Greek Texts & Translations

What two?

Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.

Explain more clearly.

It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?

Certainly.

As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things,—by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit 894cin the total number of motions.

Be it so.

Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I presume, we shall call the tenth. 894d

Most certainly.

Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?

We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.

Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?

Which do you mean?

Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.

How?

Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and the next one is second to it, 894ealthough we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.

What do you mean?

This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, 895awill the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?

Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.

Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers ^note venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, 895bsince no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.

Most true.

Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, 895chere is a question we may answer.

What is it?

If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?

What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as “alive” when it moves itself?

Yes.

It is alive, to be sure.

Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?

We must.