Greek Texts & Translations

It was.

Resuming, then, the subject of this synod, I will say this:—If one were to lay this down as an anchor for the whole State, possessing all the requisite conditions,—then, I affirm, it would secure the salvation of all that we desire.

How so?

Now will be the time for us to display no lack of zeal in declaring truly what follows.

Excellently spoken! Proceed as you propose. 961d

One ought to observe, Clinias, in regard to every object, in each of its operations, what constitutes its appropriate savior—as, for example, in an animal, the soul and the head are eminently such by nature.

How do you mean?

Surely it is the goodness of those parts that provides salvation to every animal.

How?

By the existence of reason in the soul, in addition to all its other qualities, and by the existence of sight and hearing, in addition to all else, in the head; thus, to summarize the matter, it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, and their union in one, that would most justly be termed the salvation of each animal.

That is certainly probable. 961e

It is probable. But what kind of reason is it which, when combined with senses, will afford salvation to ships in stormy weather and calm? On shipboard is it not the pilot and the sailors who, by combining the senses with the pilot reason, secure salvation both for themselves and for all that belongs to the ship?

Of course.

There is no need of many examples to illustrate this. Consider, for instance, what would be the right mark for a general to set up to shoot at in the case of an army, or the medical profession in the case of a human body, if they were aiming 962aat salvation. Would not the former make victory his mark, and mastery over the enemy, while that of the doctors and their assistants would be the providing of health to the body?

Certainly.

But if a doctor were ignorant of that bodily condition which we have now called “health,” or a general ignorant of victory, or any of the other matters we have mentioned, could he possibly be thought to possess reason about any of these things?

How could he?

What, now, shall we say about a State? If a man were to be plainly ignorant as regards the political mark to be aimed at, would he, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and, 962bsecondly, would he be able to secure the salvation of that object concerning the aim of which he knows nothing at all?

How could he?

So now, in our present case, if our settlement of the country is to be finally completed, there must, it would seem, exist in it some element which knows, in the first place, what that political aim, of which we are speaking, really is, and, secondly, in what manner it may attain this aim, and which of the laws, in the first instance, and secondly of men, gives it good counsel or bad. But if any State is destitute of such an element, it will not be surprising 962cif, being thus void of reason and void of sense, it acts at haphazard always in all its actions.

Very true.

In which, then, of the parts or institutions of our State have we now got anything so framed as to prove an adequate safeguard of this kind? Can we answer that question?

No, Stranger; at least, not clearly. But if I must make a guess, it seems to me that this discourse of yours is leading up to that synod which has to meet at night, as you said just now. 962d

An excellent reply, Clinias! And, as our present discourse shows, this synod must possess every virtue; and the prime virtue is not to keep shifting its aim among a number of objects, ^note but to concentrate its gaze always on one particular mark, and at that one mark to shoot, as it were, all its arrows continually.

Most certainly.

So now we shall understand that it is by no means surprising if the legal customs in States keep shifting, seeing that different parts of the codes in each State look in different directions. And, in general, it is not surprising that, with some statesmen, 962ethe aim of justice is to enable a certain class of people to rule in the State (whether they be really superior, or inferior), while with others the aim is how to acquire wealth (whether or not they be somebody's slaves); and others again direct their efforts to winning a life of freedom. Still others make two objects at once the joint aim of their legislation,—namely, the gaining of freedom for themselves, and mastery over other States; while those who are the wisest of all, in their own conceit, aim not at one only, but at the sum total of these and the like objects, since they are unable to specify any one object of preeminent value towards which they would desire all else to be directed. 963a

Then, Stranger, was not the view we stated long ago the right one? We said ^note that all our laws must always aim at one single object, which, as we agreed, is quite rightly named “virtue.”

Yes.

And we stated that virtue consists of four things.

Certainly.

And that the chief of all the four is reason, ^note at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim.

You follow us admirably, Clinias; and now follow us in what comes next. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed,