| Polybius, Histories (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose] [word count] [lemma count] [Polyb.]. | ||
| <<Polyb. 1 | Polyb. 2 (Greek) | >>Polyb. 3 |
IN the previous book I have described how the Romans,
note
having subdued all
As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion note
the Carthaginian government collected an army
and despatched it under the command of Hamilcar to
and even reckless personal gallantry. The Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him, who was at the time in command of the fleet.
It was at this same period that the Romans for the first
note
time crossed to
Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and note
possessed the most powerful force, both by
land and sea, of any of the kings who had
reigned in
The decision was come to on the day before the election of a new Strategus, and the transference of the command had,
according to the Aetolian custom, to take place. note But on that very night a hundred galleys with five thousand Illyrians on board, sailed up to land near Medion. Having dropped anchor at daybreak, they effected a disembarkation with secrecy and despatch; they then formed in the order customary in their country, and advanced in their several companies against the Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed with astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move; but they had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence, and having full reliance in their own forces were far from being dismayed. They drew up the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry in front of their lines on the level ground, and with a portion of their cavalry and their light infantry they hastened to occupy some rising ground in front of their camp, which nature had made easily defensible. A single charge, however, of the Illyrians, whose numbers and close order gave them irresistible weight, served to dislodge the light-armed troops, and forced the cavalry who were on the ground with them to retire to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the higher ground, and charging down from it upon the Aetolian troops formed up on the plain, routed them without difficulty; the Medionians at the same time making a diversion in their favour by sallying out of the town and charging the Aetolians. Thus, after killing a great number, and taking a still greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their king, conveyed their baggage and the rest of the booty to their boats, and immediately set sail for their own country.
This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians. They met in public assembly and deliberated on the whole business, and especially as to the inscribing the arms reserved for dedication. They decided, in mockery of the Aetolian decree, that the inscription should contain the name of the Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the candidates for succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems, in what happened to them, to have designed a display of her power to the rest of mankind. The very thing which these men were in momentary expectation of undergoing at the hands of their
enemies, she put it in their power to inflict upon those enemies, and all within a very brief interval. The unexpected disaster of the Aetolians, too, may teach all the world not to calculate on the future as though it were the actually existent, and not to reckon securely on what may still turn out quite otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the unexpected. And as this is true everywhere and to every man, so is it especially true in war.
When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers note the events of the expedition, King Agron was so beside himself with joy at the idea of having conquered the Aetolians, whose confidence in their own prowess had been extreme, that, giving himself over to excessive drinking and other similar indulgences, he was attacked by a pleurisy of which in a few days he died. His wife Teuta succeeded him on the throne; and managed the various details of administration by means of friends whom she could trust. But her woman's head had been turned by the success just related, and she fixed her gaze upon that, and had no eyes for anything going on outside the country. Her first measure was to grant letters of marque to privateers, authorising them to plunder all whom they fell in with; and she next collected a fleet and military force as large as the former one, and despatched them with general instructions to the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an enemy.
Their first attack was to be upon the coast of
bargain, they disembarked and took the town and everything
in it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in
collusion with them. When this news was known, the
Epirotes raised a general levy and came in haste to the
rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood of Phoenice, they
pitched their camp so as to have the river which flows
past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up
the planks of the bridge over it for security. But news
being brought them that Scerdilaidas with five thousand
Illyrians was marching overland by way of the pass near
Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the note hopes which they had cherished, the Epirotes turned to the despatch of ambassadors to the Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly begging for their assistance. Moved by pity for their misfortunes, these nations consented; and an army of relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum. Meanwhile the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having effected a junction with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this place, and, taking up a position opposite to this army of relief, wished at first to give it battle. But they were embarrassed by the unfavourable nature of the ground; and just then a despatch was received from Teuta, ordering their instant return, because certain Illyrians had revolted to the Dardani
Accordingly, after merely stopping to plunder
The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far from trying to retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude to those who had come to their relief, they sent ambassadors in conjunction with the Acarnanians to Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with the Illyrians, in virtue of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate with them and against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which proceedings showed conclusively the levity of their conduct towards men who had stood their friends, as well as an originally shortsighted policy in regard to their own interests.
That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but that they should from mere levity, and with their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the most serious disasters is without dispute the fault of the victims themselves. Therefore it is that pity and sympathy and assistance await those whose failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it.
It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the note hands of the Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses, knowing the common report as to the character of the Gauls, would not have hesitated to trust to them a city so rich, and offering so many opportunities for treason? And again, who would not have been on his guard against the bad character of this
particular body of them? For they had originally been
driven from their native country by an outburst of popular
indignation at an act of treachery done by them to their
own kinsfolk and relations. note note Then having been received
by the Carthaginians, because of the exigencies of the war
in which the latter were engaged, and being
drafted into
My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the Epirotes, is to point out that it is never wise to introduce a foreign garrison, especially of barbarians, which is too strong to be controlled.
To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial
note
they had oppressed and pillaged vessels sailing
from
neglected; but now when more and more persons approached
the Senate on this subject, they appointed two ambassadors,
Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to go to
When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a
note
larger fleet of galleys than ever against the
Greek shores, some of which sailed straight to
But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven decked ships from the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with
that people, and, putting to sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off
the islands called Paxi. note The Acarnanian and Achaean ships
fought without victory declaring for either, and
without receiving any further damage than
having some of their crew wounded. But the
Illyrians lashed their galleys four together, and, caring nothing
for any damage that might happen to them, grappled with the
enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies' prows struck
them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys
getting hitched on to their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped
upon the decks of the Achaean ships and captured them
by the superior number of their armed men. In this way
they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with
all hands, on board of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing,
who had all his life served the Achaean league with complete
integrity. The vessels engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing
the triumphant success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their
own speed, hoisted their sails to the wind and effected their
voyage home without further disaster. note The Illyrians, on the
other hand, filled with self-confidence by their success, continued their siege of the town in high spirits, and without
putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; while the
Corcyreans, reduced to despair of safety by
what had happened, after sustaining the siege
for a short time longer, made terms with the Illyrians, consenting to receive a garrison, and with it Demetrius of Pharos.
After this had been settled, the Illyrian admirals put to sea
again; and, having arrived at
In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus
note
Fulvius, started from
happened there, and to test the sincerity of the overtures that
had been made by Demetrius. note For Demetrius,
being in disgrace with Teuta, and afraid of what
she might do to him, had been sending messages
to
Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading
Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to
Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference
of the Romans in
We must now return to Hasdrubal in
and success, and had not only given in general a great impulse
to the Carthaginian interests there, but in particular had greatly strengthened them by the
fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and
This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid
breaking the thread of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time, and refer to the period at which these
tribes originally occupied their districts in
relation to the rest of
The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that note wheat is often sold at four obols a Sicilian medimnus, barley at two, or a metretes of wine for an equal measure of barley. The quantity of panic and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount of acorns grown in the oak forests scattered about the country may be gathered from the fact that, though nowhere are more
pigs slaughtered than in
Such parts of both slopes of the
itself by two mouths into the Adriatic. The larger part
of the plain is thus cut off by it, and lies between this river
and the
To continue my description. These plains were
anciently inhabited by Etruscans, note at the same
period as what are called the Phlegraean plains
round
the valley of the
In the early times of their settlement they did not merely subdue the territory which they occupied, but rendered also many of the neighbouring peoples subject to them, whom they overawed by their audacity. Some time afterwards they conquered the Romans in battle, and pursuing the flying
legions, in three days after the battle occupied
They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that note time, alarmed by a threatening movement on the part of the Transalpine tribes, and fearing that a dangerous war was imminent, they diverted the attack of the invading horde from themselves by presents and appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the Romans, joining in the expedition themselves. They directed their march through Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans; and the combined armies, after taking a great quantity of booty, got safely back from the Roman territory. But when they got
home, they quarrelled about the division of the spoil, and in
the end destroyed most of it, as well as the flower of their own
force. This is the way of the Gauls when they have appropriated their neighbours' property; and it mostly arises from
brutal drunkenness, and intemperate feeding. note
In the fourth year after this, the Samnites
and Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in the
neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number.
Incensed at this defeat, the Romans marched out a few days
afterwards, and with two Consular armies engaged the enemy in
the territory of
Seeing the expulsion of the
defeated in this engagement that they humbled themselves so
far as to send ambassadors to
These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus
crossed into
After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken
note
peace with
divided among their citizens the territory of Picenum, from
which they had ejected the
Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres
note
and Boii, joined in the despatch of messengers
to the tribes living about the
It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything else, helped the Carthaginians to consolidate their power in
The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed
note
the
were collected as no one could remember on any
former occasion. From every side assistance was eagerly
rendered; for the inhabitants of
But in order that we may learn from actual facts how
note
great the power was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack, and what a mighty
empire he faced when he succeeded in inflicting upon the Roman people the most severe disasters, I
must now state the amount of the forces they could at that
time bring into the field. The two Consuls had marched out
with four legions, each consisting of five thousand two hundred
infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there were
with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand
infantry and two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans
too, there had come to
and four thousand horse. And besides these, there were in
reserve in
There will be another opportunity of treating the
note
subject in greater detail; for the present I
must return to the Celts. Having entered
Etruria, they began their march through the
country, devastating it as they chose, and without any
opposition; and finally directed their course against
both sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the Celts eventually gave them the victory. No less than six thousand Romans fell: while the rest fled, most of whom made their way to a certain strongly fortified height, and there remained. The first impulse of the Celts was to besiege them: but they were worn out by their previous night march, and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving therefore a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they hastened to procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege the fugitives next day unless they voluntarily surrendered.
But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed
note
on the coast of the Adriatic at
advantageous to offer the enemy regular battle; but that it was better to dog their footsteps, watching for favourable times and places at which to inflict damage upon them, or wrest some of their booty from their hands.
Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed
note
from
Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at
It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness, and scarcely less so to hear described. A battle, to begin with, in which three distinct armies were engaged, must have presented a strange and unusual appearance, and must have been fought under strange and unusual conditions. Again, it must have seemed to a spectator open to question, whether the position of the Gauls were the most dangerous conceivable, from being between two attacking forces; or the most favourable, as
enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their own two divisions afforded each other a mutual support: and, above all, as putting retreat out of the question, or any hope of safety except in victory. For this is the peculiar advantage of having an army facing in two opposite directions. The Romans, on the other hand, while encouraged by having got their enemy between two of their own armies, were at the same time dismayed by the ornaments and clamour of the Celtic host. For there were among them such innumerable horns and trumpets, which were being blown simultaneously in all parts of their army, and their cries were so loud and piercing, that the noise seemed not to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but from the whole country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the appearance and rapid movement of the naked warriors in the van, which indicated men in the prime of their strength and beauty: while all the warriors in the front ranks were richly adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These sights certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a profitable victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle.
When the men who were armed with the pilum advanced in front of the legions, in accordance note with the regular method of Roman warfare, and hurled their pila in rapid and effective volleys, the inner ranks of the Celts found their jerkins and leather breeches of great service; but to the naked men in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack caused great distress and discomfiture. For the Gallic shields not being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked body the more certainty was there of the pilum hitting. And at last, not being able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were out of reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; while others gave ground step by step towards their own friends, whom they threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their panic. Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the preliminary attack of the pilum. But when the throwers of it had rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman
line charged, the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci received the attack, and maintained a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Though almost cut to pieces, they held their ground with unabated courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms. The shields and swords of the latter were proved to be manifestly superior for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only deliver a cut, but cannot trust. And when, besides the Roman horse charged down from the high ground on their flank, and attacked them vigorously, the infantry of the Celts were cut to pieces on the field, while their horse turned and fled.
Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten
note
thousand taken prisoners, among whom was one
of their kings, Concolitanus: the other king,
Aneroestes, fled with a few followers; joined
a few of his people in escaping to a place of security; and
there put an end to his own life and that of his friends.
Lucius Aemilius, the surviving Consul, collected the spoils of
the slain and sent them to
Thus was the most formidable Celtic invasion repelled, note
which had been regarded by all Italians, and especially by the
Romans, as a danger of the utmost gravity. The victory
inspired the Romans with a hope that they might be able to
entirely expel the Celts from the valley of the
rest of it, there was a season of excessive rains, and an outbreak of pestilence in the army.
The Consuls of the next year, however, Publius Furius
note
Philus and Caius Flaminius, once more invaded
the Celtic lands, marching through the territory
of the Anamares, who live not far from
except in victory; the impassable river being thus in their rear. These dispositions made, they were ready to engage.
The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon
note
skill in this battle; the Tribunes instructing
the troops how they were to conduct themselves both collectively and individually. They
had learned from former engagements that Gallic tribes
were always most formidable at the first onslaught, before their
courage was at all damped by a check; and that the swords
with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any effect,
but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade
so bent, that unless they had time to straighten them with
their foot against the ground, they could not deliver a second
blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out the spears of the
Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to the first ranks,
or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only,
after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts
full in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless
by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close
with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them
from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is
their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point.
The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their
swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus
repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they
eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due
to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is
thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements
for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink
of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic
of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their
deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the
battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground,
they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to
throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the
soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and
they returned to
Next year, upon embassies coming from the Celts,
note
desiring peace and making unlimited offers of
submission, the new Consuls, Marcus Claudius
Marcellus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus,
were urgent that no peace should be granted them. Thus
frustrated, they determined to try a last chance, and once more
took active measures to hire thirty thousand Gaesatae,—the
Gallic tribe which lives on the
them to stand and engage the enemy. The Roman soldiers
obeyed orders, and offered a vigorous resistance to the attacking party. The Celts, encouraged by their success, held their
ground for a certain time with some gallantry, but before long
turned and fled to the neighbouring mountains. Gnaeus followed
them, wasting the country as he went, and took
Such was the end of the Celtic war: which, for the
note
desperate determination and boldness of the enemy, for the
obstinacy of the battles fought, and for the number of those
who fell and of those who were engaged, is second to none
recorded in history, but which, regarded as a specimen of
scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible. The Gauls showed
no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and in
everything they did were swayed by impulse rather than by
sober calculation. As I have seen these tribes, after a short
struggle, entirely ejected from the valley of the
by the skill and ability of opponents, who conducted their
measures under the dictates of reason and sober calculation.
And as an invasion of Gauls has been a source of alarm to
Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left
note
in command of the Carthaginian forces in
At the same period the Achaean league and King
note
Philip, with their allies, were entering upon the
war with the Aetolian league, which is called the
Social war. Now this was the point at which I
proposed to begin my general history; and as I have brought
the account of the affairs of
in
Of
individual cities, there is a nearly absolute assimilation of institutions.
It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it
note
came to pass that the name of the Achaeans
became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the
That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in forming their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but for the present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in confirmation of my assertion.
And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean
clubs in Magna Grecia was followed by great constitutional
disturbances, as was natural on the sudden disappearance of
the leading men in each state; and the Greek cities in that
part of
Achaeans were the people selected by the two parties, out of all
When at length, however, the country did obtain
leaders of sufficient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic
excellence by the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement,—the union of the
I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible to my readers, will be to start from the period of the restoration of the Achaean league and federation, after its disintegration into separate states by the Macedonian kings: from which time it has enjoyed an unbroken progress towards the state of completion which now exists, and of which I have already spoken at some length.
The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this
note
occurred the first league of
the period before this the state of
But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change note
of sentiment prevailed among the Achaean
cities, and they began again to form a league.
This was just at the time of Pyrrhus's invasion of
the state of Caryneia was restored to the league.
For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia, when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of the
despot in
My object in thus going back in point of time was,
first, to show clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into
the second league, which exists at this day, and which were the
first members of the original league to do so; and, secondly,
that the continuity of the policy pursued by the Achaeans
might rest, not on my word only, but on the evidence of the
actual facts. It was in virtue of this policy,—by holding
out the bait of equality and freedom, and by invariably
making war upon and crushing those who on their own account, or with the support of the kings, enslaved any of the
states within their borders, that they finally accomplished the
design which they had deliberately adopted, in some cases by
their own unaided efforts, and in others by the help of their
allies. For in fact whatever was effected in this direction, by
the help of these allies in after times, must be put down to
the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the Achaeans
themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many
honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the
Romans: yet in no instance can they be said to have
aimed at obtaining from their success any advantage for a
particular state. In return for the zealous assistance rendered
by them to their allies, they bargained for nothing but the
freedom of each state and the union of the
For the first twenty-five years of the league between the cities I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined to appoint one strategus only, note and put the entire
management of the affairs of the union in his hands. note The
first to obtain this honour was Margos of Caryneia. In the fourth year after this man's tenure
of the office, Aratus of
Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so
short a time, Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of
leader-of the Achaean league, and in the consistent direction
of his whole policy to one single end; which was to expel
Macedonians from the
After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility, there gradually grew up a sentiment of brotherhood and affection between the two peoples. Upon
the death of Demetrius, after a reign of only ten years,
just about the time of the first invasion of
But the increased power and national advancement
note
which these events brought to the Achaeans
excited the envy of the Aetolians; who, besides
their natural inclination to unjust and selfish
aggrandisement, were inspired with the hope of
breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of
Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league,
they would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted
on all sides at once. And they would in all probability have
succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to
reckon with an opponent to their plans of ability equal to
almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted
this violent and unjust interference in
There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians.
note
They were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans
openly, because they could not ignore their
recent obligations to them in the war with
Demetrius: but they were plotting with the
Lacedaemonians; and showed their jealousy of
the Achaeans by not only conniving at the treacherous attack
of Cleomenes upon
and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it was decided
to proclaim war openly against
This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic note war. At first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory and cities themselves; and at the same time the remembrances of his former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy, note and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing clearly what would happen, and fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. note He satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour; he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend or foe from personal considerations, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy.
The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act towards the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not even commit to his own commentaries.
It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the
people of Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek
the protection of Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by
The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell note on were "the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part primarily of the Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first, because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both; and, secondly, because if the Aetolians and
Cleomenes conquered them, any man of sense could easily see
that they would not be satisfied or stop there. For the
encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being content to
be confined by the boundaries of the
These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been
put by Aratus with equal sincerity and ability: and after
listening to them, he eagerly took the first necessary step by
writing a letter to the people of
reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and
zeal in the cause, the spirits of the people of
had tried all their own resources to the uttermost." This speech was received with general applause: and it was decided to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided.
But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league's
note
friendship, began to furnish Cleomenes with
supplies,—which he did with a view of setting
him up as a foil to Antigonus, thinking the
Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes than
the Achaeans of being able to thwart the policy of the Macedonian kings.; and when the Achaeans themselves had suffered
three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement with Cleomenes whom they had met on a march; and again in a pitched
battle at Ladocaea in the territory of
Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by
note
his successes, Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities, winning
some by persuasion and others by threats. In
this way he got possession of Caphyae,
Aratus, as Strategus of the league, and the Achaeans to
evacuate the town, and by sending messages to Cleomenes
inviting his presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action
and a reasonable pretext for moving. Aratus was quick to
take advantage of this; and, as the Achaeans were in actual
possession of the Acrocorinthus, he made his peace with the
royal family of
Upon learning of this compact between the league and note
Antigonus, Cleomenes raised the siege of
Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face
to face: the former desirous of effecting an entrance into the
Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters, note
did not abandon their purpose or give up all
hopes of retrieving their fortunes. They gave
Aristotle of
On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty
note
into the
future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied
army, and went into winter quarters at
At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got note
on the march. On the third day he arrived at
But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the
Macedonians in the army of Antigonus had been sent home;
and that the king and his mercenaries in Aegium were three
days' march from
and Ladoceia. There happened to be residing in
For the history of the same period, with which we are note now engaged, there are two authorities, Aratus and Phylarchus, note whose opinions are opposed in many points and their statements contradictory. I think, therefore, it will be advantageous, or rather necessary, since I follow Aratus in my account of the Cleomenic war, to go into the question; and not by any neglect on my part to suffer mis-statements in historical
writings to enjoy an authority equal to that of truth. The fact is
that the latter of these two writers has, throughout the whole of his
history, made statements at random and without discrimination.
It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other
points on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account
concerning them; but such of his statements as relate to the
period which I have now in hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these
I must thoroughly sift. They will be quite sufficient to enable
us to form a judgment on the general spirit and ability with
which he approaches historical writing. note It was his object to
bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, as well as that of Aratus and the
Achaeans; and he accordingly asserts that, when
is to create illusion; but in the latter the thing of primary importance is truth, because the object is to benefit the learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus, in most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the causes which gave rise to them, or the course of events which led up to them: and without knowing these, it is impossible to feel the due indignation or pity at anything which occurs. For instance, everybody looks upon it as an outrage that the free should be struck: still, if a man provokes it by an act of violence, he is considered to have got no more than he deserved; and, where it is done for correction and discipline, those who strike free men are deemed worthy of honour and gratitude. Again, the killing of a fellow-citizen is regarded as a heinous crime, deserving the severest penalties: and yet it is notorious that the man who kills a thief, or his wife's paramour, is held guiltless; while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country receives honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their causes and the views of the actors, according as these differ.
Now the people of
they had a little while before been engaged in a war, in which they had seen many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small number grievously wounded, they now received into their houses, and entertained as their guests, interchanging every imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so. For I believe that there never were men who met with more kindly foes, or came out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters more scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing to the humanity of Aratus and the Achaeans towards them.
But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine
disorders, and the hostile designs of the Aetolians and
Lacedaemonians; they subsequently, therefore, sent envoys
to the league asking for a guard for their town. The request
was granted: and three hundred of the league army were
selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the lot fell
started for
with its enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly
served by being sold into slavery, with their wives and children,
as soon as they were beaten in war; it may be answered that
this much is only what, by the laws of warfare, awaits even
those who have been guilty of no special act of impiety. They
deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even more
complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what
Phylarchus mentions did happen to them, there was no reason
for the pity of
Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the
his treason to his own country deserved the heaviest possible
punishment. And in order, forsooth, to enhance this man's
reputation, and move his reader's sympathies for his sufferings,
our historian remarks that he had not only been a tyrant
himself, but that his fathers had been so before him. It would
not be easy to bring a graver or more bitter charge against a
man than this: for the mere word "tyrant" involves the idea
of everything that is wickedest, and includes every injustice
and crime possible to mankind. And if Aristomachus endured
the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says, he yet would
not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one day,
in which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into
But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace, without experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse Antigonus or Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a tyrant whom they had captured in war: to have killed and wreaked vengeance on whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and honour to the doers from all right-minded persons.
But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of
treachery to the league, what shall we say that he deserved?
The facts of the case are these. He abdicated his sovereignty
of
admitted him as a member of the league, and invested him
with the highest office in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and
Strategus. note All these favours he immediately forgot,
as soon as his hopes were a little raised by the Cleomenic war;
and at a crisis of the utmost importance he withdrew his
native city, as well as his own personal adhesion, from the
league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act
of treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover
of night at Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus
says: he ought to have been taken from city to city in the
There is another illustration of this writer's manner
note
to be found in his treatment of the cases of
be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the bearers
of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so
appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and
honourable mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And yet he had an opportunity ready to his
hand. For if we view with approval the conduct of a people
who merely by their declarations and votes support a war in
behalf of friends and allies; while to those who go so far as to
endure the devastation of their territory, and a siege of their
town, we give not only praise but active gratitude: what
must be our estimate of the people of
He does, however, state in the course of his narrative
that, from the spoils of
even at this period, if you could collect all the movable property of the whole
But a more astonishing mis-statement remains to be remarked. In the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts "that about ten days note before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible, before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope to provide the soldiers' pay from his own resources." But if he had at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would have been better supplied
than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but I think for my present purpose enough has been said.
Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and
Achaean soldiers having assembled from their winter quarters,
Antigonus moved his army, along with his
allies, into
Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the note
passes into the country by posting garrisons,
digging trenches, and felling trees; while he
took up position at a place called
The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not
to make an immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard
an engagement. He pitched his camp a short distance from it,
covering his front by the stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing himself by reconnaisances of
the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the troops,
and at the same time endeavouring by feigned movements to
elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an
unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely on
the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment's notice
to be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up
all thoughts of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring
the matter to the decision of battle. And, indeed, Fortune
had there brought into competition two commanders equally
endowed by nature with military skill. To face the division
of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian
hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in
alternate lines, under the command of Alexander, son of
Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind
them he placed the Acarnanians and Cretans, and behind
them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a reserve.
His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were posted
opposite the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Alexander, and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the
same number of Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries and Macedonian troops in
person against the division on
The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the
officers to their men to do their duty, and in a moment they
started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill. note But the light-armed troops who were
stationed with Cleomenes's cavalry, observing
that the Achaean lines were not covered by any other troops
behind them, charged them on the rear; and thus reduced the
division while endeavouring to carry the hill of Evas to a state of
great peril,—being met as they were on their front by Eucleidas
from the top of the hill, and being charged
and vigorously attacked by the light-armed
mercenaries on their rear. note It was at this point
that Philopoemen of
It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that
opinion, for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, with the view of convicting him of his
shortcoming, "Why he had engaged before the signal was
given?" And upon Alexander answering that "He had not
done so, but that a young officer from
What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy's
lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse. note For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.
Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also being brought to a decision; in which all the
Achaean cavalry, and especially Philopoemen, fought with
conspicuous gallantry, for to them it was a contest for freedom.
Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under him, and while
fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound through
both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings
on the other hill
But when Cleomenes saw that his brother's division
was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were
on the point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of
an attack at all points at once, he was compelled to demolish
the palisade in his front, and to lead out his whole force in
line by one side of his position. A recall was sounded on
the bugle for the light-armed troops of both sides, who were
on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes
shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged
each other. Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians
sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior
courage of the soldiers of
Having surprised and taken
As it was, Antigonus after going to
haste to reach
My reason for writing about this war at such length,
was the advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general
purpose of my history, of making clear the relations existing
between
Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, note
Ptolemy Philopator succeeded to the throne of
I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the
introduction and laid the foundation on which my history
must rest. I have shown when, how, and why the Romans,
after becoming supreme in
| Polybius, Histories (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose] [word count] [lemma count] [Polyb.]. | ||
| <<Polyb. 1 | Polyb. 2 (Greek) | >>Polyb. 3 |
