Greek Texts & Translations

Yes.

One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—“several.” Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.

You are perfectly right.

Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, 897aof which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination, ^note and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, 897bhardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?

By no means.

Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which 897chas neither quality? To this shall we make reply as follows?

How?

If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason, ^note and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.

You are right. 897d

But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.

That also is right.

Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.

Very good.

In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun, ^note as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully; 897ethe safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.

How do you mean?

Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which ^note I, along with you, will make answer.

You will probably speak admirably.

Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest?

Yes.

And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place, 898aothers move in several places?

That is so.

And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason? ^note

How do you mean?

If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place 898b(likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.

Most true.

On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order 898cor system or rule—will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?

It will, in very truth.

So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite.

But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.

You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias.