillingly and without constraint?

Clinias

Truth is a noble thing, Stranger, and an enduring; yet to persuade men of it seems no easy matter.

Athenian

Be it so; yet it proved easy to persuade men of the Sidonian fairy-tale, note incredible though it was, and of numberless others.

Clinias

What tales?

Athenian

The tale of the teeth that were sown, and how armed men sprang out of them. Here, indeed, the lawgiver has a notable example 664aof how one can, if he tries, persuade the souls of the young of anything, so that the only question he has to consider in his inventing is what would do most good to the State, if it were believed; and then he must devise all possible means to ensure that the whole of the community constantly, so long as they live, use exactly the same language, so far as possible, about these matters, alike in their songs, their tales, and their discourses. If you, however, think otherwise, I have no objection to your arguing in the opposite sense. 664b

Clinias

Neither of us, I think, could possibly argue against your view.

Athenian

Our next subject I must handle myself. I maintain that all the three choirs note must enchant the souls of the children, while still young and tender, by rehearsing all the noble things which we have already recounted, or shall recount hereafter; and let this be the sum of them: in asserting that one and the same life is declared by the gods to be both most pleasant and most just, we shall not only be saying what is most true, 664cbut we shall also convince those who need convincing more forcibly than we could by any other assertion.

Clinias

We must assent to what you say.

Athenian

First, then, the right order of procedure will be for the Muses' choir of children to come forward first to sing these things with the utmost vigor and before the whole city; second will come the choir of those under thirty, invoking Apollo Paian note as witness of the truth of what is said, and praying him of grace to persuade the youth. 664dThe next singers will be the third choir, of those over thirty and under sixty; and lastly, there were left those who, being no longer able to uplift the song, shall handle the same moral themes in stories and by oracular speech.

Clinias

Whom do you mean, Stranger, by these third choristers. For we do not grasp very clearly what you intend to convey about them.

Athenian

Yet they are in fact the very people to whom most of our previous discourse was intended to lead up.



Plato, Laws (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose] [word count] [lemma count] [Pl. Leg.].
<<Pl. Leg. 661c Pl. Leg. 663d (Greek) >>Pl. Leg. 665d

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