Greek Texts & Translations

Then how about the imitative arts which produce likenesses? If they succeed in their productions, should not any concomitant pleasure which results therefrom be most properly called “charm”?

Yes.

But, speaking generally, the correctness of these things would be the result not, primarily, of pleasure, but of equality in respect of both quality and quantity. ^note

Excellent.

Then we shall rightly judge by the criterion of pleasure 667ethat object only which, in its effects, produces neither utility nor truth nor similarity, nor yet harm, and which exists solely for the sake of the concomitant element of charm,—which element will best be named “pleasure” whenever it is accompanied by none of the other qualities mentioned.

You mean only harmless pleasure.

Yes, and I say that this same pleasure is also play, whenever the harm or good it does is negligible.

Very true.

Should we not then assert, as a corollary, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure 668aor of untrue opinion, nor indeed should any kind of equality be so judged? The reason why the equal is equal, or the symmetrical symmetrical, is not at all because a man so opines, or is charmed thereby, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.

Most certainly.

We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?

Of course.

So whenever a man states that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall decisively reject his statement; and we shall regard such music as the least important of all (if indeed any music 668bis important) and prefer that which possesses similarity in its imitation of the beautiful.

Very true.

Thus those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, as it appears, not that which is pleasant, but that which is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in the reproduction of the original in its own proper quantity and quality.

Of course.

And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would allow,—that all its productions are 668cimitative and representative; ^note that much, at least, they would all admit,—poets, audience, and actors alike, would they not?

They would.

Now the man who is to judge a poem ^note unerringly must know in each particular case the exact nature of the poem; for if he does not know its essence,—what its intention is and what the actual original which it represents,—then he will hardly be able to decide how far it succeeds or fails in fulfilling its intention.

Hardly, to be sure. 668d

And would a man who does not know what constitutes perfection be able to decide as to the goodness or badness of a poem? But I am not making myself quite clear: it might be clearer if I put it in this way—

In what way?

As regards objects of sight we have, of course, thousands of representations.

Yes.

How, then, if in this class of objects a man were to be ignorant of the nature of each of the bodies represented could he ever know whether it is perfectly executed? What I mean is this: whether it preserves the proper dimensions and the positions of each of the bodily parts, 668eand has caught their exact number and the proper order in which one is placed next another, and their colors and shapes as well,—or whether all these things are wrought in a confused manner. Do you suppose that anyone could possibly decide these points if he were totally ignorant as to what animal was being represented?

How could he?

Well, suppose we should know that the object painted or moulded is a man, and know that art has endowed him with all his proper parts, colors, 669aand shapes,—is it at once inevitable that the person who knows this can easily discern also whether the work is beautiful, or wherein it is deficient in beauty?

If that were so, Stranger, practically all of us would know what animals are beautiful.

You are quite right. In regard, then, to every representation—whether in painting, music or any other art—must not the judicious critic possess these three requisites: 669bfirst, a knowledge of the nature of the original; next, a knowledge of the correctness of the copy; and thirdly, a knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed?

It would seem so, certainly.

Let us not hesitate, then, to mention the point wherein lies the difficulty of music. Just because it is more talked about than any other form of representation, it needs more caution than any. The man who blunders in this art will do himself the greatest harm, by welcoming base morals;