Greek Texts & Translations

Once again, Stranger, you are—in a sort of a way—disparaging our lawgivers.

It is not intentionally, my friend, that I do so—if I am doing it but whither the argument leads us, thither, if you please, let us go. If we know of a music that is superior to that of the choirs or to that of the public theaters, 667blet us try to supply it to those men who, as we said, are ashamed of the latter, yet are eager to take a part in that music which is noblest.

Certainly.

^note Now, in the first place, must it not be true of everything which possesses charm as its concomitant, that its most important element is either this charm in itself, or some form of correctness, or, thirdly, utility? For instance, meat and drink and nutriment in general have, as I say, for concomitant that charm which we should term pleasure; 667cbut as regards their correctness and utility, what we call the wholesomeness of each article administered is precisely the most perfect element they contain.

Certainly.

Learning, too, is accompanied by the element of charm, which is pleasure; but that which produces its correctness and utility, its goodness and nobleness, is truth.

Quite so. 667d

Then how about the imitative arts which produce likenesses? If they succeed in their productions, should not any concomitant pleasure which results therefrom be most properly called “charm”?

Yes.

But, speaking generally, the correctness of these things would be the result not, primarily, of pleasure, but of equality in respect of both quality and quantity. ^note

Excellent.

Then we shall rightly judge by the criterion of pleasure 667ethat object only which, in its effects, produces neither utility nor truth nor similarity, nor yet harm, and which exists solely for the sake of the concomitant element of charm,—which element will best be named “pleasure” whenever it is accompanied by none of the other qualities mentioned.

You mean only harmless pleasure.

Yes, and I say that this same pleasure is also play, whenever the harm or good it does is negligible.

Very true.

Should we not then assert, as a corollary, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure 668aor of untrue opinion, nor indeed should any kind of equality be so judged? The reason why the equal is equal, or the symmetrical symmetrical, is not at all because a man so opines, or is charmed thereby, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.

Most certainly.

We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?

Of course.

So whenever a man states that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall decisively reject his statement; and we shall regard such music as the least important of all (if indeed any music 668bis important) and prefer that which possesses similarity in its imitation of the beautiful.

Very true.

Thus those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, as it appears, not that which is pleasant, but that which is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in the reproduction of the original in its own proper quantity and quality.

Of course.

And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would allow,—that all its productions are 668cimitative and representative; ^note that much, at least, they would all admit,—poets, audience, and actors alike, would they not?

They would.

Now the man who is to judge a poem ^note unerringly must know in each particular case the exact nature of the poem; for if he does not know its essence,—what its intention is and what the actual original which it represents,—then he will hardly be able to decide how far it succeeds or fails in fulfilling its intention.

Hardly, to be sure. 668d

And would a man who does not know what constitutes perfection be able to decide as to the goodness or badness of a poem? But I am not making myself quite clear: it might be clearer if I put it in this way—

In what way?

As regards objects of sight we have, of course, thousands of representations.

Yes.

How, then, if in this class of objects a man were to be ignorant of the nature of each of the bodies represented could he ever know whether it is perfectly executed? What I mean is this: whether it preserves the proper dimensions and the positions of each of the bodily parts,