Greek Texts & Translations

Would not that be right?

Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that “all” includes for us passions ^note nearly as much as actions.

Well, what then?

Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.

Yes.

It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— 860athat a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.

True.

But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.

What do you mean by that?

It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.

What statements? 860b

We laid it down ^note that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?

I am afraid so. 860c

Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.

It certainly seems so, Stranger.

Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.

What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?

I believe that I expressly stated ^note in our previous discourse,—or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert—

What? 860d

That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.

What statement do you mean?

This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. ^note But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who, 860ethrough contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly,—how am I to prove consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me—“If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not?” “Legislate by all means,” I shall reply. “Will you make a distinction, then, between voluntary and involuntary wrongdoings, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the crimes and wrongdoings that are voluntary, 861aand lighter penalties for the others? Or shall we enact equal penalties for all, on the view that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of injustice?”

What you say, Stranger, is quite right: so what use are we to make of our present arguments?

A very proper question! The use we shall make of them, to begin with, is this—

What?

Let us recall how, a moment ago, we rightly stated that in regard to justice we are suffering from the greatest confusion and inconsistency. Grasping this fact, 861blet us again question ourselves,—“As to our perplexity about these matters, since we have neither got it clear nor defined the point of difference between those two kinds of wrongdoing, voluntary and involuntary, which are treated as legally distinct in every State by every legislator who has ever yet appeared,—as to this, is the statement we recently made to stand, like a divine oracle, as a mere ex cathedra statement, unsupported by any proof, and to serve as a kind of master-enactment ^note?” 861cThat is impossible; and before we legislate we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrong-doings are two-fold, and wherein their difference consists, in order that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules, and be able to form some judgment regarding the suitability or otherwise of our enactments.

What you say, Stranger, appears to us to be excellent: we ought to do one of two things,—either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else make our distinctions first,