Greek Texts & Translations

What do you mean by that, Stranger?

Courage is, presumably, one part of virtue.

Certainly.

Now that you have heard the argument, judge for yourself whether you would welcome as housemate or neighbor a man who is extremely courageous, but licentious rather than temperate. 696c

Don't suggest such a thing!

Well then,—a man wise in arts and crafts, but unjust.

Certainly not.

But justice, surely, is not bred apart from temperance.

Impossible.

Nor is he whom we recently proposed ^note as our type of wisdom,—the man who has his feelings of pleasure and pain in accord with the dictates of right reason and obedient thereto.

No, indeed. 696d

Here is a further point we must consider, in order to judge about the conferment of honors in States, when they are right and when wrong.

What point?

If temperance existed alone in a man's soul, divorced from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor or the reverse?

I cannot tell what reply to make.

Yet, in truth, you have made a reply, and a reasonable one. For if you had declared for either of the alternatives in my question, you would have said what is, to my mind, quite out of tune.

So it has turned out to be all right.

Very good. Accordingly, the additional element in objects deserving of honor 696eor dishonor will be one that demands not speech so much as a kind of speechless silence. ^note

I suppose you mean temperance.

Yes. And of the rest, that which, with the addition of temperance, benefits us most would best deserve to be held in the highest honor, and the second in degree of benefit put second in order of honor; and so with each of the others in succession—to each it will be proper to assign the honor due to its rank. 697a

Just so.

Well then, shall we not declare that the distribution of these things is the lawgiver's task?

Certainly.

Is it your wish that we should hand over the whole distribution to him, to deal with every case and all the details, while we—as legal enthusiasts ourselves also—confine ourselves to making a threefold division, and endeavor to distinguish what comes first in importance, and what second and third? ^note

By all means.

We declare, then, that a State which is to endure, 697band to be as happy as it is possible for man to be, must of necessity dispense honors rightly. And the right way is this: it shall be laid down that the goods of the soul are highest in honor and come first, provided that the soul possesses temperance; second come the good and fair things of the body; and third the so-called goods of substance and property. And if any law-giver or State transgresses these rules, either by promoting wealth to honors, or by raising one of the lower goods 697cto a higher rank by means of honors, he will be guilty of a breach both of religion and of statesmanship. Shall this be our declaration, or what?

By all means let us declare this plainly.

It was our investigation of the polity of the Persians that caused us to discuss these matters at greater length. We find that they grew still worse, the reason being, as we say, that by robbing the commons unduly of their liberty and introducing despotism in excess, they destroyed 697din the State the bonds of friendliness and fellowship. And when these are destroyed, the policy of the rulers no longer consults for the good of the subjects and the commons, but solely for the maintenance of their own power; if they think that it will profit them in the least degree, they are ready at any time to overturn States and to overturn and burn up friendly nations; and thus they both hate and are hated with a fierce and ruthless hatred. And when they come to need the commons, to fight in their support, they find in them no patriotism