Greek Texts & Translations

You are right: let us do as you say.

First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple-robbers and all forms of thieving and wrongdoing; nor should we be vexed by the fact that, although we enacted some points while legislating, 859cthere are some points still under consideration: for we are in process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers as yet. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us so consider them.

Most certainly.

In respect of goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this,—how far we now agree with ourselves, and how far we differ (for we should certainly say that we desire, if nothing else, 859dto differ at least from the majority of men), and how far also the majority agree or differ among themselves.

What differences of ours have you in mind?

I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body, 859eare quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.

Would not that be right?

Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that “all” includes for us passions ^note nearly as much as actions.

Well, what then?

Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.

Yes.

It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— 860athat a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.

True.

But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.

What do you mean by that?

It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.

What statements? 860b

We laid it down ^note that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?

I am afraid so. 860c

Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.

It certainly seems so, Stranger.

Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.

What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?

I believe that I expressly stated ^note in our previous discourse,—or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert—

What? 860d

That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.

What statement do you mean?

This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. ^note But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who, 860ethrough contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly,—how am I to prove consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me—“If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not?” “Legislate by all means,” I shall reply. “Will you make a distinction, then, between voluntary and involuntary wrongdoings, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the crimes and wrongdoings that are voluntary,