Greek Texts & Translations

Most certainly he heard that.

Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

We do say so.

And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Certainly. 900e

And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Necessarily.

And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

To this, too, everyone would assent.

Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

How could we?

As the opposite, then?

Yes. 901a

And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?

Of the opposite quality.

What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described ^note—“a man most like to sting-less drones”?

A most true description.

That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.

We could not possibly allow that.

When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for 901bsome object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

What forms?

Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, 901cor else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

Of course not.

Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small. 901dFirst, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, ^note and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?

That is what we assert. ^note

And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?

They will, of course, admit that this also is the case. 901e

And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.

Most certainly.

Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.

Very true.

None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.

You are very right. 902a

Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or—well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?

There is none.

Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, 902bowing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?

Impossible.

Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?

That is certainly probable.

We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.

Of course.

That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great