Greek Texts & Translations

A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.

Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, 900dhe was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

Most certainly he heard that.

Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

We do say so.

And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Certainly. 900e

And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Necessarily.

And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

To this, too, everyone would assent.

Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

How could we?

As the opposite, then?

Yes. 901a

And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?

Of the opposite quality.

What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described ^note—“a man most like to sting-less drones”?

A most true description.

That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.

We could not possibly allow that.

When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for 901bsome object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

What forms?

Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, 901cor else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

Of course not.

Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small. 901dFirst, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, ^note and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?

That is what we assert. ^note

And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?

They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.