Plato, Laws (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose] [word count] [lemma count] [Pl. Leg.]. | ||
<<Pl. Leg. 898a | Pl. Leg. 900a (Greek) | >>Pl. Leg. 901e |
Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.
AthenianConcerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that “all things are full of gods”? note
899cCliniasThere is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.
AthenianLet us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him.
CliniasWhat conditions?
AthenianThat either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods.
899dLet us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.CliniasAnything rather than defectively, Stranger.
AthenianThen let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him we must admonish. “My good sir,” let us say, “the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil and
899eunjust men, both private and public,—which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind. Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children's children in the highest offices, 900avery likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability 900bto repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well.” 900cAnd do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream. noteCliniasA good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.
AthenianWell, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course,
900dhe was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.CliniasMost certainly he heard that.
AthenianLet us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?
CliniasWe do say so.
AthenianAnd further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?
CliniasCertainly.
900eAthenianAnd shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?
CliniasNecessarily.
AthenianAnd shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?
CliniasTo this, too, everyone would assent.
AthenianWell then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?
CliniasHow could we?
AthenianAs the opposite, then?
CliniasYes.
901aAthenianAnd the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?
CliniasOf the opposite quality.
AthenianWhat then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described note—“a man most like to sting-less drones”?
CliniasA most true description.
AthenianThat God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.
CliniasWe could not possibly allow that.
AthenianWhen a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for
Plato, Laws (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose] [word count] [lemma count] [Pl. Leg.]. | ||
<<Pl. Leg. 898a | Pl. Leg. 900a (Greek) | >>Pl. Leg. 901e |