Greek Texts & Translations

THE year of office as Strategus of the younger Aratus had ^note now come to an end with the rising of the Pleiades; for that was the arrangement of time then observed by the Achaeans. ^note Accordingly he laid down his office and was succeeded in the command of the Achaeans by Eperatus; Dorimachus being still Strategus of the Aetolians.

It was at the beginning of this summer that Hannibal entered upon open war with Rome; started from New Carthage; and crossing the Iber, definitely began his expedition and march into Italy; while the Romans despatched Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with an army, and Publius Cornelius to Iberia.

This year, too, Antiochus and Ptolemy, abandoning diplomacy, and the support of their mutual claims upon Coele-Syria by negotiation, began actual war with each other.

As for Philip, being in need of corn and money for his ^note army, he summoned the Achaeans to a general assembly by means of their magistrates. When the assembly had met, according to the federal law, at Aegium, ^note the king saw that Aratus and his son were indisposed to act for him, because of the intrigues against them in the matter of the election, which had been carried on by Apelles; and that Eperatus was naturally inefficient, and an object of general contempt. These

facts convinced the king of the folly of Apelles and Leontius, and he once more decided to stand by Aratus. He therefore persuaded the magistrates to transfer the assembly to Sicyon; and there inviting both the elder and younger Aratus to an interview, he laid the blame of all that had happened upon Apelles, and urged them to maintain their original policy. Receiving a ready consent from them, he then entered the Achaean assembly, and being energetically supported by these two statesmen, carried all the measures that he desired. For the Achaeans past ^note a vote decreeing "that five hundred talents should be paid to the king at once for his last campaign; that three months' pay should be given to his army, and ten thousand medimni of corn: and that, for the future, so long as the king should remain in the Peloponnese as their ally in the war, he should receive seventeen talents a month from the Achaeans.

Having passed this decree, the Achaeans dispersed to ^note their various cities. And now the king's forces mustered again from their winter quarters; and after deliberations with his friends, Philip decided to transfer the war to the sea. For he had become convinced that it was only by so doing that he would himself be able to surprise the enemy at all points at once, and would best deprive them of the opportunity of coming to each others' relief; as they were widely scattered, and each would be in alarm for their own safety, because the approach of an enemy by sea is so silent and rapid. For he was at war with three separate nations,—Aetolians, Lacedaemonians, and Eleans.

Having arrived at this decision, he ordered the ships of the Achaeans as well as his own to muster at Lechaeum; and there he made continual experiments in practising the soldiers of the phalanx to the use of the oar. The Macedonians answered to his instructions with ready enthusiasm; for they are in fact the most gallant soldiers on the field of battle, the promptest to undertake service at sea if need be, and the most laborious workers at digging trenches, making palisades, and all such engineering work, in the world: just such as Hesiod describes the Aeacidae to be "Joying in war as in a feast."
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The king, then, and the main body of the Macedonian army, remained in Corinth, busied with these practisings and preparations for taking the sea. ^note But Apelles, being neither able to retain an ascendency over Philip, nor to submit to the loss of influence which resulted from this disregard, entered into a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas, by which it was agreed that these two men should stay on the spot and damage the king's service by deliberate neglect; while he went to Chalcis, and contrived that no supplies should be brought the king from thence for the promotion of his designs. Having made this arrangement and mischievous stipulation with these two men, Apelles set out for Chalcis, having found some false pretexts to satisfy the king as to his departure. And while protracting his stay there, he carried out his sworn agreement with such determination, that, as all men obeyed him because of this former credit, the king was at last reduced by want of money to pawn some of the silverplate used at his own table, to carry on his affairs. ^note However, when the ships were all collected, and the Macedonian soldiers already well trained to the oar; the king, giving out rations of corn and pay to the army, put to sea, and arrived at Patrae on the second day, with six thousand Macedonians and twelve hundred mercenaries.

Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus Dorimachus sent Agelaus and Scopas with five hundred Neo-Cretans ^note into Elis; while the Eleans, in fear of Philip's attempting the siege of Cyllene, were collecting mercenaries, preparing their own citizens, and carefully strengthening the defences of Cyllene. When Philip saw what was going on, he stationed a force at Dyme, consisting of the Achaean-mercenaries, some of the Cretans serving with him, and some of the Gallic horse, together with two thousand picked Achaean infantry. These he left there as a reserve, as well as an advance guard to prevent the danger of an attack from Elis; while he himself, having first written to the Acarnanians and Scerdilaidas, that each of

their towns should man such vessels as they had and meet him at Cephallenia, put to sea from Patrae at the time arranged, and arrived off Pronni in Cephallenia. But when he saw that this fortress was difficult to besiege, and its position a contracted one, he coasted past it with his fleet and came to anchor at Palus. ^note Finding that the country there was full of corn and capable of supporting an army, he disembarked his troops and encamped close to the city: and having beached his ships close together, secured them with a trench and palisade, and sent out his Macedonian soldiers to forage. He himself made a personal inspection of the town, to see how he could bring his siege-works and artillery to bear upon the wall. He wished to be able to use the place as a rendezvous for his allies; but he was also desirous of taking it: first, because he would thereby deprive the Aetolians of their most useful support,—for it was by means of Cephallenian ships that they made their descents upon the Peloponnese, and ravaged the sea-boards of Epirus and Acarnania,—and, secondly, that he might secure for himself and his allies a convenient base of operations against the enemy's territory. For Cephallenia lies exactly opposite the Corinthian Gulf, in the direction of the Sicilian Sea, and commands the northwestern district of the Peloponnese, and especially Elis; as well as the south-western parts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania.

The excellent position, therefore, of the island, both as a rendezvous for the allies and as a base of attack against the hostile, or of defence for the friendly, territory, made the king very anxious to get it into his power. His survey of the town showed him that it was entirely defended by the sea and steep hills, except for a short distance in the direction of Zacynthus, where the ground was flat; and he accordingly resolved to erect his works and concentrate his attack at that spot.

While the king was engaged in these operations fifty galleys ^note arrived from Scerdilaidas, who had been prevented from sending more by the plots and civil broils throughout Illyria, caused by the despots of the various cities. There arrived also the appointed contingents of allies from Epirus, Acarnania, and even Messenia; for the Messenians had ceased to excuse themselves

from taking part in the war ever since the capture of Phigalia.

Having now made his arrangements for the siege, and ^note having got his catapults and ballistae in position to annoy the defenders on the walls, the king harangued his Macedonian troops, and, bringing his siege-machines up to the walls, began under their protection to sink mines. The Macedonians worked with such enthusiastic eagerness that in a short time two hundred feet of the wall were undermined and underpinned: and the king then approached the walls and invited the citizens to come to terms. Upon their refusal, he set fire to the props, and thus brought down the whole part of the wall that rested upon them simultaneously. Into this breach he first sent his peltasts under the command of Leontius, divided into cohorts, and with orders to force their way over the ruin. But Leontius, in fulfilment of his compact with Apelles, three times running prevented the soldiers, even after they had carried the breach, from effecting the capture of the town. He had corrupted beforehand the most important officers of the several cohorts; and he himself deliberately affected fear, and shrunk from every service of danger; and finally they were ejected from the town with considerable loss, although they could have mastered the enemy with ease. When the king saw that the officers were behaving with cowardice, and that a considerable number of the Macedonian soldiers were wounded, he abandoned the siege, and deliberated with his friends on the next step to be taken.

Meanwhile Lycurgus had invaded Messenia; and Dorimachus had started for Thessaly with half the ^note Aetolian army,—both with the idea that they would thus draw off Philip from the siege of Palus. Presently ambassadors arrived at the court to make representations on these subjects from Acarnania and Messenia: the former urging Philip to prevent Dorimachus's invasion of Macedonia by himself invading Aetolia, and traversing and plundering the whole country while there was no one to resist him; the latter begged him to come to their assistance, representing that in the

existing state of the Etesian winds the passage from Cephallenia to Messenia could be effected in a single day, whereby, so Gorgus of Messenia and his colleagues argued, a sudden and effective attack would be made upon Lycurgus. In pursuance of his policy Leontius eagerly supported Gorgus, seeing that by this means Philip would absolutely waste the summer. For it was easy enough to sail to Messenia; but to sail back again, while the Etesian winds prevailed, was impossible. It was plain therefore that Philip would get shut up in Messenia with his army, and remain inactive for what remained of the summer; while the Aetolians would traverse Thessaly and Epirus and plunder them at their pleasure. Such was the insidious nature of the advice given by Gorgus and Leontius. But Aratus, who was present, advocated an exactly opposite policy, urging the king to sail to Aetolia and devote himself to that part of the campaign: for as the Aetolians had gone on an expedition across the frontier under Dorimachus, it was a most excellent opportunity for invading and plundering Aetolia. ^note The king had begun to entertain distrust of Leontius since his exhibition of cowardice in the siege; and had detected his dishonesty in the course of the discussions held about Palus: he therefore decided to act in the present instance in accordance with the opinion of Aratus. Accordingly he wrote to the Achaean Strategus Eperatus, bidding him take the Achaean levies, and go to the aid of the Messenians; while he himself put to sea from Cephallenia, and arrived at night after a two days' voyage at Leucas: and having managed by proper contrivances to get his ships through the channel or Dioryctus, ^note he sailed up the Ambracian Gulf, which, as I have already stated, ^note stretches from the Sicilian Sea a long distance into the interior of Aetolia. Having made the whole length of this gulf, and anchored a short time before daybreak at Limnaea, he ordered his men to get their breakfast, and leaving the greater part of their baggage behind them, to make themselves ready in light equipment for a march; while he

himself collected the guides, and made careful inquiries of them about the country and neighbouring towns.

Before they started, Aristophanes the Acarnanian ^note Strategus arrived with the full levy of his people. For having in former times suffered many severe injuries at the hands of the Aetolians, they were now inspired with a fierce determination to be revenged upon them and damage them in every possible way: they gladly therefore seized this opportunity of getting the help of the Macedonians; and the men who now appeared in arms were not confined to those forced by law to serve, but were in some cases past the military age. The Epirotes were quite as eager to join, and for the same motives; but owing to the wide extent of their country, and the suddenness of the Macedonian arrival, they had not been able to muster their forces in time. As to the Aetolians, Dorimachus had taken half their army with him, as I have said, while the the other half he had left at home; thinking that it would be an adequate reserve to defend the towns and district against unforeseen contingencies. The king, leaving a sufficient guard for his baggage, started from Limnaea in the evening, and after a march of sixty stades pitched his camp: but, having dined and given his men a short rest, he started again; and marching right through the night, arrived just as the day was breaking at the river Achelous, between the towns of Stratus and Conope, being anxious that his entrance into the district of Thermus should be sudden and unexpected.

Leontius saw that it was likely that the king would attain ^note his object, and the Aetolians be unable to resist him, for the double reason of the speed and unexpectedness of the Macedonian attack, and of his having gone to Thermus; for the Aetolians would never suppose him likely to venture to expose himself so rashly, seeing the strongly fortified nature of the country, and would therefore be sure to be caught off their guard and wholly unprepared for the danger. Clinging still to his purpose, therefore, he advised the king to encamp on the Achelous, and rest his army after their night's march; being anxious to give the Aetolians a short respite to make preparations

for their defence. But Aratus, seeing clearly that the opportunity for action was fleeting, and that Leontius was plainly trying to hinder their success, conjured Philip not to let slip the opportunity by delaying.

The king was now thoroughly annoyed with Leontius: and ^note accepting the advice of Aratus, continued his march without interruption; and, after crossing the Achelous, advanced rapidly upon Thermus, plundering and devastating the country as he went, and marching so as to keep Stratus, Agrinium, and Thestia on his left, Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phytaeum on his right. Arrived at the town of Metapa, which is on the borders of the Trichonian Lake, and close to the narrow pass along it, about sixty stades from Thermus, he found it abandoned by the Aetolians, and occupied it with a detachment of five hundred men, with a view of its serving as a fortress to secure both ends of the pass: for the whole shore of the lake is mountainous and rugged, closely fringed with forest, and therefore affording but a narrow and difficult path. He now arranged his order of march, putting the mercenaries in the van, next them the Illyrians, and then the peltasts and the men of the phalanx, and thus advanced through the pass; his rear protected by the Cretans: while the Thracians and light-armed troops took a different line of country, parallel to his own, and kept up with him on his right: his left being secured by the lake for nearly thirty stades.

At the end of this distance he arrived at the village of Pamphia; and having, as in the case of Panapa, secured it by a guard, he continued his advance towards Thermus: the road now being not only steep and exceedingly rough, but with deep precipices also on either side, so as to make the path in places very dangerous and narrow; and the whole ascent being nearly thirty stades. But having accomplished this also in a short time, thanks to the energy with which the Macedonians conducted the march, he arrived late in the day at Thermus. ^note There he pitched a camp, and allowed his men to go off plundering the neighbouring villages and scouring the plain of Thermus, as well as to sack the dwelling-houses in Thermus itself,

which were full, not only of corn and such like provisions, but of all the most valuable property which the Aetolians possessed. For as the annual fair and most famous games, as well as the elections, were held there, everybody kept their most costly possessions in store at Thermus, to enable them to entertain their friends, and to celebrate the festivals with proper magnificence. But besides this occasion for the employment of their property, they expected to find the most complete security for it there, because no enemy had ever yet ventured to penetrate to that place; while its natural strength was so great as to serve as an acropolis to the whole of Aetolia. The place therefore having been in the enjoyment of peace from time immemorial, not only were the buildings immediately round the temple filled with a great variety of property, but the homesteads on the outskirts also. For that night the army bivouacked on the spot laden with booty of every description; but the next morning they selected the most valuable and portable part of it, and making the rest into a heap in front of their tents, set fire to it. So also in regard to the dedicated arms which were hanging up in the porticoes,—those of them which were valuable they took down and carried off, some they exchanged for their own, while the rest they collected together and burnt. The number of these was more than fifteen thousand.

Up to this point everything was right and fair by the ^note laws of war; but I do not know how to characterise their next proceedings. For remembering what the Aetolians had done at Dium ^note and Dodona, ^note they burnt the colonnades, and destroyed what were left of the dedicated offerings, some of which were of costly material, and had been elaborated with great skill and expense. And they were not content with destroying the roofs of these buildings with fire, they levelled them to their foundations; and threw down all the statues, which numbered no less than two thousand; and many of them they broke to pieces, sparing only those that were inscribed with the names or figures of gods. Such they did abstain from injuring. On the walls also they wrote the celebrated line composed

by Samus, the son of Chrysogonus, a foster-brother of the king, whose genius was then beginning to manifest itself. The line was this— "Seest thou the path the bolt divine has sped?"
And in fact the king and his staff were fully convinced that, in thus acting, they were obeying the dictates of right and justice, by retaliating upon the Aetolians with the same impious outrages as they had themselves committed at Dium. ^note But I am clearly of an opposite opinion. And the readiest argument, to prove the correctness of my view, may be drawn from the history of this same royal family of Macedonia.

For when Antigonus, by his victory in a pitched battle over Cleomenes the King of the Lacedaemonians, had become master of Sparta, and had it absolutely in his own power to treat the town and its citizens as he chose, he was so far from doing any injury to those who had thus fallen into his hands, that he did not return to his own country until he had bestowed upon the Lacedaemonians, collectively and individually, some benefits of the utmost importance. The consequence was that he was honoured at the time with the title of "Benefactor," and after his death with that of "Preserver"; and not only among the Lacedaemonians, but among the Greeks generally, has obtained undying honour and glory. ^note

Take again the case of Philip, the founder of the ^note family splendour, and the first of the race to establish the greatness of the kingdom. The success which he obtained, after his victory over the Athenians at Chaeronea, was not due so much to his superiority in arms, as to his justice and humanity. His victory in the field gave him the mastery only over those immediately engaged against him; while his equity and moderation secured his hold upon the entire Athenian people and their city. For he did not allow his measures to be dictated by vindictive passion; but laid aside his arms and warlike

measures, as soon as he found himself in a position to display the mildness of his temper and the uprightness of his motives. With this view he dismissed his Athenian prisoners without ransom, and took measures for the burial of those who had fallen, and, by the agency of Antipater, caused their bones to be conveyed home; and presented most of those whom he released with suits of clothes. And thus, at small expense, his prudence gained him a most important advantage. The pride of the Athenians was not proof against such magnanimity; and they became his zealous supporters, instead of antagonists, in all his schemes.

Again in the case of Alexander the Great. He was so ^note enraged with the Thebans that he sold all the inhabitants of the town into slavery, and levelled the city itself with the ground; yet in making its capture he was careful not to outrage religion, and took the utmost precautions against even involuntary damage being done to the temples, or any part of their sacred enclosures. Once more, when he crossed into Asia, to avenge on the Persians the impious outrages which they had inflicted on the Greeks, he did his best to exact the full penalty from men, but refrained from injuring places dedicated to the gods; though it was in precisely such that the injuries of the Persians in Greece had been most conspicuous. These were the precedents which Philip should have called to mind on this occasion; and so have shown himself the successor and heir of these men,—not so much of their power, as of their principles and magnanimity. ^note But throughout his life he was exceedingly anxious to establish his relationship to Alexander and Philip, and yet took not the least pains to imitate them. The result was that, as he advanced in years, as his conduct differed from theirs, so his general reputation came to be different also.

The present affair was an instance of this. He imagined that he was doing nothing wrong in giving the rein to his anger, and retaliating upon the impious acts of the Aetolians by similar impieties, and "curing ill by ill"; and while he was always reproaching Scopas and Dorimachus with

depravity and abandoned wickedness, on the grounds of their acts of impiety at Dodona and Dium, he imagined that, while emulating their crimes, he would leave quite a different impression of his character in the minds of those to whom he spoke. But the fact is, that whereas the taking and demolishing an enemy's forts, harbours, cities, men, ships and crops, and other such things, by which our enemy is weakened, and our own interests and tactics supported, are necessary acts according to the laws and rights of war; to deface temples, statues, and such like erections in pure wantonness, and without any prospect of strengthening oneself or weakening the enemy, must be regarded as an act of blind passion and insanity. For the purpose with which good men wage war is not the destruction and annihilation of the wrongdoers, but the reformation and alteration of the wrongful acts. Nor is it their object to involve the innocent in the destruction of the guilty, but rather to see that those who are held to be guilty should share in the preservation and elevation of the guiltless. It is the act of a tyrant to inflict injury, and so to maintain his power over unwilling subjects by terror,—hated, and hating those under him: but it is the glory of a king to secure, by doing good to all, that he should rule over willing subjects, whose love he has earned by humanity and beneficence.

But the best way of appreciating the gravity of Philip's ^note mistake is to put before our eyes the idea which the Aetolians would probably have conceived of him, had he acted in an opposite way, and destroyed neither colonnades nor statutes, nor done injury to any of the sacred offerings. For my part I think it would have been one of the greatest goodness and humanity. For they would have had on their consciences their own acts at Dium and Dodona; and would have seen unmistakably that, whereas Philip was absolutely master of the situation, and could do what he chose, and would have been held fully justified as far as their deserts went in taking the severest measures, yet deliberately, from mere gentleness and magnanimity, he refused to copy their conduct in any respect.

Clearly these considerations would most probably have led them to condemn themselves, and to view Philip

with respect and admiration for his kingly and high minded qualities, shown by his respect for religion and by the moderation of his anger against themselves. For in truth to conquer one's enemies in integrity and equity is not of less, but of greater, practical advantage than victories in the field. In the one case the defeated party yields under compulsion; in the other with cheerful assent. In the one case the victor effects his reformation at the cost of great losses; in the other he recalls the erring to better courses without any damage to himself. But above all, in the one case the chief credit of the victory belongs to the soldiers, in the other it falls wholly and solely to the part of the leaders.

Perhaps, however, one ought not to lay all the blame for ^note what was done on that occasion on Philip, taking his age into consideration; but chiefly on his friends, who were in attendance upon him and co-operating with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos. In regard to them it would not be difficult to assert, even without being there, from which of the two a counsel of this sort proceeded. For apart from the general principles animating the whole course of his life, in which nothing savouring of rashness and want of judgment can be alleged of Aratus, while the exact contrary may be said of Demetrius, we have an undisputed instance of the principles actuating both the one and the other in analogous circumstances, on which I shall speak in its proper place.

To return then to Philip. Taking with him as much ^note booty living and dead as he could, he started from Thermus, returning by the same road as that by which he had come; putting the booty and heavy-armed infantry in the van, and reserving the Acarnanians and mercenaries to bring up the rear. He was in great haste to get through the difficult passes, because he expected that the Aetolians, relying on the security of their strongholds, would harass his rear. And this in fact promptly took place: for a body of Aetolians, that had collected to the number of nearly three thousand for the defence of the country, under the command of Alexander of Trichonium,

hovered about, concealing themselves in certain secret hiding-places, and not venturing to approach as long as Philip was on the high ground; but as soon as he got his rear-guard in motion they promptly threw themselves into Thermus and began harassing the hindermost of the enemy's column. The rear being thus thrown into confusion, the attacks and charges of the Aetolians became more and more furious, encouraged by the nature of the ground. But Philip had foreseen this danger, and had provided for it, by stationing his Illyrians and his best peltasts under cover of a certain hill on the descent. These men suddenly fell upon the advanced bodies of the enemy as they were charging; whereupon the rest of the Aetolian army fled in headlong haste over a wild and trackless country, with a loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and about the same number taken prisoners. ^note This success relieved his rear; which, after burning Pamphium, accomplished the passage of the narrow gorge with rapidity and safety, and effected a junction with the Macedonians near Matape, at which place Philip had pitched a camp and was waiting for his rear-guard to come up. ^note Next day, after levelling Metape to the ground, he advanced to the city called Acrae; next day to Conope, ravaging the country as he passed, and there encamped for the night. ^note On the next he marched along the Achelous as far as Stratus; there he crossed the river, and, having halted his men out of range, endeavoured to tempt the garrison outside the walls; for he had been informed that two thousand Aetolian infantry and about four hundred horse, with five hundred Cretans, had collected into Stratus. But when no one ventured out, he renewed his march, and ordered his van to advance towards Limnaea and the ships.

But no sooner had his rear passed the town than, ^note first, a small body of Aetolian cavalry sallied out and began harassing the hindmost men; and then, the whole of the Cretans and some Aetolian troops having joined their cavalry, the conflict became more severe, and the rear of Philip's army were forced to face about and engage the enemy. At first the conflict was undecided; but on Philip's mercenaries being

supported by the arrival of the Illyrians, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries gave way and fled in disorder. ^note The royal troops pursued most of them to the entrance of the gates, or up to the walls, and killed about a hundred of them. After this skirmish the garrison remained inactive, and the rear of the royal army reached the camp and the ships in safety.

Philip pitched his camp early in the day, and proceeded to make a thank offering to the gods for the successful issue of his undertaking; and to invite the officers to a banquet, at which it was his intention to entertain them all. His view was that he had ventured upon a dangerous country, and such as no one had ever ventured to enter with an army before; while he had not only entered it with an army, but had returned in safety, after accomplishing all that he had intended. But while he was thus intent on entertaining his officers in great elation of mind, Megaleas and Leontius were nursing feelings of great annoyance at the success of the king. They had arranged with Apelles to hamper all his plans, but had been unable to do so; and now saw everything turning out exactly contrary to their views.

Still they came to the banquet, where they from the first ^note excited the suspicions of the king and the rest of the company, by showing less joy at the events than the others present. But as the drinking went on, and grew less and less moderate, being forced to do just as the others did, they soon showed themselves in their true colours. ^note For as soon as the company broke up, losing control over themselves under the influence of wine, they roamed about looking for Aratus; and having fallen in with him on his way home, they first attacked him with abusive language, and then threw stones at him; and a number of people coming to the assistance of both parties, there was a noise and disturbance in the camp. But the king hearing the noise sent some officers to ascertain the cause, and to put an end to the disturbance. On their coming upon the scene, Aratus stated what had occurred, called those present to witness the truth of his words, and retired to his

own tent; but Leontius by some unexplained means slipped away in the crowd. ^note When informed of what had taken place, the king sent for Megaleas and Crinon and rebuked them sharply: and when they not only expressed no submission, but actually retorted with a declaration that they would never desist until they had paid Aratus out, the king, enraged at their words, at once required them to give security for the payment of a fine of twenty talents, and ordered them to be placed under arrest.

Next morning, too, he sent for Aratus and bade him ^note have no fears, for that he would see that the business was properly settled. When Leontius learned what had happened to Megaleas, he came to the king's tent with some peltasts, believing that, owing to his youth, he should overawe the king, and quickly induce him to repent of his purpose. Coming into the royal presence he demanded who had ventured to lay hands on Megaleas, and lead him to confinement? But when the king answered with firmness that he had given the order, Leontius was dismayed; and, with an exclamation of indignant sorrow, departed in high wrath. Immediately after getting the fleet across the gulf, and anchoring at Leucas, the king first gave orders to the officers appointed to distribute the spoils to carry out that business with all despatch; and then summoned his friends to council, and tried the case of Megaleas. In his speech as accuser Aratus went over the crimes of Leontius and his party from beginning to end; detailed the massacre in Argos perpetrated by them after the departure of Antigonus; their arrangement made with Apelles; and finally their contrivance to prevent success at Palus. Of all these accusations he gave distinct proof, and brought forward witnesses: and Megaleas and Crinon being entirely unable to refute any of them, were unanimously condemned by the king's friends. Crinon remained under arrest, but Leontius went bail for the payment of the Megaleas's fine. Thus the intrigue of Apelles and Leontius turned out quite contrary to their original hopes: for they had expected, by terrifying Aratus and isolating Philip, to do whatever seemed to suit their interests; whereas the result had been exactly the reverse.

About the same time Lycurgus returned from Messenia ^note without having accomplished anything of importance. Afterwards he started again and seized Tegea. The inhabitants having retreated into the citadel, he determined to besiege it; but finding himself unable to make any impression upon it he returned once more to Sparta.

The Eleans after over-running Dymaea, gained an easy ^note victory over some cavalry that had come out to resist them, by decoying them into an ambush. They killed a considerable number of the Gallic mercenaries, and among the natives whom they took prisoners were Polymedes of Aegium, and Agesipolis, and Diocles of Dyme.

Dorimachus had made his expedition originally, as I have ^note already mentioned, under the conviction that he would be able to devastate Thessaly without danger to himself, and would force Philip to raise the siege of Palus. But when he found Chrysogonus and Petraeus ready in Thessaly to engage him, he did not venture to descend into the plain, but kept close upon the skirts of the mountains; and when news reached him of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia, he abandoned his attempt upon Thessaly, and hurried home to resist the invaders, whom he found however already departed from Aetolia: and so was too late for the campaign at all points.

Meanwhile the king set sail from Leucas; and after ravaging ^note the territory of Oeanthe as he coasted along, arrived with his whole fleet at Corinth, and dropping anchor in the harbour of Lechaeum, disembarked his troops, and sent his letter-bearers to the allied cities in the Peloponnese, naming a day on which he wished all to be at Tegea by bed-time.

Then, without making any stay in Corinth, he gave the ^note Macedonians marching orders; and came at the end of a two days' march by way of Argos to Tegea. There he took on the Achaean troops that had assembled, and advanced by the mountain road, being very desirous to effect an entrance into the territory of the

Lacedaemonians before they became aware of it. ^note Thus after a circuitous route through an uninhabited district he came out upon the hills facing the town, and continued his advance right upon Amyclae, keeping the Menelaïum on his right. The Lacedaemonians were dismayed and terrified at seeing from the town the army passing along the hills, and wondered what was happening. For they were still in a state of excitement at the news of Philip which had arrived,—his destruction of Thermus, and his whole campaign in Aetolia; and there was even some talk among them of sending Lycurgus to the assistance of the Aetolians. ^note But no one had so much as thought of danger coming so quickly to their own gates from such a distance, especially as the youth of the king still gave room for a certain feeling of contempt. The event therefore being totally contrary to their expectations, they were naturally in a state of great dismay. For the courage and energy beyond his years, with which Philip acted, reduced all his enemies to a state of the utmost difficulty and terror. For setting out, as I have shown, from the centre of Aetolia, and crossing the Ambracian gulf by night, he passed over to Leucas; and after a two days' halt there, on the third he renewed his voyage before daybreak, and after a two days' sail, during which he ravaged the sea-board of the Aetolians, he dropped anchor in Lechaeum; thence, after seven days' continuous march, he arrived on the heights above Sparta in the neighbourhood of the Menelaïum,—a feat which most of those even who saw it done could scarcely believe.

While the Lacedaemonians were thus thoroughly terrified at the unexpected danger, and at a loss what to do to meet it, Philip encamped on the first day at Amyclae: a place in Laconia about twenty stades from Lacedaemon, exceedingly rich in forest and corn, and containing a temple of Apollo, which is about the most splendid of all the temples in Laconia, situated in that quarter of the city which slopes down towards the sea. Next day the king descended to a place called the Camp of Pyrrhus, ^note wasting the country as

he went. ^note After devastating the neighbouring districts for the two following days, he encamped near Carnium; thence he started for Asine, and after some fruitless assaults upon it, he started again, and thenceforth devoted himself to plundering all the country bordering on the Cretan Sea as far as Taenarum. ^note Then, once more changing the direction of his march, he advanced to Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, which possesses a safe harbour, and is about thirty stades from the city. ^note Then leaving this on the right, he pitched his camp in the territory of Helos, which of all the districts of Laconia is the most extensive and most beautiful. Thence he sent out foraging parties and wasted the country with fire and sword, and destroyed the crops in it: pushing his devastation as far as Acriae and Leucae, and even to the district of Boeae.

On the receipt of the despatch from Philip commanding ^note the levy, the Messenians were no less forward than the other allies to undertake it. They showed indeed great zeal in making the expedition, sending cut the flower of their troops, two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry. Owing, however, to their distance from the seat of war, they arrived at Tegea after Philip had left, and at first were at a loss what to do; but being very anxious not to appear lukewarm in the campaign, because of the suspicions which had attached to them before, they pressed forward through Argolis into Laconia, with a view of effecting a junction with Philip; and having reached a fort called Glympes, which is situated on the frontiers of Argolis and Laconia, they encamped there in an unskilful and careless manner: for they neither entrenched themselves with ditch nor rampart, nor selected an advantageous spot; but trusting to the friendly disposition of the natives, bivouacked there unsuspiciously outside the walls of the fortress. But on news being brought to Lycurgus of the arrival of the Messenians, he took his mercenaries and some Lacedaemonians with him, and reaching the place before daybreak, boldly attacked the camp. Ill advised as the proceedings of the Messenians had been, and especially in advancing

from Tegea with inadequate numbers and without the direction of experts, in the actual hour of danger, when the enemy was upon them, they did all that circumstances admitted of to secure their safety. For as soon as they saw the enemy appearing they abandoned everything and took refuge within the fort. Accordingly, though Lycurgus captured most of the horses and the baggage, he did not take a single prisoner, and only succeeded in killing eight of the cavalry. ^noteAfter this reverse, the Messenians returned home through Argolis: but elated with success Lycurgus went to Sparta, and set about preparations for war; and took secret counsel with his friends to prevent Philip from getting safe out of the country without an engagement. Meanwhile the king had started from the district of Helos, and was on his return march, wasting the country as he came; and on the fourth day, about noon, arrived once more with his whole army at Amyclae.

Leaving directions with his officers and friends as to the coming engagement, Lycurgus himself left Sparta and occupied the ground near the Menelaïum, with as many as two thousand men. He agreed with the officers in the town that they should watch carefully, in order that, whenever he raised the signal, they might lead out their troops from the town at several points at once, and draw them up facing the Eurotas, at the spot where it is nearest the town. Such were the measures and designs of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians.

But lest ignorance of the locality should render my story ^note unintelligible and vague, I must describe its natural features and general position: following my practice throughout this work of drawing out the analogies and likenesses between places which are unknown and those already known and described. For seeing that in war, whether by sea or land, it is the difference of position which generally is the cause of failure; and since I wish all to know, not so much what happened, as how it happened, I must not pass over local description in detailing events of any sort, least of all in such as relate to war: and I must not shrink from using as landmarks, at one time harbours

and seas and islands, at another temples, mountains, or local names; or, finally, variations in the aspect of the heaven, these being of the most universal application throughout the world. For it is thus, and thus only, that it is possible, as I have said, to bring my readers to a conception of an unknown scene.

These then are the features of the country in question. ^note Sparta, as a whole, is in the shape of a circle; and is situated on level ground, broken at certain points by irregularities and hills. The river Eurotas flows past it on the east, and for the greater part of the year is too large to be forded; and the hills on which the Menelaïum stands are on the other side of the river, to the south-east of the town, rugged and difficult of access and exceedingly lofty; they exactly command the space between the town and the Eurotas, which flows at the very foot of the hill, the whole valley being at this point no more than a stade and a half wide. ^note Through this Philip was obliged to pass on his return march, with the city, and the Lacedaemonians ready and drawn up for battle, on his left hand, and on his right the river, and the division of Lycurgus posted upon the hills. In addition to these arrangements the Lacedaemonians had had recourse to the following device: They had dammed up the river above the town, and turned the stream upon the space between the town and the hills; with the result that the ground became so wet that men could not keep their feet, to say nothing of horses. The only course, therefore, left to the king was to lead his men close under the skirts of the hills, thus presenting to the attack of the enemy a long line of march, in which it was difficult for one part to relieve another.

Philip perceived these difficulties, and after consultation ^note with his friends decided that the matter of most urgent necessity was to dislodge the division of Lycurgus, first of all, from the position near the Menelaïum. He took therefore his mercenaries, peltasts, and Illyrians, and advanced across the river in the direction of the hills. Perceiving Philip's design, Lycurgus began getting his men ready, and exhorted them to face the battle, and

at the same time displayed the signal to the forces in the town: whereupon those whose duty it was immediately led out the troops from the town, as had been arranged, and drew them up outside the wall, with the cavalry on their right wing.

When he had got within distance of Lycurgus, Philip at first ordered the mercenaries to charge alone: and, accordingly, their superiority in arms and position contributed not a little to give the Lacedaemonians the upper hand at the beginning of the engagement. But when Philip supported his men by sending his reserve of peltasts on to the field, and caused the Illyrians to charge the enemy on the flanks, the king's mercenaries were encouraged by the appearance of these reserves to renew the battle with much more vigour than ever; while Lycurgus's men, terrified at the approach of the heavy-armed soldiers, gave way and fled, leaving a hundred killed and rather more prisoners, while the rest escaped into the town. Lycurgus himself, with a few followers going by a deserted and pathless route, made his way into the town under cover of night. Philip secured the hills by means of the Illyrians; and, accompanied by his light-armed troops and peltasts, rejoined his main forces. Just at the same time Aratus, leading the phalanx from Amyclae, had come close to the town. So the king, after re-crossing the Eurotas, halted with his light-armed peltasts and cavalry until the heavy-armed got safely through the narrow part of the road at the foot of the hills. Then the troops in the city ventured to attack the covering force of cavalry. There was a serious engagement, in which the peltasts fought with conspicuous valour; and the success of Philip being now beyond dispute, he chased the Lacedaemonians to their very gates, and then, having got his army safely across the Eurotas he brought up the rear of his phalanx.

But it was now getting late: and being obliged to ^note encamp, he availed himself for that purpose of a place at the very mouth of the pass, his officers having chanced already to have selected that very place; than which it would be impossible to find one more advantageous for making an invasion of

Laconia by way of Sparta itself. For it is at the very commencement of this pass, just where a man coming from Tegea, or, indeed, from any point in the interior, approaches Sparta; being about two stades from the town and right upon the river. The side of it which looks towards the town and river is entirely covered by a steep, lofty, and entirely inaccessible rock; while the top of this rock is a table-land of good soil and well supplied with water, and very conveniently situated for the exit and entrance of troops. A general, therefore, who was encamped there, and who had command of the height overhanging it, would evidently be in a place of safety as regards the neighbouring town, and in a most advantageous situation as commanding the entrance and exit of the narrow pass. Having accordingly encamped himself on this spot in safety, next day Philip sent forward his baggage; but drew out his army on the table-land in full view of the citizens, and remained thus for a short time. ^note Then he wheeled to the left and marched in the direction of Tegea; and when he reached the site of the battle of Antigonus and Cleomenes, he encamped there. Next day, having made an inspection of the ^note ground and sacrificed to the gods on both the eminences, Olympus and Evas, he advanced with his rear-guard strengthened. On arriving at Tegea he caused all the booty to be sold; and then, marching through Argos, arrived with his whole force at Corinth. There ambassadors appeared from Rhodes and Chios to negotiate a suspension of hostilities; to whom the king gave audience, and feigning that he was, and always had been, quite ready to come to terms with the Aetolians, sent them away to negotiate with the latter also; while he himself went down to Lechaeum, and made preparations for an embarkation, as he had an important undertaking to complete in Phocis.

Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, being still persuaded that they could frighten Philip, and thus neutralise their former failures, took this opportunity of tampering with the peltasts, and what the Macedonians call the

Agema, ^note by suggesting to them that they were risking their all, and getting none of their just rights, nor receiving the booty which, according to custom, properly fell to their share. ^note By these words they incited the young men to collect together, and attempt to plunder the tents of the most prominent of the king's friends, and to pull down the doors, and break through the roof of the royal headquarters.

The whole city being thereby in a state of confusion and uproar, the king heard of it and immediately came hastily running to the town from Lechaeum; and having summoned the Macedonians to the theatre he addressed them in terms of mingled exhortation and rebuke for what had happened. A scene of great uproar and confusion followed: and while some advised him to arrest and call to account the guilty, others to come to terms and declare an indemnity, for the moment the king dissembled his feelings, and pretended to be satisfied; and so with some words of exhortation addressed to all, retired: and though he knew quite well who were the ringleaders in the disturbance, he made a politic pretence of not doing so.

After this outbreak the king's schemes in Phocis met ^note with certain impediments which prevented their present execution. Meanwhile Leontius, despairing of success by his own efforts, had recourse to Apelles, urging him by frequent messages to come from Chalcis, and setting forth his own difficulties and the awkwardness of his position owing to his quarrel with the king. Now Apelles had been acting in Chalcis with an unwarrantable assumption of authority. He gave out that the king was still a mere boy, and for the most part under his control, and without independent power over anything; the management of affairs and the supreme authority in the kingdom he asserted to belong to himself. Accordingly, the magistrates and commissioners of Macedonia and Thessaly reported to him; and the cities in Greece in their decrees and

votes of honours and rewards made brief reference to the king, while Apelles was all in all to them. Philip had been kept informed of this, and had for some time past been feeling annoyed and offended at it,—Aratus being at his side, and using skilful means to further his own views; still he kept his own counsel, and did not let any one see what he intended to do, or what he had in his mind. In ignorance, therefore, of his own position, and persuaded that, if he could only come into Philip's presence, he would manage everything as he chose, Apelles set out from Chalcis to the assistance of Leontius. ^note On his arrival at Corinth, Leontius, Ptolemy and Megaleas, being commanders of the peltasts and the other chief divisions of the army, took great pains to incite the young men to go to meet him. He entered the town, therefore, with great pomp, owing to the number of officers and soldiers who went to meet him, and proceeded straight to the royal quarters. But when he would have entered, according to his former custom, one of the ushers prevented him, saying that the king was engaged. Troubled at this unusual repulse, and hesitating for a long while what to do, Apelles at last turned round and retired. Thereupon all those who were escorting him began at once openly to fall off from him and disperse, so that at last he entered his own lodging, with his children, absolutely alone. So true it is all the world over that a moment exalts and abases us; but most especially is this true of courtiers. ^note They indeed are exactly like counters on a board, which, according to the pleasure of the calculator, are one moment worth a farthing, the next a talent. Even so courtiers at the king's nod are one moment at the summit of prosperity, at another the objects of pity. When Megaleas saw that the help he had looked for from Apelles was failing him, he was exceedingly frightened, and made preparations for flight. Apelles meanwhile was admitted to the king's banquets and honours of that sort, but had no share in his council or daily social employments; and when, some days afterwards, the king resumed his voyage from Lechaeum, to complete his designs in Phocis, he took Apelles with him.

The expedition to Phocis proving a failure, the king

was retiring from Elatea; and while this was going on, Megaleas removed to Athens, leaving Leontius behind him as his security for his twenty talents fine. ^note The Athenian Strategi however refused to admit him, and he therefore resumed his journey and went to Thebes. Meanwhile the king put to sea from the coast of Cirrha and sailed with his guards ^note to the harbour of Sicyon, whence he went up to the city and, excusing himself to the magistrates, took up his quarters with Aratus, and spent the whole of his time with him, ordering Apelles to sail back to Corinth. ^note But upon news being brought him of the proceedings of Megaleas, he despatched the peltasts, whose regular commander was Leontius, in the charge of Taurion to Triphylia, on the pretext of some service of pressing need; and, when they had departed, he gave orders to arrest Leontius to answer his bail. When the peltasts heard what had happened from a messenger sent to them by Leontius, they despatched ambassadors to the king, begging him that, "if he had arrested Leontius on any other score, not to have him tried on the charges alleged against him without their presence: for otherwise they should consider themselves treated with signal contempt, and to be one and all involved in the condemnation." Such was the freedom of speech towards their king which the Macedonians always enjoyed. They added, that "if the arrest was on account of his bail for Megaleas, they would themselves pay the money by a common subscription." The king however was so enraged, that he put Leontius to death sooner than he had intended, owing to the zeal displayed by the peltasts.

Presently the ambassadors of Rhodes and Chios ^note returned from Aetolia. They had agreed to a truce of thirty days, and asserted that the Aetolians were ready to make peace: they had also arranged for a stated day on which they claimed that Philip should meet them at Rhium; undertaking that the Aetolians would be ready to do anything on condition of making peace. Philip accepted

the truce and wrote letters to the allies, bidding them send assessors and commissioners to discuss the terms with the Aetolians; while he himself sailed from Lechaeum and arrived on the second day at Patrae. ^note Just then certain letters were sent to him from Phocis, which Megaleas had written to the Aetolians, exhorting them not to be frightened, but to persist in the war, because Philip was in extremities through a lack of provisions. Besides this the letters contained some offensive and bitter abuse of the king. As soon as he had read these, the king feeling no doubt that Apelles was the ringleader of the mischief, placed him under a guard and despatched him in all haste to Corinth, with his son and favourite boy; while he sent Alexander to Thebes to arrest Megaleas, with orders to bring him before the magistrates to answer to his bail. When Alexander had fulfilled his commission, Megaleas, not daring to await the issue, committed suicide: and about the same time Apelles, his son and favourite boy, ended their lives also. ^note Such was the end of these men, thoroughly deserved in every way, and especially for their outrageous conduct to Aratus.

Now the Aetolians were at first very anxious for the ^note ratification of a peace, because they found the war burdensome, and because things had not gone as they expected. For, looking to his tender years and lack of experience, they had expected to have a mere child to deal with in Philip; but had found him a full-grown man both in his designs and his manner of executing them: while they had themselves made a display of imbecility and childishness alike in the general conduct, and the particular actions, of the campaign. But as soon as they heard of the outbreak of the disturbance among the peltasts, and of the deaths of Apelles and Leontius, hoping that there was a serious and formidable disaffection at the court, they procrastinated until they had outstayed the day appointed for the meeting at Rhium. But Philip was delighted to seize the pretext: for he felt confident of success in the war, and had already resolved to avoid coming to terms. He therefore at once exhorted such of the allies as had come to meet him

to make preparations, not for the peace, but for war; and putting to sea again sailed back to Corinth. He then dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to go home through Thessaly for the winter: while he himself putting to sea from Cenchreae, and coasting along Attica, sailed through the Euripus to Demetrias, and there before a jury of Macedonians had Ptolemy tried and put to death, who was the last survivor of the conspiracy of Leontius.

It was in this season that Hannibal, having succeeded in ^note entering Italy, was lying encamped in presence of the Roman army in the valley of the Padus. Antiochus, after subduing the greater part of Coele-Syria, had once more dismissed his army into winter quarters. The Spartan king Lycurgus fled to Aetolia in fear of the Ephors: for acting on a false charge that he was meditating a coup d'état, they had collected the young men and come to his house at night. But getting previous intimation of what was impending, he had quitted the town accompanied by the members of his household.

When the next winter came, Philip having departed ^note to Macedonia, and the Achaean Strategus Eperatus having incurred the contempt of the Achaean soldiers and the complete disregard of the mercenaries, no one would obey his orders, and no preparation was made for the defence of the country. This was observed by Pyrrhias, who had been sent by the Aetolians to command the Eleans. ^note He had under him a force of thirteen hundred Aetolians, and the mercenaries hired by the Eleans, as well as a thousand Elean infantry and two hundred Elean cavalry, amounting in all to three thousand: and he now began committing frequent raids, not only upon the territories of Dyme and Pharae, but upon that of Patrae also. Finally he pitched his camp on what is called the Panachaean Mountain, which commands the town of Patrae, and began wasting the whole district towards Rhium and Aegium. The result was that the cities, being exposed to much suffering, and unable to obtain any assistance, began to make difficulties

about paying their contribution to the league; and the soldiers finding their pay always in arrear and never paid at the right time acted in the same way about going to the relief of the towns. Both parties thus mutually retaliating on each other, affairs went from bad to worse, and at last the foreign contingent broke up altogether. ^noteAnd all this was the result of the incompetence of the chief magistrate. The time for the next election finding Achaean affairs in this state, Eperatus laid down his office, and just at the beginning of summer Aratus the elder was elected Strategus. ^note

Such was the position of affairs in Europe. We have now ^note arrived at a proper juncture, both of events and of time, to transfer our narrative to the history of Asia. I will therefore resume my story of the transactions which occurred there during the same Olympiad.

I will first endeavour, in accordance with my original plan, to give an account of the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy for the possession of Coele-Syria. Though I am fully aware that at the period, at which I have stopped in my Greek history, this war was all but decided and concluded, I have yet deliberately chosen this particular break and division in my narrative; believing that I shall effectually provide against the possibility of mistakes on the part of my readers in regard to dates, if I indicate in the course of my narrative the years in this Olympiad in which the events in the several parts of the world, as well as in Greece, began and ended. For I think nothing more essential to the clearness of my history of this Olympiad than to avoid confusing the several narratives. Our object should be to distinguish and keep them separate as much as possible, until we come to the next Olympiad, and begin setting down the contemporary events in the several countries under each year. For since I have undertaken to write, not a particular, but a universal history, and have

ventured upon a plan on a greater scale, as I have already shown, than any of my predecessors, it will be necessary also for me to take greater care than they, as to my method of treatment and arrangement; so as to secure clearness, both in the details, and in the general view adopted in my history. I will accordingly go back a short way in the history of the kingdoms of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and try to fix upon a starting-point for my narrative which shall be accepted and recognised by all: for this is a matter of the first importance.

For the old saying, "Well begun is half done," was meant by its inventors to urge the importance of taking the greater pains to make a good beginning than anything else. And though some may consider this an exaggeration, in my opinion it comes short of the truth; for one might say with confidence, not that "the beginning was half the business," but rather that it was near being the whole. For how can one make a good beginning without having first grasped in thought the complete plan, or without knowing where, with what object, and with what purpose he is undertaking the business? Or how can a man sum up a series of events satisfactorily without a reference to their origin, and without showing his point of departure, or why and how he has arrived at the particular crisis at which he finds himself? Therefore both historian and reader alike should be exceedingly careful to mark the beginnings of events, with a conviction that their influence does not stop half-way, but is paramount to the end. And this is what I shall endeavour to do.

I am aware, however, that a similar profession has been made by many other historians of an intention to write a universal history, and of undertaking a work on a larger scale than their predecessors. About these writers, putting out of the question Ephorus, the first and only man who has really attempted a universal history, I will not mention any name or say more about them than this,—that several of my contemporaries, while professing to write a universal history have imagined that they could tell the story of the war of Rome and Carthage in three or four pages. Yet every one knows that events more numerous or important were never accomplished in Iberia,

Libya, Sicily, and Italy than in that war; and that the Hannibalian war was the most famous and lasting of any that has taken place except the Sicilian. So momentous was it, that all the rest of the world were compelled to watch it in terrified expectation of what would follow from its final catastrophe. Yet some of these writers, without even giving as many details of it as those who, after the manner of the vulgar, inscribe rude records of events on house walls, pretend to have embraced the whole of Greek and foreign history. The truth of the matter is, that it is a very easy matter to profess to undertake works of the greatest importance; but by no means so simple a matter in practice to attain to any excellence. The former is open to every one with the requisite audacity: the latter is rare, and is given to few. So much for those who use pompous language about themselves and their historical works. I will now return to my narrative.

Immediately after his father's death, Ptolemy Philopator ^note put his brother Magas and his partisans to death, and took possession of the throne of Egypt. He thought that he had now freed himself by this act from domestic danger; and that by the deaths of Antigonus and Seleucus, and their being respectively succeeded by mere children like Antiochus and Philip, fortune had released him from danger abroad. He therefore felt secure of his position and began conducting his reign as though it were a perpetual festival. He would attend to no business, and would hardly grant an interview to the officials about the court, or at the head of the administrative departments in Egypt. Even his agents abroad found him entirely careless and indifferent; though his predecessors, far from taking less interest in foreign affairs, had generally given them precedence over those of Egypt itself. For being masters of Coele-Syria and Cyprus, they maintained a threatening attitude towards the kings of Syria, both by land and sea; and were also in a commanding position in regard to the princes of Asia, as well as the islands, through their possession of the most splendid cities, strongholds, and harbours all along the seacoast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and the district round Lysimachia. Moreover they were favourably placed for an

attack upon Thrace and Macedonia from their possession of Aenus, Maroneia, and more distant cities still. And having thus stretched forth their hands to remote regions, and long ago strengthened their position by a ring of princedoms, these kings had never been anxious about their rule in Egypt; and had naturally, therefore, given great attention to foreign politics. But when Philopator, absorbed in unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continuous drunkenness, treated these several branches of government with equal indifference, it was naturally not long before more than one was found to lay plots against his life as well as his power: of whom the first was Cleomenes, the Spartan. ^note

As long as Euergetes was alive, with whom he had ^note agreed to make an alliance and confederacy, Cleomenes took no steps. But upon that monarch's death, seeing that the time was slipping away, and that the peculiar position of affairs in Greece seemed almost to cry aloud for Cleomenes,—for Antigonus was dead, the Achaeans involved in war, and the Lacedaemonians were at one with the Aetolians in hostility to the Achaeans and Macedonians, which was the policy originally adopted by Cleomenes,—then, indeed, he was actually compelled to use some expedition, and to bestir himself to secure his departure from Alexandria. First therefore, in interviews with the king, he urged him to send him out with the needful amount of supplies and troops; but not being listened to in this request, he next begged him earnestly to let him go alone with his own servants; for he affirmed that the state of affairs was such as to show him sufficient opportunities for recovering his ancestral throne. The king, however, for the reasons I have mentioned, taking absolutely no interest in such matters, nor exercising any foresight whatever, continued with extraordinary folly and blindness to neglect the petitions of Cleomenes. But the party of Sosibius, the leading statesman at the time, took counsel together, and agreed on the following course of action in regard to him. They decided not to send him out with a fleet and supplies; for, owing to the death of Antigonus, they took little account

of foreign affairs, and thought money spent on such things would be thrown away. Besides, they were afraid that since Antigonus was dead, and no one was left who could balance him, Cleomenes might, if he got Greece into his power quickly and without trouble, prove a serious and formidable rival to themselves; especially as he had had a clear view of Egyptian affairs, had learnt to despise the king; and had discovered that the kingdom had many parts loosely attached, and widely removed from the centre, and presenting many facilities for revolutionary movements: for not a few of their ships were at Samos, and a considerable force of soldiers at Ephesus. These considerations induced them to reject the idea of sending Cleomenes out with supplies; for they thought it by no means conducive to their interests to carelessly let a man go, who was certain to be their opponent and enemy. The other proposal was to keep him there against his will; but this they all rejected at once without discussion, on the principle that the lion and the flock could not safely share the same stall. Sosibius himself took the lead in regarding this idea with aversion, and his reason was this.

While engaged in effecting the destruction of Magas ^note and Berenice, his anxiety at the possible failure of his attempt, especially through the courageous character of Berenice, had forced him to flatter the courtiers, and give them all hopes of advantage in case his intrigue succeeded. It was at this juncture that, observing Cleomenes to stand in need of the king's help, and to be possessed of a clear understanding and a genuine grasp of the situation, he admitted him to a knowledge of his design, holding out to him hopes of great advantage. And when Cleomenes saw that Sosibius was in a state of great anxiety, and above all afraid of the foreign soldiers and mercenaries, he bade him not be alarmed; and undertook that the foreign soldiers should do him no harm, but should rather be of assistance to him. And on Sosibius expressing surprise rather than conviction at this promise, he said, "Don't you see that there are three thousand foreign soldiers here from the Peloponnese, and a thousand from Crete? I have only to nod to these men, and every

man of them will at once do what I want. With these all ready to hand, whom do you fear? Surely not mere Syrians and Carians." Sosibius was much pleased at the remark at the time, and doubly encouraged in his intrigue against Berenice; but ever afterwards, when observing the indifference of the king, he repeated it to himself, and put before his eyes the boldness of Cleomenes, and the goodwill of the foreign contingent towards him.

These feelings now moved him to advise the king and ^note his friends above all things to arrest and incarcerate Cleomenes: and to carry out this policy he availed himself of the following circumstance, which happened conveniently for him. There was a certain Messenian called Nicagoras, an ancestral guest-friend of the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus. They had not previously had much intercourse; but when Archidamus fled from Sparta, for fear of Cleomenes, and came to Messenia, not only did Archidamus show great kindness in receiving him under his roof and furnishing him with other necessaries, but from the close association that followed a very warm friendship and intimacy sprang up between them: and accordingly when Cleomenes subsequently gave Archidamus some expectation of being restored to his city, and composing their quarrels, Nicagoras devoted himself to conducting the negotiation and settling the terms of their compact. These being ratified, Archelaus returned to Sparta relying on the treaty made by the agency of Nicagoras. But as soon as he met him, Cleomenes assassinated Archidamus, ^note sparing however Nicagoras and his companions. To the outside world Nicagoras pretended to be under an obligation to Cleomenes for saving his life; but in heart he was exceedingly incensed at what had happened, because he had the discredit of having been the cause of the king's death. Now it happened that this same Nicagoras had, a short time before the events of which we are speaking, come to Alexandria with a cargo of horses. Just as

he was disembarking he came upon Cleomenes, Panterus, and Hippitas walking together along the quay. When Cleomenes saw him, he came up and welcomed him warmly, and asked him on what business he was come. Upon his replying that he had brought a cargo of horses, "You had better," said he, "have brought a cargo of catamites and sakbut girls; for that is what the present king is fond of." Nicagoras laughed, and said nothing at the time: but some days afterwards, when he had, in the course of his horse-sales, become more intimate with Sosibius, he did Cleomenes the ill turn of repeating his recent sarcasm; and seeing that Sosibius heard it with satisfaction, he related to him the whole story of his grievance against Cleomenes.

Finding then that he was hostile in feeling to Cleomenes, Sosibius persuaded Nicagoras, partly by presents given on the spot and partly by promises for the future, to write a letter accusing Cleomenes, and leave it sealed; that as soon as he had sailed, as he would do in a few days, his servant might bring it to him as though sent by Nicagoras. Nicagoras performed his part in the plot; and after he had sailed, the letter was brought by the servant to Sosibius, who at once took the servant and the letter to the king. The servant stated that Nicagoras had left the letter with orders to deliver it to Sosibius; and the letter declared that it was the intention of Cleomenes, if he failed to secure his despatch from the country with suitable escort and provisions, to stir up a rebellion against the king. Sosibius at once seized the opportunity of urging on the king and his friends to take prompt precautions against Cleomenes and to put him in ward. ^note This was at once done, and a very large house was assigned to him in which he lived under guard, differing from other prisoners only in the superior size of his prison. Finding himself in this distressing plight, and with fear of worse for the future, Cleomenes determined to make the most desperate attempts for freedom: not so much because he felt confident of success, —for he had none of the elements of success in such an enterprise on his side,—but rather because he was eager to die nobly, and endure nothing unworthy of the gallantry which he

had previously displayed. He must, I think, as is usually the case with men of high courage, have recalled and reflected upon as his model those words of the hero: ^note— "Yea, let me die,—but not a coward's death,
Nor all inglorious: let me do one deed,
That children yet unborn may hear and mark!"

He therefore waited for the time at which the king left ^note Alexandria for Canopus, and then spread a report among his guards that he was going to be released by the king; and on this pretext entertained his own attendants at a banquet, and sent out some flesh of the sacrificial victims, some garlands, and some wine to his guards. the latter indulged in these good things unsuspiciously, and became completely drunk; whereupon Cleomenes walked out about noon, accompanied by his friends and servants armed with daggers, without being noticed by his guard. As the party advanced they met Ptolemy in the street, who had been left by the king in charge of the city; and overawing his attendants by the audacity of his proceeding, dragged Ptolemy himself from his chariot and put him in a place of security, while they loudly called upon the crowds of citizens to assert their freedom. But every one was unprepared for the movement, and therefore no one obeyed their summons or joined them; and they accordingly turned their steps to the citadel, with the intention of bursting open the doors and obtaining the help of the prisoners confined there. But the commanders of the citadel were on the alert, and learning what was going to take place had secured the entrance gate: having therefore failed in this design they killed themselves like brave men and Spartans.

Such was the end of Cleomenes: a man of brilliant social qualities, with a natural aptitude for affairs, and, in a word, endued with all the qualifications of a general and a king.

Shortly after the catastrophe of Cleomenes, the governor of Coele-Syria, who was an Aetolian by birth, resolved to hold treasonable parley with Antiochus and put the cities of that

province into his hands. ^note He was induced to take this step partly by the contempt with which Ptolemy's shameful debauchery and general conduct had inspired him; and partly by distrust of the king's ministers, which he had learned to entertain in the course of the recent attempt of Antiochus upon Coele-Syria: for in that campaign he had rendered signal service to Ptolemy, and yet, far from receiving any thanks for it, he had been summoned to Alexandria and barely escaped losing his life. The advances which he now made to Antiochus were gladly received, and the affair was soon in the course of being rapidly completed.

But I must make my readers acquainted with the position of the royal family of Syria as I have already done with that of Egypt; and in order to do so, I will go back to the succession of Antiochus to the throne, and give a summary of events from that point to the beginning of the war of which I am to speak.

Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus; and ^note on the death of his father, and the succession in right of seniority of his brother Seleucus to the throne, he at first removed to upper Asia and lived there. ^note But Seleucus having been treacherously assassinated after crossing Mount Taurus with his army, as I have already related, he succeeded to the throne himself; and made Achaeus governor of Asia on this side Taurus, Molon and his brother Alexander guardians of his dominions in upper Asia,—Molon acting as Satrap of Media, his brother of Persia.

These two brothers despising the king for his youth, ^note and hoping that Achaeus would join in their treason, but most of all because they dreaded the cruel character and malign influence of Hermeias, who was at that time the chief minister of the entire kingdom, formed the design of revolting themselves and causing the upper Satrapies to revolt also.

This Hermeias was a Carian and had obtained his power by the appointment of the king's brother Seleucus, who had entrusted it to him when he was setting out on his expedition

^note to the Taurus. Invested with this authority he at once began to display jealousy of all those about the court who were in any way prominent; and being cruel by nature he inflicted punishment on some for acts of ignorance, on which he always managed to place the worst interpretation; while against others he brought trumped-up and lying charges, and then acted towards them the part of an inflexible and harsh judge. But his chief end and object was to secure the destruction of Epigenes who had brought home the forces which had accompanied Seleucus; because he saw that he was a man of eloquence and practical ability, and highly acceptable to the army. With this design he was ever on the watch to lay hold of some handle or pretext against him. Accordingly when a council was summoned on the subject of Molon's revolt, and when the king bade each councillor deliver his opinion on the measures to be taken against the rebels, Epigenes spoke first and urged that "there ought to be no delay, but the matter should be taken in hand at once; and that, first and foremost, the king should go in person to the district, and be ready to seize the right moments for action. For the actual presence of the king, and his appearance at the head of an army before the eyes of the common people, would prevent the party of Molon from venturing upon revolutionary measures at all; or if they had the audacity to do so, and persisted in their design, they would be quickly arrested by the populace and handed over into the king's power."

While Epigenes was still speaking in this strain, Hermeias, in a burst of rage, exclaimed, "That Epigenes had long been secretly plotting treason against the king; but that now he had happily shown his real sentiments by the advice which he had given, proving how eager he was to expose the king's person to the rebels with an insignificant guard." For the present he was content with making this insinuation as fuel for a future outburst of slander, and without further reference to Epigenes, after what was rather an ill-timed ebullition of temper than serious hostility, he delivered his own opinion; which, from his fear of the danger and his inexperience in war, was against undertaking the expedition against Molon personally, but was

warmly in favour of an attack upon Ptolemy; because he was of opinion that this latter war would involve no danger, owing to that monarch's cowardly character. For the present he overawed the rest of the council into agreement with him: and he thereupon sent Xenon and Theodotus Hemiolius with an army against Molon; while he employed himself in continually inciting Antiochus to undertake the expedition into Coele-Syria: thinking that it was only by involving the young king in war on every side that he could escape punishment for his past misdeeds, and avoid being deprived of his position of authority; for the king would have need of his services when he found himself surrounded by struggles and dangers. With this object in view, he finally hit on the device of forging a letter, which he presented to the king as having been sent by Achaeus. In it Achaeus was made to state that "Ptolemy had urged him to assert his right to the government: and promised to supply him with ships and money for all his attempts, if he would only take the crown, and come forward in the sight of all the world as a claimant of the sovereign power; which he already possessed, in fact, though he grudged himself the title, and rejected the crown which fortune gave him."

This letter successfully imposed on the king, who became ready and eager to go on the expedition against Coele-Syria.

While this was going on, Antiochus happened to be at ^note Seleucia, on the Zeugma, when the Navarchus Diognetus arrived from Cappadocia, on the Euxine, bringing Laodice, the daughter of king Mithridates, an unmarried girl, destined to be the king's wife. This Mithridates boasted of being a descendant of one of the seven Persians who killed the Magus, ^note and he had maintained the sovereignty handed down from his ancestors, as it had been originally given to them by Darius along the shore of the Euxine. Having gone to meet the princess with all due pomp and splendour, Antiochus immediately celebrated his nuptials with royal magnificence. The marriage having been completed, he went to Antioch; and after proclaiming Laodice queen, devoted himself thenceforth to making preparation for the war.

Meanwhile Molon had prepared the people of his own ^note Satrapy to go all lengths, partly by holding out to them hopes of advantages to be gained, and partly by working on the fears of their chief men, by means of forged letters purporting to be from the king, and couched in threatening terms. He had also a ready coadjutor in his brother Alexander; and had secured the co-operation of the neighbouring Satrapies, by winning the goodwill of their leading men with bribes. It was, therefore, at the head of a large force that he took the field against the royal generals. Terrified at his approach Xenon and Theodotus retired into the cities; and Molon, having secured the territory of Apollonia, had now a superabundance of supplies.

But, indeed, even before that he was a formidable ^note enemy owing to the importance of his province. For the whole of the royal horses out at grass are entrusted to the Medes; ^note and they have an incalculable quantity of corn and cattle. Of the natural strength and extent of the district it would be impossible to speak highly enough. For Media lies nearly in the centre of Asia and in its size, and in the height of its steppes compares favourably with every other district of Asia. And again it overlooks some of the most warlike and powerful tribes. On the east lie the plains of the desert which intervenes between Persia and Parthia; and, moreover, it borders on and commands the "Caspian Gates," and touches the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far from the Hyrcanian Sea. On the south it slopes down to Mesopotamia and the territory of Apollonia. It is protected from Persia by the barrier of Mount Zagrus, which has an ascent of a hundred stades, and containing in its range many separate peaks and defiles is subdivided by deep valleys, and at certain points by cañons, inhabited by Cosseans, Corbrenians, Carchi, and several other barbarous tribes who have the reputation of being excellent warriors. Again on the west it is coterminous

with the tribe called Satrapeii, who are not far from the tribes which extend as far as the Euxine. Its northern frontier is fringed by Elymaeans, Aniaracae, Cadusii, and Matiani, and overlooks that part of the Pontus which adjoins the Maeotis. Media itself is subdivided by several mountain chains running from east to west, between which are plains thickly studded with cities and villages.

Being masters, then, of a territory of proportions ^note worthy of a kingdom, his great power had made Molon from the first a formidable enemy: but when the royal generals appeared to have abandoned the country to him, and his own forces were elated at the successful issue of their first hopes, the terror which he inspired became absolute, and he was believed by the Asiatics to be irresistible. Taking advantage of this, he first of all resolved to cross the Tigris and lay siege to Seleucia; but when his passage across the river was stopped by Zeuxis seizing the river boats, he retired to the camp at Ctesiphon, and set about preparing winter quarters for his army.

When King Antiochus heard of Molon's advance and the ^note retreat of his own generals, he was once more for giving up the expedition against Ptolemy, and going in person on the campaign against Molon, and not letting slip the proper time for action. But Hermeias persisted in his original plan, and despatched the Achaean Xenoetas against Molon, in command of an army, with full powers; asserting that against rebels it was fitting that generals should have the command; but that the king ought to confine himself to directing plans and conducting national wars against monarchs. Having therefore the young king entirely in his power, owing to his age, he set out; and having mustered the army at Apameia he started thence and arrived at Laodiceia. ^note Advancing from that time with his whole army, the king crossed the desert and entered the cañon called Marsyas, which lies between the skirts of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and is contracted into a narrow gorge by those two mountains. Just where the valley is narrowest it is divided by marshes and lakes, from which the scented reed is cut.

On one side of the entrance to this pass lies a place called Brochi, on the other Gerrha, which leave but a narrow space between them. After a march of several days through this canon, and subduing the towns that lay along it, Antiochus arrived at Gerrha. Finding that Theodotus the Aetolian had already occupied Gerrha and Brochi, and had secured the narrow road by the lakes with ditches and palisades and a proper disposition of guards, the king at first tried to carry the pass by force; but after sustaining more loss than he inflicted, and finding that Theodotus remained still stanch, he gave up the attempt. In the midst of these difficulties news was brought that Xenoetas had suffered a total defeat and that Molon was in possession of all the upper country: he therefore abandoned his foreign expedition and started to relieve his own dominions.

The fact was that when the general Xenoetas had been despatched with absolute powers, as I have before ^note stated, his unexpected elevation caused him to treat his friends with haughtiness and his enemies with overweening temerity. His first move however was sufficiently prudent. He marched to Seleucia, and after sending for Diogenes the governor of Susiana, and Pythiades the commander in the Persian Gulf, he led out his forces and encamped with the river Tigris protecting his front. But there he was visited by many men from Molon's camp, who swam across the river and assured him that, if he would only cross the Tigris, the whole of Molon's army would declare for him; for the common soldiers were jealous of Molon and warmly disposed towards the king. Xenoetas was encouraged by these statements to attempt the passage of the Tigris. He made a feint of bridging the river at a spot where it is divided by an island; but as he was getting nothing ready for such an operation, Molon took no notice of his pretended move; while he was really occupied in collecting boats and getting them ready with every possible care. Then having selected the most courageous men, horse and foot, from his entire army, he left Zeuxis and Pythiades in charge of his camp, and marched up stream at night about eighty stades above Molon's camp; and having got his force safely over in boats, encamped them before

daybreak in an excellent position, nearly surrounded by the river, and covered where there was no river by marshes and swamps.

When Molon learnt what had taken place, he sent his cavalry, under the idea that they would easily stop those who were actually crossing, and ride down those who had already crossed. But as soon as they got near Xenoetas's force, their ignorance of the ground proved fatal to them without any enemy to attack them; for they got immersed by their own weight, and sinking in the lakes were all rendered useless, while many of them actually lost their lives. Xenoetas, however, feeling sure that if he only approached, Molon's forces would all desert to him, advanced along the bank of the river and pitched a camp close to the enemy. Thereupon Molon, either as a stratagem, or because he really felt some doubt of the fidelity of his men, and was afraid that some of Xenoetas's expectations might be fulfilled, left his baggage in his camp and started under cover of night in the direction of Media. Xenoetas, imagining that Molon had fled in terror at his approach, and because he distrusted the fidelity of his own troops, first attacked and took the enemy's camp, and then sent for his own cavalry and their baggage from the camp of Zeuxis. He next summoned the soldiers to a meeting, and told them that they should feel encouraged and hopeful now that Molon had fled. With this preface, he ordered them all to attend to their bodily wants and refresh themselves; as he intended without delay to go in pursuit of the enemy early next morning.

But the soldiers, filled with confidence, and enriched ^note with every kind of provisions, eagerly turned to feasting and wine and the demoralisation which always accompanies such excesses. But Molon, after marching a considerable distance, caused his army to get their dinner, and then wheeling round reappeared at the camp. He found all the enemy scattered about and drunk, and attacked their palisade just before daybreak. Dismayed by this unexpected danger, and unable to awake his men from their drunken slumber, Xenoetas and his staff rushed furiously upon the enemy and were killed. Of the sleeping soldiers most were killed in their beds, while the

rest threw themselves into the river and endeavoured to cross to the opposite camp. The greater part however even of these perished; for in the blind hurry and confusion which prevailed, and in the universal panic and dismay, seeing the camp on the other side divided by so narrow a space, they all forgot the violence of the stream, and the difficulty of crossing it, in their eagerness to reach a place of safety. In wild excitement therefore, and with a blind instinct of self-preservation, they not only hurled themselves into the river, but threw their beasts of burden in also, with their packs, as though they thought that the river by some providential instinct would take their part and convey them safely to the opposite camp. The result was that the stream presented a truly pitiable and extraordinary spectacle,—horses, beasts of burden, arms, corpses, and every kind of baggage being carried down the current along with the swimmers.

Having secured the camp of Xenoetas, Molon crossed the ^note river in perfect safety and without any resistance, as Zeuxis also now fled at his approach; took possession of the latter's camp, and then advanced with his whole army to Seleucia; carried it at the first assault, Zeuxis and Diomedon the governor of the place both abandoning it and flying; and advancing from this place reduced the upper Satrapies to submission without a blow. That of Babylon fell next, and then the Satrapy which lay along the Persian Gulf. This brought him to Susa, which he also carried without a blow; though his assaults upon the citadel proved unavailing, because Diogenes the general had thrown himself into it before he could get there. He therefore abandoned the idea of carrying it by storm, and leaving a detachment to lay siege to it, hurried back with his main army to Seleucia on the Tigris. There he took great pains to refresh his army, and after addressing his men in encouraging terms he started once more to complete his designs, and occupied Parapotamia as far as the city Europus, and Mesopotamia as far as Dura.

When news of these events was brought to Antiochus, as I have said before, he gave up all idea of the Coele-Syrian campaign, and turned all his attention to this war. Another meeting of his council was thereupon summoned: and on the

king ordering the members of it to deliver their opinions as to the tactics to be employed against Molon, the first to speak on the business was again Epigenes: who said that "his advice should have been followed all along, and measures have been promptly taken before the enemy had obtained such important successes: still even at this late hour they ought to take it in hand resolutely." ^note Thereupon Hermeias broke out again into an unreasonable and violent fit of anger and began to heap abuse upon Epigenes; and while belauding himself in a fulsome manner, brought accusations against Epigenes that were absurd as well as false. He ended by adjuring the king not to be diverted from his purpose without better reason, nor to abandon his hopes in Coele-Syria. This advice was ill-received by the majority of the council, and displeasing to Antiochus himself; and, accordingly, as the king showed great anxiety to reconcile the two men, Hermeias was at length induced to put an end to his invectives. The council decided by a majority that the course recommended by Epigenes was the most practical and advantageous, and a resolution was come to that the king should go on the campaign against Molon, and devote his attention to that. Thereupon Hermeias promptly made a hypocritical pretence of having changed his mind: and remarking that it was the duty of all to acquiesce loyally in the decision, made a great show of readiness and activity in pushing on the preparations.

The forces, however, having been mustered at Apameia, upon a kind of mutiny arising among the common soldiers, on account of some arrears of pay, Hermeias, observing the king to be in a state of anxiety, and to be alarmed at the disturbance at so critical a moment, offered to discharge all arrears, if the king would only consent to Epigenes not accompanying the expedition; on the ground that nothing could be properly managed in the army when such angry feelings, and such party spirit, had been excited. The proposal was very displeasing to the king, who was exceedingly anxious that Epigenes should accompany him on the campaign, owing to his experience in the field; but he was bound so completely hand and foot, and entangled by the craft of

Hermeias, his skilful finance, constant watchfulness, and designing flattery, that he was not his own master; and accordingly he yielded to the necessity of the moment and consented to his demand. When Epigenes thereupon retired, as he was bidden, the members of the council were too much afraid of incurring displeasure to remonstrate; while the army generally, by a revulsion of feeling, turned with gratitude to the man to whom they owed the settlement of their claims for pay. The Cyrrhestae were the only ones that stood out: and they broke out into open mutiny, and for some time occasioned much trouble; but, being at last conquered by one of the king's generals, most of them were killed, and the rest submitted to the king's mercy. Hermeias having thus secured the allegiance of his friends by fear, and of the troops by being of service to them, started on the expedition in company with the king; while in regard to Epigenes he elaborated the following plot, with the assistance of Alexis, the commander of the citadel of Apameia. He wrote a letter purporting to have been sent from Molon to Epigenes, and persuaded one of the latter's servants, by holding out the hope of great rewards, to take it to the house of Epigenes, and mix it with his other papers. Immediately after this had been done, Alexis came to the house and asked Epigenes whether he had not received certain letters from Molon; and, upon his denial, demanded in menacing terms to be allowed to search. Having entered, he quickly discovered the letter, which he availed himself of as a pretext for putting Epigenes to death on the spot. By this means the king was persuaded to believe that Epigenes had justly forfeited his life; and though the courtiers had their suspicions, they were afraid to say anything.

When Antiochus had reached the Euphrates, and had ^note taken over the force stationed there, he once more started on his march and got as far as Antioch, in Mygdonia, about mid-winter, and there remained until the worst of the winter should be over. Thence after a stay of forty days he advanced to Libba. Molon was now in the neighbourhood of Babylon: and Antiochus consulted his council as to the route to be pursued, the tactics to be adopted, and the source from which

provisions could best be obtained for his army on the march in their expedition against Molon. The proposal of Hermeias was to march along the Tigris, with this river, and the Lycus and Caprus, on their flank. Zeuxis, having the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, was in a state of painful doubt whether to speak his real opinion or no; but as the mistake involved in the advice of Hermeias was flagrant, he at last mustered courage to advise that the Tigris should be crossed; alleging as a reason the general difficulty of the road along the river: especially from the fact that, after a considerable march, the last six days of which would be through a desert, they would reach what was called the "King's Dyke," which it would be impossible to cross if they found it invested by the enemy; while a retirement by a second march through the wilderness would be manifestly dangerous, especially as their provisions would be sure to be running short. On the other hand he showed that if they crossed the Tigris it was evident the Apolloniates would repent of their treason and join the king; for even as it was they had submitted to Molon, not from choice, but under compulsion and terror; and the fertility of their soil promised abundance of provisions for the troops. But his most weighty argument was that by their thus acting Molon would be cut off from a return to Media, and from drawing supplies from that country, and would thereby be compelled to risk a general action: or, if he refused to do so, his troops would promptly fix their hopes upon the king.

The suggestion of Zeuxis being approved, the army was ^note immediately arranged in three divisions, and got across with the baggage at three points in the river. Thence they marched in the direction of Dura, where they quickly caused the siege of the citadel to be raised, which was being invested at the time by some of Molon's officers; and thence, after a march of eight successive days, they crossed the mountain called Oreicum and arrived at Apollonia.

Meanwhile Molon had heard of the king's arrival, and not feeling confidence in the inhabitants of Susiana and Babylonia, because he had conquered them so recently and by surprise, fearing also to be cut off from a retreat to Media, he determined to throw a bridge over the Tigris and get his army

across; being eager if it were possible to secure the mountain district of Apollonia, because he had great confidence in his corps of slingers called Cyrtii. He carried out his resolution, and was pushing forward in an unbroken series of forced marches. ^note Thus it came about that, just as he was entering the district of Apollonia, the king at the head of his whole army was marching out. The advanced guard of skirmishers of the two armies fell in with each other on some high ground, and at first engaged and made trial of each other's strength; but upon the main armies on either side coming on to the ground, they separated. For the present both retired to their respective entrenchments, and encamped at a distance of forty stades from each other. When night had fallen, Molon reflected that there was some risk and disadvantage in a battle by broad daylight and in the open field between rebels and their sovereign, and he determined therefore to attack Antiochus by night. ^note Selecting the best and most vigorous of his soldiers, he made a considerable detour, with the object of making his attack from higher ground. But having learnt during his march that ten young men had deserted in a body to the king, he gave up his design, and facing right about returned in haste to his own entrenchment where he arrived about daybreak. His arrival caused a panic in the army; for the troops in the camp, startled out of their sleep by the arrival of the returning men, were very near rushing out of the lines.

But while Molon was doing his best to calm the panic, ^note the king, fully prepared for the engagement, was marching his whole army out of their lines at daybreak. On his right wing he stationed his lancers under the command of Ardys, a man of proved ability in the field; next to them the Cretan allies, and next the Gallic Rhigosages. Next these he placed the foreign contingent and mercenary soldiers from Greece, and next to them he stationed his phalanx: the left wing he assigned to the cavalry called the "Companions." ^note His elephants, which

were ten in number, he placed at intervals in front of the line. His reserves of infantry and cavalry he divided between the two wings, with orders to outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun. He then went along the line and addressed a few words of exhortation to the men suitable to the occasion; and put Hermeias and Zeuxis in command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself.

On the other side, owing to the panic caused by his rash ^note movement of the previous night, Molon was unable to get his men out of camp, or into position without difficulty and confusion. He did however divide his cavalry between his two wings, guessing what the disposition of the enemy would be; and stationed the scutati and Gauls, and in short all his heavy-armed men in the space between the two bodies of cavalry. His archers, slingers, and all such kind of troops he placed on the outer flank of the cavalry on either wing; while his scythed chariots he placed at intervals in front of his line. He gave his brother Neolaus command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself.

When the two armies advanced to the battle, Molon's ^note right wing remained faithful to him, and vigorously engaged the division of Zeuxis; but the left wing no sooner came within sight of the king than it deserted to the enemy: the result of which was that Molon's army was thrown into consternation, while the king's troops were inspired with redoubled confidence. When Molon comprehended what had taken place, and found himself surrounded on every side, reflecting on the tortures which would be inflicted upon him if he were taken alive, he put an end to his own life. So too all who had taken part in the plot fled severally to their own homes, and terminated their lives in the same way. Neolaus escaped from the field and found his way into Persis, to the house of Molon's brother Alexander; and there first killed his mother and Molon's children and afterwards himself, having previously persuaded Alexander to do the same to himself. After plundering the enemy's camp, the king ordered the body of Molon to be impaled on the most conspicuous spot in Media: which the men appointed

to the work immediately did; for they took it to Callonitis and impaled it close to the pass over Mount Zagrus. The king, after plundering the enemy's camp, rebuked the rebel army in a long speech; and finally receiving them back into favour by holding out his right hand to them, appointed certain officers to lead them back to Media and settle the affairs of that district; while he himself went down to Seleucia and made arrangements for the government of the Satrapies round it, treating all with equal clemency and prudence. But Hermeias acted with his usual harshness: he got up charges against the people of Seleucia, and imposed a fine of a thousand talents upon the city; drove their magistrates, called Adeiganes, into exile; and put many Seleucians to death with various tortures, by mutilation, the sword and the rack. With great difficulty, sometimes by dissuading Hermeias, and sometimes by interposing his own authority, the king did at length put an end to these severities; and, exacting only a fine of a hundred and fifty talents from the citizens for the error they had committed, restored the city to a state of order. This being done, he left Diogenes in command of Media, and Apollodorus of Susiana; and sent Tychon, his chief military secretary, to command the district along the Persian Gulf.

Thus was the rebellion of Molon and the rising in the upper Satrapies suppressed and quieted.

Elated by his success, and wishing to strike awe and ^note terror into the minds of the princes of the barbarians who were near, or conterminous with his own Satrapies, that they might never venture to aid by supplies or arms those who revolted from him, he determined to march against them. And first of all against Artabazanes, who appeared to be the most formidable and able of all the princes, and who ruled over a tribe called the Satrapeii, and others on their borders. ^note But Hermeias was at that time afraid of an expedition farther up country, owing to its danger; and was always yearning for the expedition against Ptolemy in accordance with his original plan. When news, however, came that a son had been born to the king, thinking that Antiochus might possibly fall by the hands of the

barbarians in upper Asia, or give him opportunities of putting him out of the way, he consented to the expedition; believing that, if he could only effect the death of Antiochus, he would be guardian to his son and so sole master of the whole kingdom. This having been decided, the army crossed Mount Zagrus and entered the territory of Artabazanes, which borders on Media, and is separated from it by an intervening chain of mountains. Part of it overlooks the Pontus, near the valley of the Phasis; and it extends to the Hyrcanian Sea. Its inhabitants are numerous and warlike and especially strong in horsemen; while the district produces within itself all other things necessary for war. The dynasty has lasted from the time of the Persians, having been overlooked at the period of Alexander's conquests. But now in great alarm at the king's approach, and at his own infirmities, for he was an extremely old man, Artabazanes yielded to the force of circumstances, and made a treaty with Antiochus on his own terms.

It was after the settlement of this treaty that Apollophanes, the physician, who was regarded with ^note great affection by the king, observing that Hermeias was getting beyond all bounds in his high place, began to be anxious for the king's safety, and still more suspicious and uneasy for his own. He took an opportunity, therefore, of conveying a suggestion to the king, that he had better not be too careless or unsuspicious of the audacious character of Hermeias; nor let things go on until he found himself involved in a disaster like that of his brother. "The danger," he said, "is not at all remote." And he begged him to be on his guard, and take prompt measures for the safety of himself and his friends. Antiochus owned to him that he disliked and feared Hermeias; and thanked him for the care of his person, which had emboldened him to speak to him on the subject. This conversation encouraged Apollophanes by convincing him that he had not been mistaken about the feelings and opinions of the king; and Antiochus begged him not to confine his assistance to words, but to take some practical steps to secure the safety of himself and his friends. Upon Apollophanes replying that he was ready to do anything in the world, they concerted the

following plan. On the pretext of the king being afflicted with an attack of vertigo, it was given out that the daily attendance of courtiers and officials was to be discontinued for a few days: the king and his physician thus getting the opportunity of conferring with such of his friends as he chose, who came on the pretext of visiting him. In the course of these visits suitable persons for carrying out the design were prepared and instructed; and every one readily responding to the proposal, from hatred of Hermeias, they proceeded to complete it. The physicians having prescribed walks at daybreak for Antiochus on account of the coolness, Hermeias came to the place assigned for the walk, and with him those of the king's friends who were privy to the design; while the rest were much too late on account of the time of the king's coming out being very different from what it had usually been. Thus they got Hermeias gradually a considerable distance from the camp, until they came to a certain lonely spot, and then, on the king's going a little off the road, on the pretence of a necessary purpose, they stabbed him to death. Such was the end of Hermeias, whose punishment was by no means equal to his crimes. Thus freed from much fear and embarrassment, the king set out on his march home amidst universal manifestations from the people of the country in favour of his measures and policy; but nothing was more emphatically applauded in the course of his progress than the removal of Hermeias. In Apameia, at the same time, the women stoned the wife of Hermeias to death, and the boys his sons.

When he had reached home and had dismissed his ^note troops into winter quarters, Antiochus sent a message to Achaeus, protesting against his assumption of the diadem and royal title, and warning him that he was aware of his dealings with Ptolemy, and of his restless intrigues generally. For while the king was engaged on his expedition against Artabazanes, Achaeus, being persuaded that Antiochus would fall, or that, if he did not fall, would be so far off, that it would be possible for him to invade Syria before his return, and with the assistance of the Cyrrhestae, who were in revolt against the king, seize the

kingdom, started from Lydia with his whole army; and on arriving at Laodiceia, in Phrygia, assumed the diadem, and had the audacity for the first time to adopt the title of king, and to send royal despatches to the cities, the exile Garsyeris being his chief adviser in this measure. But as he advanced farther and farther, and was now almost at Lycaonia, a mutiny broke out among his forces, arising from the dissatisfaction of the men at the idea of being led against their natural king. When Achaeus found that this disturbed state of feeling existed among them, he desisted from his enterprise; and wishing to make his men believe that he had never had any intention of invading Syria, he directed his march into Pisidia, and plundered the country. By thus securing large booty for his army he conciliated its affection and confidence, and then returned to his own Satrapy.

Every detail of these transactions was known to the king: who, while sending frequent threatening messages to Achaeus, was now concentrating all his efforts on the preparations for the war against Ptolemy. ^note Having accordingly mustered his forces at Apameia just before spring, he summoned his friends to advise with him as to the invasion of Coele-Syria. After many suggestions had been made in respect to this undertaking, touching the nature of the country, the military preparation required, and the assistance to be rendered by the fleet,—Apollophanes of Seleucia, whom I mentioned before, put an abrupt end to all these suggestions by remarking that "it was folly to desire Coele-Syria and to march against that, while they allowed Seleucia to be held by Ptolemy, which was the capital, and so to speak, the very inner shrine of the king's realm. ^note Besides the disgrace to the kingdom which its occupation by the Egyptian monarchs involved, it was a position of the greatest practical importance, as a most admirable base of operations. Occupied by the enemy it was of the utmost hindrance to all the king's designs; for in whatever direction he might have it in his mind to move his forces, his own country, owing to the fear of danger from this place, would need as much care and precaution as the preparations against his foreign enemies. Once taken, on the

other hand, not only would it perfectly secure the safety of the home district, but was also capable of rendering effective aid to the king's other designs and undertakings, whether by land or sea, owing to its commanding situation." His words carried conviction to the minds of all, and it was resolved that the capture of the town should be their first step. For Seleucia was still held by a garrison for the Egyptian kings; and had been so since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, who took it when he invaded Syria to revenge the murder of Berenice.

In consequence of this decision, orders were sent to Diognetus the commander of the fleet to sail towards Seleucia: while Antiochus himself started from Apameia with his army, and encamped near the Hippodrome, about five stades from the town. He also despatched Theodotus Hemiolius with an adequate force against Coele-Syria, with orders to occupy the passes and to keep the road open for him.

The situation of Seleucia and the natural features of the surrounding country are of this kind. The city stands on the sea coast between Cilicia and Phoenicia; and has close to it a very great mountain called Coryphaeus, which on the west is washed by the last waves of the sea which lies between Cyprus and Phoenicia; while its eastern slopes overlook the territories of Antioch and Seleucia. It is on the southern skirt of this mountain that the town of Seleucia lies, separated from it by a deep and difficult ravine. The town extends down to the sea in a straggling line broken by irregularities of the soil, and is surrounded on most parts by cliffs and precipitous rocks. On the side facing the sea, where the ground is level, stand the market-places, and the lower town strongly walled. Similarly the whole of the main town has been fortified by walls of a costly construction, and splendidly decorated with temples and other elaborate buildings. There is only one approach to it on the seaward side, which is an artificial ascent cut in the form of a stair, interrupted by frequently occurring drops and awkward places. Not far from the town is the mouth of the river Orontes, which rises in the district of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and after traversing the plain of Amyca reaches

Antioch; through which it flows, and carrying off by the force of its current all the sewage of that town, finally discharges itself into this sea not far from Seleucia.

Antiochus first tried sending messages to the magistrates of Seleucia, offering money and other rewards on condition of having the city surrendered without fighting. And though he failed to persuade the chief authorities, he corrupted some of the subordinate commanders; and relying on them, he made preparations to assault the town on the sea-ward side with the men of his fleet, and on the land side with his soldiers. He divided his forces therefore into three parts, and addressed suitable words of exhortation to them, causing a herald to proclaim a promise to men and officers alike of great gifts and crowns that should be bestowed for gallantry in action. To the division under Zeuxis he entrusted the attack upon the gate leading to Antioch; to Hermogenes that upon the walls near the temple of Castor and Pollux; and to Ardys and Diognetus the assault upon the docks and the lower town: in accordance with his understanding with his partisans in the town, whereby it had been agreed that, if he could carry the lower town by assault, the city also should then be put into his hands. When the signal was given, a vigorous and determined assault was begun simultaneously at all these points: though that made by Ardys and Diognetus was by far the most daring; for the other points did not admit of any assault at all by means of scaling ladders, nor could be carried except by the men climbing up on their hands and knees; while at the docks and lower town it was possible to apply scaling ladders and fix them firmly and safely against the walls. The naval contingent therefore having fixed their ladders on the docks, and the division of Ardys theirs upon the lower town, a violent effort was made to carry the walls: and the garrison of the upper town being prevented from coming to the assistance of these places, because the city was being assaulted at every other point at the same time, Ardys was not long before he captured the lower town. No sooner had this fallen, than the subordinate officers who had been corrupted hurried to the commander-in-chief Leontius, and urged that he ought to

send ambassadors to Antiochus, and make terms with him, before the city was taken by storm. Knowing nothing about the treason of these officers, but alarmed by their consternation, Leontius sent commissioners to the king to make terms for the safety of all within the city.

The king accepted the proposal and agreed to grant safety to all in the town who were free, amounting to six thousand souls. And when he took over the town, he not only spared the free, but also recalled those of the inhabitants who had been exiled; and restored to them their citizenship and property; while he secured the harbour and citadel with garrisons.

While still engaged in this business, he received a letter ^note from Theodotus offering to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and inviting him to come thither with all speed. This letter caused him great embarrassment and doubt as to what he ought to do, and how best to take advantage of the offer. This Theodotus was an Aetolian who, as I have already narrated, had rendered important services to Ptolemy's kingdom: for which, far from being reckoned deserving of gratitude, he had been in imminent danger of his life, just about the time of the expedition of Antiochus against Molon. Thereupon conceiving a contempt for Ptolemy, and a distrust of his courtiers, he seized upon Ptolemais with his own hands, and upon Tyre by the agency of Panaetolus, and made haste to invite Antiochus. Postponing therefore his expedition against Achaeus, and regarding everything else as of secondary importance, Antiochus started with his army by the same route as he had come. After passing the canon called Marsyas, he encamped near Gerrha, close to the lake which lies between the two mountains. Hearing there that Ptolemy's general Nicolaus was besieging Theodotus in Ptolemais, he left his heavy-armed troops behind with orders to their leaders to besiege Brochi,—the stronghold which commands the road along the lake,—and led his light-armed troops forward himself, with the intention of raising the siege of Ptolemais. But Nicolaus had already got intelligence of the king's approach; and had accordingly retired from Ptolemais himself, and sent forward Diogoras the

Cretan and Dorymenes the Aetolian to occupy the passes at Berytus. The king therefore attacked these men, and having easily routed them took up a position near the pass.

There he awaited the coming up of the remainder ^note of his forces, and, after addressing them in words befitting the occasion, continued his advance with his entire army, full of courage and with high hopes of success. When Theodotus and Panaetolus met him with their partisans he received them graciously, and took over from them Tyre and Ptolemais, and the war material which those cities contained. Part of this consisted of forty vessels, of which twenty were decked and splendidly equipped, and none with less than four banks of oars; the other twenty were made up of triremes, biremes, and cutters. These he handed over to the care of the Navarch Diognetus; and being informed that Ptolemy had come out against him, and had reached Memphis, and that all his forces were collected at Pelusium, and were opening the sluices, and filling up the wells of drinking water, he abandoned the idea of attacking Pelusium; but making a progress through the several cities, endeavoured to win them over by force or persuasion to his authority. Some of the less-fortified cities were overawed at his approach and made no difficulty about submitting, but others trusting to their fortifications or the strength of their situations held out; and to these he was forced to lay regular siege and so wasted a considerable time.

Though treated with such flagrant perfidy, the character of Ptolemy was so feeble, and his neglect of all military preparations had been so great, that the idea of protecting his rights with the sword, which was his most obvious duty, never occurred to him.

Agathocles and Sosibius, however, the leading ministers ^note in the kingdom at that time, took counsel together and did the best they could with the means at their disposal, in view of the existing crisis. They resolved to devote themselves to the preparations for war; and, meanwhile, by embassies to try to retard the advance of Antiochus: pretending to confirm him in the opinion he originally entertained about

Ptolemy, namely, that he would not venture to fight, but would trust to negotiations, and the interposition of common friends, to induce him to evacuate Coele-Syria. Having determined upon this policy, Agathocles and Sosibius, to whom the whole business was entrusted, lost no time in sending their ambassadors to Antiochus: and at the same time they sent messages to Rhodes, Byzantium, and Cyzicus, not omitting the Aetolians, inviting them to send commissioners to discuss the terms of a treaty. The commissioners duly arrived, and by occupying the time with going backwards and forwards between the two kings, abundantly secured to these statesmen the two things which they wanted,—delay, and time to make their preparations for war. They fixed their residence at Memphis and there carried on these negotiations continuously. Nor were they less attentive to the ambassadors from Antiochus, whom they received with every mark of courtesy and kindness. But meanwhile they were calling up and collecting at Alexandria the mercenaries whom they had on service in towns outside Egypt; were despatching men to recruit foreign soldiers; and were collecting provisions both for the troops they already possessed, and for those that were coming in. No less active were they in every other department of the military preparations. They took turns in going on rapid and frequent visits to Alexandria, to see that the supplies should in no point be inadequate to the undertaking before them. The manufacture of arms, the selection of men, and their division into companies, they committed to the care of Echecrates of Thessaly and Phoxidas of Melita. With these they associated Eurylochus of Magnesia, and Socrates of Boeotia, who were also joined by Cnopias of Allaria. By the greatest good fortune they had got hold of these officers, who, while serving with Demetrius and Antigonus, ^note had acquired some experience of real war and actual service in the field. Accordingly they took command of the assembled troops, and made the best of them by giving them the training of soldiers.

Their first measure was to divide them according to their country and age, and to assign to each division its appropriate arms, taking no account of what they had borne

before. ^noteNext they broke up their battalions and muster-rolls, which had been formed on the basis of their old system of pay, and formed them into companies adapted to the immediate purpose. Having effected this they began to drill the men; habituating them severally not only to obey the words of command, but also to the proper management of their weapons. ^note They also frequently summoned general meetings at headquarters, and delivered speeches to the men. The most useful in this respect were Andromachus of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos; because they had recently crossed from Greece, and were still thoroughly imbued with the Greek spirit, and the military ideas prevalent in the several states. Moreover, they were illustrious on the score of their private wealth, as well as on that of their respective countries; to which advantages Polycrates added those of an ancient family, and of the reputation obtained by his father Mnasiades as an athlete. By private and public exhortations these officers inspired their men with a zeal and enthusiasm for the struggle which awaited them.

All these officers, too, had commands in the army suited to their particular accomplishments. Eurylochus of magnesia commanded about three thousand men of what were called in the royal armies the Agema, or Guard; Socrates of Boeotia had two thousand light-armed troops under him; while the Achaean Phoxidas, and Ptolemy the son of Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus were associated in the duty of drilling the phalanx and the mercenary Greek soldiers on the same ground,—Andromachus and Ptolemy commanding the phalanx, Phoxidas the mercenaries; of which the numbers were respectively twenty-five thousand and eight thousand. The cavalry, again, attached to the court, amounting to seven hundred, as well as that which was obtained from Lybia or enlisted in the country, were being trained by Polycrates, and were under his personal command: amounting

in all to about three thousand men. In the actual campaign the most effective service was performed by Echecrates of Thessaly, by whom the Greek cavalry, which, with the whole body of mercenary cavalry, amounted to two thousand men, was splendidly trained. No one took more pains with the men under his command than Cnopias of Allaria. He commanded all the Cretans, who numbered three thousand, and among them a thousand Neo-Cretans, ^note over whom he had set Philo of Cnossus. They also armed three thousand Libyans in the Macedonian fashion, who were commanded by Ammonius of Barce. The Egyptians themselves supplied twenty thousand soldiers to the phalanx, and were under the command of Sosibius. A body of Thracians and Gauls was also enrolled, four thousand being taken from settlers in the country and their descendants, while two thousand had been recently enlisted and brought over: and these were under the command of Dionysius of Thrace. Such in its numbers, and in the variety of the elements of which it was composed, was the force which was being got ready for Ptolemy.

Meanwhile Antiochus had been engaged in the ^note siege of Dura: ^note but the strength of the place and the support given it by Nicolaus prevented him from effecting anything; and as the winter was closing in, he agreed with the ambassadors of Ptolemy to a suspension of hostilities for four months, and promised that he would discuss the whole question at issue in a friendly spirit. But he was as far as possible from being sincere in this negotiation: his real object was to avoid being detained any length of time from his own country, and to be able to place his troops in winter quarters in Seleucia; because Achaeus was now notoriously plotting against him, and without disguise co-operating with Ptolemy. So having come to this agreement, Antiochus dismissed the ambassadors with injunctions to acquaint him as soon as possible with the decision of Ptolemy, and to meet him at Seleucia. He then placed the necessary guards in the various strongholds, committed to

Theodotus the command-in-chief over them all, and returned home. On his arrival at Seleucia he distributed his forces into their winter quarters; and from that time forth took no pains to keep the mass of his army under discipline, being persuaded that the business would not call for any more fighting; because he was already master of some portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, and expected to secure the rest by voluntary submission or by diplomacy: for Ptolemy, he believed, would not venture upon a general engagement. This opinion was shared also by the ambassadors: because Sosibius fixing his residence at Memphis conducted his negotiations with them in a friendly manner; while he prevented those who went back wards and forwards to Antiochus from ever becoming eyewitnesses of the preparations that were being carried on at Alexandria. Nay, even by the time that the ambassadors arrived, Sosibius was already prepared for every eventuality.

Meanwhile Antiochus was extremely anxious to have ^note as much the advantage over the government of Alexandria in diplomatic argument as he had in arms. Accordingly when the ambassadors arrived at Seleucia, and both parties began, in accordance with the instructions of Sosibius, to discuss the clauses of the proposed arrangement in detail, the king made very light of the loss recently sustained by Ptolemy, and the injury which had been manifestly inflicted upon him by the existing occupation of Coele-Syria; and in the pleadings on this subject he refused to look upon this transaction in the light of an injury at all, alleging that the places belonged to him of right. ^noteHe asserted that the original occupation of the country by Antigonus the One-eyed, and the royal authority exercised over it by Seleucus, ^note constituted an absolutely decisive and equitable claim, in virtue of which Coele-Syria belonged of right to himself and not to Ptolemy; for Ptolemy I. went to war with Antigonus with the view of annexing this country, not to his own government, but to that of Seleucus. But, above all, he

pressed the convention entered into by the three kings, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, when, after having conquered Antigonus, ^note they deliberated in common upon the arrangements to be made, and decided that the whole of Syria should belong to Seleucus. The commissioners of Ptolemy endeavoured to establish the opposite case. ^note They magnified the existing injury, and dilated on its hardship; asserting that the treason of Theodotus and the invasion of Antiochus amounted to a breach of treaty-rights. They alleged the possession of these places in the reign of Ptolemy, son of Lagus; and tried to show that Ptolemy had joined Seleucus in the war on the understanding that he was to invest Seleucus with the government of the whole of Asia, but was to take Coele-Syria and Phoenicia for himself.

Such were the arguments brought forward by the two contracting parties in the course of the embassies and counterembassies and conferences. There was no prospect, however, of arriving at any result, because the controversy was conducted, not by the principals, but by the common friends of both; and there was no one to intervene authoritatively to check and control the caprice of the party which they might decide to be in the wrong. But what caused the most insuperable difficulty was the matter of Achaeus. For Ptolemy was eager that the terms of the treaty should include him: while Antiochus would not allow the subject to be so much as mentioned; and was indignant that Ptolemy should venture to protect rebels, or bring such a point into the discussion at all.

The approach of spring found both sides weary of ^note negotiations, and with no prospect of coming to a conclusion. Antiochus therefore began collecting his forces, with a view of making an invasion by land and sea, and completing his conquest of Coele-Syria. On his part Ptolemy gave the supreme management of the war to Nicolaus, sent abundant provisions to Gaza, and despatched land and sea forces. The arrival of these reinforcements gave Nicolaus courage to enter upon the war: the commander of the navy promptly co-operating with him in carrying out all his orders. This admiral was Perigenes, whom Ptolemy sent out

in command of the fleet, consisting of thirty fully-decked ships and more than four thousand ships of burden. Nicolaus was by birth an Aetolian, and was the boldest and most experienced officer in the service of Ptolemy. With one division of his army he hastened to seize the pass at Platanus; with the rest, which he personally commanded, he occupied the environs of Porphyrion; and there prepared to resist the invasion of the king: the fleet being also anchored close to him.

Meanwhile Antiochus had advanced as far as Marathus. ^note On his way he had received a deputation of Aradians, asking for an alliance; and had not only granted their request, but had put an end to a quarrel which they had amongst themselves, by reconciling those of them who lived on the island with those who lived on the mainland. Starting from Marathus he entered the enemy's country near the promontory called Theoprosopon, and advanced to Berytus, having seized Botrys on his way, and burnt Trieres and Calamus. From Berytus he sent forward Nicarchus and Theodotus with orders to secure the difficult passes near the river Lycus; while he himself set his army in motion and encamped near the river Damuras: Diognetus, the commander of his navy, coasting along parallel with him all the while. Thence once more, taking with him the divisions commanded by Theodotus and Nicarchus, which were the light troops of the army, he set out to reconnoitre the pass occupied already by Nicolaus. After thoroughly surveying the nature of the ground, he retired to his camp for that day. But on the next, leaving his heavy-armed troops in the charge of Nicarchus, he set out with the rest of his forces to execute his design.

At this point there is but a small and narrow space ^note between the foot of Libanus and the sea; and even that is intersected by a steep and rugged spur, leaving only a narrow and difficult passage along the very water's edge. On this pass Nicolaus had taken up his position; and having occupied some of the points by means of his large numbers, and secured others by artificial works, he felt certain that he would be able to prevent Antiochus from effecting an entrance. But

the king divided his army into three parts, of which he entrusted one to Theodotus with orders to close with the enemy and force their way along the skirts of Libanus; the second to Menedemus with urgent orders to attempt the centre of the spur; while the third he put under the command of Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, and ordered them to keep close to the sea. He himself with his guard occupied a central position, intending to superintend the whole action and give help where it was wanted. At the same time Diognetus and Perigenes made preparations for a sea-fight, coming as close as possible to the shore, and endeavouring to make the battles at sea and on land present the appearance of a single contest. ^note A general advance having begun by sea and land, at the same signal and word of command, the battle on the sea was undecided, because the number of vessels on either side and their equipment were about equal: but on land the troops of Nicolaus got the best of it at first, from the advantage of their position. But when Theodotus routed the men on the mountain skirts, and then charged from the higher ground, Nicolaus's men all turned and fled precipitately. In this flight two thousand of them fell, and as many were taken prisoners: the rest retreated towards Sidon. Though he now had the better prospect of the two in the sea-fight; yet, when he saw the defeat of the army on land, Perigenes turned his prows and made good his retreat to the same place.

Thereupon Antiochus got his army on the march, and, ^note arriving at Sidon, encamped under its wall. He did not however venture to attempt the town, because of the vast stores it contained and the number of its ordinary inhabitants, as well as of the refugees who had collected there. ^note He therefore broke up his camp again, and continued his march towards Philoteria: ordering Diognetus his navarch to sail back with his ships to Tyre. Now Philoteria is situated right upon the shores of the lake into which the river Jordan discharges itself, and from which it issues out again into the plains surrounding Scythopolis. The surrender of these two cities

^noteto him encouraged him to prosecute his further designs; because the country subject to them was easily able to supply his whole army with provisions, and everything necessary for the campaign in abundance. ^noteHaving therefore secured them by garrisons, he crossed the mountain chain and arrived at Atabyrium, which is situated upon a rounded hill, the ascent of which is more than fifteen stades long. But on this occasion he managed to take it by an ambuscade and stratagem. He induced the men of the town to come out to a skirmish, and enticed their leading columns to a considerable distance; then his troops suddenly turned from their pretended flight, and those who were concealed rising from their ambush, he attacked and killed a large number of the enemy; and finally, by pursuing close upon their heels, and thus creating a panic in the town before he reached it, he carried it as he had done others by assault. At this juncture Ceraeas, one of Ptolemy's ^note At this juncture Ceraeas, one of Ptolemy's officers, deserted to Antiochus, whose distinguished reception caused great excitement in the minds of many other of the enemy's officers. ^noteAt any rate, not long afterwards, Hippolochus of Thessaly joined Antiochus with four hundred cavalry of Ptolemy's army. Having therefore secured Atabyrium also with a garrison, Antiochus started once more and took over Pella, Camus, and Gephrus.

This unbroken stream of success caused the inhabitants ^note of the neighbouring Arabia to rouse each other up to take action; and they unanimously joined Antiochus. ^noteWith the additional encouragement and supplies which they afforded he continued his advance; and, arriving in the district of Galatis, made himself master of Abila, and the relieving force which had thrown itself into that town, under the command of Nicias, a friend and kinsman of Menneas. ^noteGadara was the only town now left, which is thought to be the strongest of any in those parts. ^noteHe therefore encamped under its walls and, bringing siegeworks to bear upon it, quickly terrified it into submission. Then hearing that a strong force of the enemy were concentrated at Rabbatamana in Arabia,

and were pillaging and overrunning the territory of those Arabians who had joined him, he threw everything else aside and started thither; and pitched his camp at the foot of the high ground on which that city stands. After going round and reconnoitring the hill, and finding that it admitted of being ascended only at two points, he led his army to them and set up his siege artillery at these points. He put one set of siege-works under the care of Nicarchus, the other under that of Theodotus: while he superintended both equally, and observed the zeal shown by the two respectively. Great exertions were accordingly made by each, and a continual rivalry kept up as to which should be the first to make a breach in the wall opposite their works: and the result was that both breaches were made with unexpected rapidity; whereupon they kept making assaults night and day, and trying every means to force an entrance, without an hour's intermission. ^note But though they kept up these attempts continuously, they failed to make any impression; until a prisoner showed them the underground passage through which the besieged were accustomed to descend to fetch water. They broke into this and stopped it up with timber and stones and everything of that sort; and when this was done, the garrison surrendered for want of water. Having thus got possession of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus with an adequate garrison in command of it; and sent the two deserters from Ptolemy, Hippolochus and Ceraeas, with five thousand infantry, to Samaria: with orders to take the government of the district and protect all who submitted to him. ^noteHe then started with his army for Ptolemais, where he was resolved to winter.

In the course of this same summer, the Pednelissians, ^{note note}. being besieged and reduced to great straits by the Selgians, sent messages to Achaeus asking for help: and upon receiving a ready assent, continued to sustain the siege with great spirit in reliance upon this hope of relief. Achaeus selected Garsyeris to conduct the expedition; and sent him out in all haste, with six thousand

infantry and five hundred horse, to relieve the Pednelissians. But when they heard of the approach of the army of relief, the Selgians occupied the pass called the Stair with the main body of their own army; and put a garrison at the entrance into Saperda: breaking up and spoiling all the paths and tracks leading to it. After entering Milyades and encamping under the walls of Cretopolis, perceiving that a farther advance was made impossible by the occupation of these positions by the enemy, Garsyeris hit upon the following ruse. He broke up his camp, and began his return march, as though he had abandoned all thoughts of relieving Pednelissus, owing to the enemy's occupation of these positions. The Selgians were readily persuaded that he had really abandoned the relief of Pednelissus, and departed, some to the besieging camp and others home to Selge, as it was now close upon harvest-time. Thereupon Garsyeris faced about, and, marching with great speed, arrived at the pass over the mountain; and finding it unguarded, secured it by a garrison, under the command of Phayllus; while he himself with his main army went to Perga: and thence sent embassies to the other states in Pisidia and Pamphylia, pointing out that the power of the Selgians was A standing menace, and urging all to ally themselves with Achaeus and join in relieving Pednelissus.

Meanwhile the Selgians had sent out a general in command of a force which they hoped would terrify Phallyus by their superior knowledge of the country, and expel him from his strong position. But when, far from attaining their object, they lost large numbers of men in their attacks upon him; though they abandoned the hope of accomplishing this, they yet persisted with increased ardour in the siege of Pednelissus. Garsyeris was now reinforced by eight thousand hoplites from the Etennes, who inhabit the highlands of Pisidia above Side, and half that number from Aspendus. The people of Side itself, partly from a wish to curry favour with Antiochus, but chiefly from hatred to the Aspendians, refused to take part in the relief of Pednelissus. With these reinforcements, as well as his own army, Garsyeris advanced towards Pednelissus, feeling certain that he would be able to raise the siege at the

first attack: but when the Selgians showed no sign of alarm, he entrenched himself at a moderate distance from them. The Pednelissians were now becoming hard pressed from want of provisions; and Garsyeris, being anxious to do all he could, got ready two thousand men, giving each a medimnus of wheat, and despatched them under cover of night into Pednelissus. But the Selgians getting intelligence of what was going on, and, coming out to intercept them, most of those who were carrying in the corn were killed, and the Selgians got possession of the wheat. Elated with this success, they now essayed to storm the camp of Garsyeris as well as the city. An adventurous daring in the presence of the enemy is indeed characteristic of the Selgians: and on this occasion they left a barely sufficient number to guard their camp; and, surrounding the enemy's entrenchment with the rest, assaulted it at several points at once. Finding himself unexpectedly attacked on every side, and portions of his palisade being already torn down, Garsyeris, appreciating the gravity of the danger, and feeling that there was but little chance of averting total destruction, sent out some cavalry at a point which the enemy had left unguarded. These the Selgians imagined to be flying in a panic and for fear of what was coming: and therefore, instead of attending to them, they treated them with utter contempt. When these horsemen, however, had ridden round, so as to get on the rear of the enemy, they charged and fought with great fierceness. This raised the spirits of Garsyeris's infantry, though they had already given way: and they therefore faced round, and once more offered resistance to the troops that were storming their camp. The Selgians, accordingly, being now attacked on front and rear at once, broke and fled. At the same time the Pednelissians sallied out and attacked the troops left in charge of the Selgian camp, and drove them out. The pursuit lasted to so great a distance that no less than ten thousand of the Selgian army fell: of the survivors all who were allies fled to their own cities; while the Selgians themselves escaped over the highlands into their native land.

Garsyeris immediately started in pursuit of the fugitives, being in haste to get over the narrow pass, and approach Selge, before they could make a stand, and form any

plan for meeting his approach. Thus he came to Selge with his army. ^note But the inhabitants, having no longer any hopes in their allies, after the disaster which had affected them all alike, and themselves dispirited at the misfortune which had befallen them, became exceedingly anxious for the safety of themselves and their country. They accordingly determined in public assembly to send one of their citizens on an embassy to Gassyeris; and selected for the purpose Logbasis, who had been for a long time on terms of intimacy and friendship with the Antiochus that lost his life in Thrace. ^note Laodice, ^note also, who became afterwards the wife of Achaeus, having been committed to his care, he had brought this young lady up as his daughter, and had treated her with conspicuous kindness. ^note The Selgians therefore thought that his character made him eminently fitted for an ambassador in the circumstances, and accordingly sent him on the mission. He, however, obtained a private interview with Garsyeris, and was so far from carrying out the purpose for which he came, by properly supporting the interests of his country, that on the contrary he strongly urged Garsyeris to send with all speed for Achaeus, and undertook to put the city into their hands. Garsyeris, of course, grasped eagerly at the chance offered to him and sent messengers to induce Achaeus to come, and to inform him of the position of affairs. Meanwhile he concluded an armistice with the Selgians, and protracted the negotiations for a treaty by continually bringing forward objections and scruples on points of detail, in order to give time for the arrival of Achaeus, and for Logbasis to conduct his negotiations and mature his plot.

While this was going on frequent meetings for discussion took place between the camp and the town, and it became quite an ordinary thing for the soldiers to go into the town to purchase corn. This is a state of things which has on many occasions proved fatal. And it appears to me that of all animals the most easily deceived is man, though he has the credit of being the most cunning. For consider how

many entrenched camps and fortresses, how many and what great cities have been betrayed by this kind of trick! And yet in spite of such frequent and conspicuous examples of the many people to whom it has happened, somehow or another we are always new to such deceit, and fall into the trap with the inexperience of youth. The reason is that we do not keep ready for reference in our minds the disasters of those who have made mistakes before us in this or that particular. But while preparing with great labour and cost stores of corn and money, and a provision of walls and weapons to meet unforeseen eventualities, that which is the easiest of all and the most serviceable in the hour of danger—that we all neglect; although we might obtain this experience from history and research, which in themselves add a dignity to leisure and a charm to existence.

Achaeus then duly arrived at the time expected: and after ^note conference with him, the Selgians had great hopes of experiencing some signal kindness at his hands. But in the interval Logbasis had little by little collected in his house some of the soldiers who came into the town from the camp; and now advised the citizens not to let slip the opportunity, but to act with the display of Achaeus's kindly disposition towards them before their eyes; and to put the finishing stroke to the treaty, after holding a general assembly of the whole community to discuss the situation. An assembly was at once convened, to which even those on guard were all summoned to assist in bringing the treaty to completion; and the citizens began deliberating on the state of affairs.

Meanwhile Logbasis, who had agreed with the enemy to take that opportunity, began getting ready those who had congregated at his house, and prepared and armed himself and his sons also for the fight. And now Achaeus with half the hostile force was advancing towards the city itself; while Garsyeris with the remainder was marching towards the Cesbedium as it is called, or temple of Zeus, which stands in a position commanding the city and presenting very much the appearance of a citadel. But a goatherd, having by chance observed what was going on, brought the news to the assembly; thereupon some of the citizens made a hurried rush

to the Cesbedium, others to their posts on the wall, and the majority in great anger to the house of Logbasis. His treasonable practice being thus detected, some of them climbed upon the roof, others forced their way in by the front door, and murdered Logbasis and his sons and all the other men which they found there at the same time. Then they caused a proclamation to be made promising freedom to all slaves who would join them: and dividing themselves into three companies, they hastened to defend all the points of vantage. When he saw that the Cesbedium was already occupied, Garsyeris abandoned his enterprise; but Achaeus held on his way until he came right up to the gates: whereupon the Selgians sallied out, killed seven hundred, and forced the rest to give up the attempt. Upon this conclusion of their enterprise, Achaeus and Garsyeris retired to the camp. But the Selgians fearing treason among themselves, and alarmed at the presence of a hostile camp, sent out some of their elders in the guise of suppliants, and concluded a peace, on condition of paying four hundred talents on the spot and restoring the Pednelissians whom they had taken prisoners, and paying a further sum of three hundred talents at a fixed date. Thus did the Selgians by their own valour save their country, which they had been in danger of losing through the infamous treason of Logbasis; and thus neither disgraced their freedom, nor their relationship to the Lacedaemonians. ^note

But after reducing Milyas, and the greater part of Pamphylia, Achaeus took his departure, and arriving at Sardis kept up a continuous warfare with Attalus, and began threatening Prusias, and making himself an object of terror and alarm to all the inhabitants on this side Taurus.

But while Achaeus was engaged on his expedition against ^note Selge, Attalus with the Aegosagae from Gaul was going through all the cities in Aeolis, and the neighbourhood, which had before this been terrified into joining Achaeus; but most of which now voluntarily and even gratefully gave in their adherence to him, though there were some few which waited to be forced. Now the cities which transferred their

allegiance to him in the first instance were Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea; after them Aegae and Temnus submitted, in terror at his approach; and thereupon he was waited upon by ambassadors from Teos and Colophon with offers to surrender themselves and their cities. He received them also upon the same terms as they had enjoyed before, taking hostages; but he treated the ambassadors from Smyrna with special kindness, because they had been the most constant in their loyalty of all. Continuing his march without interruption, he crossed the Lycus and arrived at the hamlets of Mysia, and thence came to Carseae. Overawing the inhabitants of this town, as well as the garrison of the Two Walls, he got them surrendered to him by Themistocles, who had been, as it happened, left by Achaeus in command of this district. Starting thence, and wasting the plain of Apia, he crossed Mount Pelecas and encamped near the river Megistus.

While he was here an eclipse of the moon occurred: ^note and the Gauls who had all along been much discontented at the hardships of the march,—which was rendered the more painful for them by the fact of their being accompanied by their wives and children, who followed the host in waggons,— now regarded the eclipse as an evil augury, and refused to go on. But King Attalus, who got no effective service out of them, and saw that they straggled during the march and encamped by themselves, and wholly declined to obey orders and despised all authority, was in great doubt as to what to do. He was anxious less ^note they should desert to Achaeus, and join in an attack upon himself: and was at the same time uneasy at the scandal to which he would give rise, if he caused his soldiers to surround and kill all these men, who were believed to have crossed into Asia in reliance on his honour. He therefore seized the occasion of their refusal to proceed, to promise them that he would see that they were taken back to the place where they had crossed into Asia; would assign them suitable lands for a settlement; and would afterwards do them any service they asked for, if it was within his power and consistent with justice.

Accordingly Attalus led the Aegosagae back to the Helles

pont; and after negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Ilium, and Alexandria, conducted in a friendly spirit because they had preserved their loyalty to him, he returned with his army to Pergamum.

At the beginning of the following spring, having all ^note preparations for war completed, Antiochus and Ptolemy determined to bring their claims to Coele-Syria to the decision of a battle. Ptolemy accordingly set out from Alexandria with seventy thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and seventy-three elephants. Being informed of his approach, Antiochus drew his forces together. These consisted of Daae, Carmani, and Cilicians, equipped as light-armed troops to the number of about five thousand, under the charge and command of Byttacus the Macedonian. ^note Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian fashion, most of whom had silver shields. The number of the phalanx was twenty thousand, and they were led by Nicarchus and Theodotus Hemiolius. In addition to these there were Agrianes and Persians, who were either bowmen or slingers, to the number of two thousand. With them were a thousand Thracians, under the command of Menedemus of Alabanda. There was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians, amounting to five thousand men, who were assigned to the chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. Certain Arabians also and men of neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten thousand, were commanded by Zabdibelus. The mercenaries from Greece amounting to five thousand were led by Hippolochus of Thessaly. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred Cretans who came with Eurylochus, and a thousand Neo-Cretans commanded by Zelys of Gortyna; with whom were five hundred javelin-men of Lydia, and a thousand Cardaces who came with Lysimachus the Gaul. The entire number of his horse was six thousand; four thousand were commanded by the king's nephew Antipater, the rest by Themison: so that the whole

number of Antiochus's force was sixty-two thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and one hundred and two elephants.

Having marched to Pelusium Ptolemy made his first ^note halt in that town: and having been there joined by the stragglers, and having given out their rations of corn to his men, he got the army in motion, and led them by a line of march which goes through the waterless region skirting Mount Casius and the Marshes. ^note On the fifth day's march he reached his destination, and pitched his camp a distance of fifty stades from Rhaphia, which is the first city of Coele-Syria towards Egypt.

While Ptolemy was effecting this movement Antiochus ^note arrived with his army at Gaza, where he was joined by some reinforcements, and once more commenced his advance, proceeding at a leisurely pace. He passed Rhaphia and encamped about ten stades from the enemy. For a while the two armies preserved this distance, and remained encamped opposite each other. But after some few days, wishing to remove to more advantageous ground and to inspire confidence in his troops, Antiochus pushed forward his camp so much nearer Ptolemy, that the palisades of the two camps were not more than five stades from each other; and while in this position, there were frequent struggles at the watering-places and on forays, as well as infantry and cavalry skirmishes in the space between the camps.

In the course of these proceedings Theodotus conceived ^note and put into execution an enterprise, very characteristic of an Aetolian, but undoubtedly requiring great personal courage. Having formerly lived at Ptolemy's court he knew the king's tastes and habits. Accordingly, accompanied by two others, he entered the enemy's camp just before daybreak; where, owing to the dim light, he could not be recognised by his face, while his dress and other accoutrements did not render him noticeable, owing to the variety of costume prevailing among themselves. He had marked the position of the king's tent during the

preceding days, for the skirmishes took place quite close; and he now walked boldly up to it, and passed through all the outer ring of attendants without being observed: but when he came to the tent in which the king was accustomed to transact business and dine, though he searched it in every conceivable way, he failed to find the king; for Ptolemy slept in another tent, separate from the public and official tent. He however wounded two men who were sleeping there, and killed Andreas, the king's physician; and then returned safely to his own camp, without meeting with any molestation, except just as he was passing over the vallum of the enemy's camp. As far as daring went, he had fulfilled his purpose: but he had failed in prudence by not taking the precaution to ascertain where Ptolemy was accustomed to sleep.

After being encamped opposite each other for five ^note days, the two kings resolved to bring matters to the decision of battle. And upon Ptolemy beginning to move his army outside its camp, Antiochus hastened to do the same. Both formed their front of their phalanx and men armed in the Macedonian manner. But Ptolemy's two wings were formed as follows:—Polycrates, with the cavalry under his command, occupied the left, and between him and the phalanx were Cretans standing close by the horsemen; next them came the royal guard; ^note then the peltasts under Socrates, adjoining the Libyans armed in Macedonian fashion. On the right wing was Echecrates of Thessaly, with his division of cavalry; on his left were stationed Gauls and Thracians; next them Phoxidas and the Greek mercenaries, extending to the Egyptian phalanx. Of the elephants forty were on the left wing, where Ptolemy was to be in person during the battle; the other thirty-three had been stationed in front of the right wing opposite the mercenary cavalry.

Antiochus also placed sixty of his elephants commanded by his foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, on which he was to be present personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind these he stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and two thousand more at right angles to them.

In line with the cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them the Greek mercenaries; with the latter he mixed two thousand of these armed in the Macedonian fashion under the command of the Macedonian Byttacus. At the extreme point of the left wing he placed two thousand cavalry under the command of Themison; by their side Cardacian and Lydian javelin-men; next them the light-armed division of three thousand, commanded by Menedemus; then the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and by their side the Arabians and neighbouring peoples who continued the line up to the phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he placed in front of his left wing under the command of Myiscus, one of the boys about the court.

The two armies having been drawn up in the order I ^note have described; the kings went along their respective lines, and addressed words of encouragement and exhortation to their officers and friends. But as they both rested their strongest hopes on their phalanx, they showed their greatest earnestness and addressed their strongest exhortations to them; which were re-echoed in Ptolemy's case by Andromachus and Sosibius and the king's sister Arsinoe; in the case of Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus: these officers being the commanders of the phalanx in the two armies respectively. The substance of what was said on both sides was the same: for neither monarch had any glorious or famous achievement of his own to quote to those whom he was addressing, seeing that they had but recently succeeded to their crowns; but they endeavoured to inspire the men of the phalanx with spirit and boldness, by reminding them of the glory of their ancestors, and the great deeds performed by them. But they chiefly dwelt upon the hopes of advancement which the men might expect at their hands in the future; and they called upon and exhorted the leaders and the whole body of men, who were about to be engaged, to maintain the fight with a manly and courageous spirit. So with these or similar words, delivered by their own lips or by interpreters, they rode along their lines.

Ptolemy, accompanied by his sister, having arrived at

the left wing of his army, and Antiochus with the royal guard at the right: they gave the signal for the battle, and opened the fight by a charge of elephants. ^noteOnly some few of Ptolemy's elephants came to close quarters with the foe: seated on these the soldiers in the howdahs maintained a brilliant fight, lunging at and striking each other with crossed pikes. ^note But the elephants themselves fought still more brilliantly, using all their strength in the encounter, and pushing against each other, forehead to forehead.

The way in which elephants fight is this: they get their ^note tusks entangled and jammed, and then push against one another with all their might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving superior in strength has pushed aside the other's trunk; and when once he can get a side blow at his enemy, he pierces him with his tusks as a bull would with his horns. Now, most of Ptolemy's animals, as is the way with Libyan elephants, were afraid to face the fight: for they cannot stand the smell or the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, but are frightened at their size and strength, I suppose, and run away from them at once without waiting to come near them. ^note This is exactly what happened on this occasion: and upon their being thrown into confusion and being driven back upon their own lines, Ptolemy's guard gave way before the rush of the animals; while Antiochus, wheeling his men so as to avoid the elephants, charged the division of cavalry under Polycrates. At the same time the Greek mercenaries stationed near the phalanx, and behind the elephants, charged Ptolemy's peltasts and made them give ground, the elephants having already thrown their ranks also into confusion. Thus Ptolemy's whole left wing began to give way before the enemy.

Echecrates the commander of the right wing waited at ^note first to see the result of the struggle between the other wings of the two armies: but when he saw the dust coming his way, and that the elephants opposite his division were afraid even to approach

the hostile elephants at all, he ordered Phoxidas to charge the part of the enemy opposite him with his Greek mercenaries; while he made a flank movement with the cavalry and the division behind the elephants; and so getting out of the line of the hostile elephants' attack, charged the enemy's cavalry on the rear or the flank and quickly drove them from their ground. Phoxidas and his men were similarly successful: for they charged the Arabians and Medes and forced them into precipitate flight. Thus Antiochus's right wing gained a victory, while his left was defeated. ^noteThe phalanxes, left without the support of either wing, remained intact in the centre of the plain, in a state of alternate hope and fear for the result. Meanwhile Antiochus was assisting in gaining the victory on his right wing; while Ptolemy, who had retired behind his phalanx, now came forward in the centre, and showing himself in the view of both armies struck terror in the hearts of the enemy, but inspired great spirit and enthusiasm in his own men; and Andromachus and Sosibius at once ordered them to lower their sarissae and charge. The picked Syrian troops stood their ground only for a short time, and the division of Nicarchus quickly broke and fled. Antiochus presuming, in his youthful inexperience, from the success of his own division, that he would be equally victorious all along the line, was pressing on the pursuit; but upon one of the older officers at length giving him warning, and pointing out that the cloud of dust raised by the phalanx was moving towards their own camp, he understood too late what was happening; and endeavoured to gallop back with the squadron of royal cavalry on to the field. ^note But finding his whole line in full retreat he was forced to retire to Rhaphia: comforting himself with the belief that, as far as he was personally concerned, he had won a victory, but had been defeated in the whole battle by the want of spirit and courage shown by the rest.

Having secured the final victory by his phalanx, and killed large numbers of the enemy in the pursuit by means of his cavalry and mercenaries on his right wing, Ptolemy retired to his own camp and there spent the night. But next day,

after picking up and burying his own dead, and stripping the bodies of the enemy, he advanced towards Rhaphia. Antiochus had wished, immediately after the retreat of his army, to make a camp outside the city; and there rally such of his men as had fled in compact bodies: but finding that the greater number had retreated into the town, he was compelled to enter it himself also. Next morning, however, before daybreak, he led out the relics of his army and made the best of his way to Gaza. There he pitched a camp: and having sent an embassy to obtain leave to pick up his dead, he obtained a truce for performing their obsequies. ^note His loss amounted to nearly ten thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry killed, and four thousand taken prisoners. Three elephants were killed on the field, and two died afterwards of their wounds. On Ptolemy's side the losses were fifteen hundred infantry killed and seven hundred cavalry: sixteen of his elephants were killed, and most of the others captured.

Such was the result of the battle of Rhaphia between kings Ptolemy and Antiochus for the possession of Coele-Syria.

After picking up his dead Antiochus retired with his army ^note to his own country: while Ptolemy took over Rhaphia and the other towns without difficulty, all the states vying with each other as to which should be first to renew their allegiance and come over to him. And perhaps it is the way of the world everywhere to accommodate one's self to circumstances at such times; but it is eminently true of the race inhabiting that country, that they have a natural turn and inclination to worship success. Moreover it was all the more natural in this case, owing to the existing disposition of the people in favour of the Alexandrian kings; for the inhabitants of Coele-Syria are somehow always more loyally disposed to this family than to any other. Accordingly they now stopped short of no extravagance of adulation, honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, and every possible compliment of the kind.

Meanwhile Antiochus, on arriving at the city which bears his own name, immediately despatched an embassy to Ptolemy, consisting of Antipater, his nephew, and Theodotus

Hemiolius, to treat of a peace, in great alarm lest the enemy should advance upon him. ^note For his defeat had inspired him with distrust of his own forces, and he was afraid that Achaeus would seize the opportunity to attack him. It did not occur to Ptolemy to take any of these circumstances into account: but being thoroughly satisfied with his unexpected success, and generally at his unlooked for acquisition of Coele-Syria, he was by no means indisposed to peace; but even more inclined to it than he ought to have been: influenced in that direction by the habitual effeminacy and corruption of his manner of life. Accordingly, when Antipater and his colleague arrived, after some little bluster and vituperation of Antiochus for what had taken place, he agreed to a truce for a year. He sent Sosibius back with the ambassadors to ratify the treaty: while he himself, after remaining three months in Syria and Phoenicia, and settling the towns, left Andromachus of Aspendus as governor of this district, and started with his sister and friends for Alexandria: having brought the war to a conclusion in a way that surprised his subjects, when they contrasted it with the principles on which he spent he rest of his life. Antiochus after exchanging ratifications of the treaty with Sosibius, employed himself in making preparations for attacking Achaeus, as he had originally begun doing. Such was the political situation in Asia.

About the same period the earthquake occurred at ^note Rhodes, which overthrew the great Colossus and the larger part of the walls and dockyards. But the adroit policy of the Rhodians converted this misfortune into an opportunity; and under their skilful management, instead of adding to their embarrassments, it became the means of restoring their prosperity. So decisive in human affairs, public or private, is the difference between incapacity and good sense, between idle indifference and a close attention to business. Good fortune only damages the one, while disaster is but a means of recovery to the other. This was illustrated by the manner in which the Rhodians turned the misfortune that befell them to account. They enhanced its magnitude and importance by the prominence which they gave

it, and the serious tone in which they spoke of it, as well by the mouth of their ambassadors as in the intercourse of private life; and they created thus such an effect upon other states, and especially upon the feelings of the kings, that they were not only overwhelmed with presents, but made the donors feel actually obliged for their acceptance of them. ^note Hiero and Gelo, for instance, presented them with seventy-five talents of silver, part at once, and the rest at a very short interval, as a contribution towards the expenses of the gymnasium; gave them for religious purposes some silver cauldrons and their stands, and some water vessels; and in addition to this ten talents for their sacrifices, and ten more to attract new citizens: their intention being that the whole present should amount to a hundred talents. ^note Not only so, but they gave immunity from customs to Rhodian merchants coming to their ports; and presented them besides with fifty catapults of three cubits length. In spite too of these large gifts, they regarded themselves as under an obligation to the Rhodians; and accordingly erected statues in the Deigma or Mart of Rhodes, representing the community of Rhodes crowned by that of Syracuse.

Then too Ptolemy offered them three hundred talents ^note of silver; a million medimni ^note of corn; ship timber for ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, consisting of forty thousand cubits of squared pine planking; a thousand talents of bronze coinage; three thousand talents ^note of tow; three thousand pieces of sail cloth; three thousand talents for the repair of the Colossus; a hundred master builders with three hundred and fifty workmen, and fourteen talents yearly to pay their wages. Besides this he gave twelve thousand medimni of corn for their public games and sacrifices, and twenty thousand medimni for victualling ten triremes. The greater part of these goods was delivered at once, as well as a third of the whole of the

money named. ^note In a similar spirit Antigonus offered ten thousand timbers, varying from sixteen to eight cubits in length, to be used as purlins; five thousand rafters seven cubits long; three thousand talents of iron; a thousand talents of pitch; a thousand amphorae of the same unboiled; and a hundred talents of silver besides. His queen, Chryseis, also gave a hundred thousand medimni of corn, and three thousand talents of lead. Again Seleucus, ^note father of Antiochus, besides granting freedom from imports to Rhodians sailing to his dominions, and besides giving ten quinqueremes fully equipped, and two hundred thousand medimni of corn; gave also ten thousand cubits of timber, and a thousand talents of resin and hair.

Nor were Prusias and Mithridates far behind these in ^note liberality; nor the princes Lysanias, Olympichus, and Lymnaeas, who were at that time in power in different parts of Asia; and as for states that, according to their several abilities contributed to their assistance, it would be difficult to reckon their number. In fact, though when we regard the time which it took the city to recover its populousness, and the state of desolation from which it started, we cannot fail to be struck at the rapidity and the extent of its improvement in regard both to private and public wealth; yet when we contemplate the natural advantages of its site, and the contributions from outside which served to raise its fortunes to their original height, this feeling must give way to a conviction that the advance was somewhat less than might have been expected.

My object in giving these details is twofold. I wished to exhibit the brilliant conduct of their public affairs by the Rhodians, for indeed they deserve both to be commended and imitated: and I wished also to point out the insignificance of the gifts bestowed by the kings of our own day, and received by nations and states; that these monarchs may not imagine that by the expenditure of four or five talents they are doing anything so very great, or expect to receive at the hands of the Greeks the honour enjoyed by former kings; and that states when they see before their eyes the magnitude of the presents

formerly bestowed, may not, nowadays, in return for insignificant and paltry benefactions, blindly bestow their most ample and splendid honours; but may use that discrimination in apportioning their favours to desert, in which Greeks excel the rest of the world.

Just at the beginning of this summer, while Agetas ^note was Strategus of the Aetolians, and when Aratus had just become Strategus of the Achaean league,—at which point we broke off in our history of the Social war, ^note—Lycurgus of Sparta returned home from Aetolia. The Ephors had discovered that the charge on which he had been banished was false; and had accordingly sent for him back, and recalled him from exile. He at once began making an arrangement with Pyrrhias the Aetolian, who happened at the time to be commander in Elis, for an invasion of Messenia. Now, when Aratas came into office, he found the mercenary army of the league in a state of complete demoralisation, and the cities very slack to pay the tax for their support, owing to the bad and spiritless manner in which his predecessor Eperatus had managed the affairs of the league. ^note He, however, exhorted the members of the league to reform, and obtained a decree dealing with this matter; and then threw himself with energy into the preparations for the war. The decree passed by the Achaeans ordered the maintenance of eight thousand mercenary infantry and five hundred horse, together with three thousand Achaean infantry and three hundred horse, enrolled in the usual way; and that of these latter five hundred foot and fifty horse were to be brazen-shield men from Megalopolis, and the same number of Argives. It ordered also that three ships should be manned to cruise off Acte and in the Argolic gulf, and three off Patrae and Dyme, and in the sea there.

While Aratus was engaged in these transactions, and in completing these preparations, Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after

an interchange of messages to secure their making their expedition at the same time, marched into Messenia. The Achaean Strategus, aware of their design, came with the mercenaries and some of the picked Achaeans to Megalopolis, with the view of supporting the Messenians. ^note After setting out, Lycurgus got possession of Calamae, a stronghold in Messenia, by treachery; and pressed hurriedly forward to effect a junction with the Aetolians. But Pyrrhias had started from Elis with a wholly inadequate force, and, having been easily stopped at the pass into Messenia by the Cyparissians, had turned back. Lycurgus therefore being unable to effect his junction with Pyrrhias, and not being strong enough by himself, after assaulting Andania for a short time, returned back to Sparta without having effected anything.

When the plot of the enemy had thus gone to pieces; Aratus, with a provident regard for the future, arranged with Taurion to provide fifty horse and five hundred foot, and with the Messenians to send an equal number; with the view of using these men to protect the territories of Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos,—for these districts, being on the frontier of Laconia, have to bear the brunt of Lacedaemonian invasion for the rest of the Peloponnese; while with the Achaean levies and mercenaries he planned to guard the parts of Achaia which lay towards Elis and Aetolia.

After adjusting these matters, he settled in accordance with the decree of the league the intestine disputes at Megalopolis. For it happened that the people of this town having been recently deprived of their country by Cleomenes, ^note and, to use a common expression, shaken to their foundations, were in absolute want of many things, and ill-provided with all: for they persisted in maintaining their usual scale of living, while their means both public and private were entirely crippled. The consequence was that the town was filled with disputes, jealousies, and mutual hatred; which is ever the case, both with states and individuals, when means fall short of desires. The first controversy was about the walling of the

town,—one party maintaining that the limits of the city should be contracted to a size admitting of being completely walled and guarded at a time of danger; for that in the late occasion it was its size and unguarded state which had caused their disaster. In addition to this it was maintained by this party that the landowners should contribute the third part of their land to provide for the enrolment of new citizens. The other party rejected the notion of contracting the limits of the city and would not consent to contribute a third part of their lands. But the most serious controversy of all was in regard to the laws draughted for them by Prytanis, an eminent Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus Doson appointed to draw them up a constitution. In this distracted state of politics, Aratus intervened with all the earnestness he could command, and succeeded in pacifying the heated feelings of the citizens. The terms on which the controversies were settled were engraved on a column, and set up near the altar of Vesta in the Homarium. ^note

After arranging this settlement, Aratus broke up his ^note camp; and going on himself to the congress of the Achaeans, handed over the mercenaries to Lycus of Pharae, as the Sub-Strategus of the league. But the Eleans, being dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, once more induced the Aetolians to send them Euripidas; who, waiting until the Achaeans were engaged in their congress, took sixty horse and two thousand foot, and started on a raid. Having passed through the territory of Pharae, he overran the country up to the territory of Aegium; and after securing and driving off a considerable booty, he began a retreat towards Leontium. But Lycus, learning what had happened, went in all haste to protect the country; and falling in with the enemy, he attacked them at once and killed four hundred and took two hundred prisoners, among whom were the following men of rank: Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus, Androlochus, Euanoridas, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius. ^noteThe arms and baggage fell entirely into his hands. About the same time the Navarch of the league having gone on an expedition to Molycria, returned with nearly a hundred

captives. Returning once more to Aetolia he sailed to Chalceia and captured two war ships, with their crews, which put out to resist him; and took also a long boat with its men on the Aetolian Rhium. There being thus an influx of booty both by sea and land at the same period, and a considerable amount of money and provisions being obtained from this, the soldiers felt confident of getting their pay, and the cities of the league were sanguine of not being likely to be hard pressed by their contributions.

While these events were taking place Scerdilaidas, ^note thinking that he was not being treated fairly, because some of the payments agreed upon in his treaty with Philip were in arrear, sent out fifteen galleys, treacherously pretending that their object was to receive and convoy the money. These galleys sailed to Leucas, where they were received by all as friendly, owing to their former alliance: but the only mischief they had time to do was to make a treacherous attack on the Corinthian Agathinus and Cassander, who had come there on board Taurion's ships, and were lying at anchor close to them with four vessels. These they captured with their vessels and sent to Scerdilaidas; and then putting out to sea from Leucas, and sailing towards Malea, they plundered and captured the merchants whom they met.

Harvest time was now approaching: and as Taurion paid ^note little attention to the protection of the cities I mentioned above; Aratus in person, at the head of some picked Achaean troops, protected the getting in of the harvest round Argos: while Euripidas at the head of a force of Aetolians set out on a raid, with the object of ravaging the territory of Tritaea. But when Lycus and Demodocus, the Hipparch of the league, heard of the expedition of the Aetolians from Elis, they collected the people of Dymae, Patrae and Pharae, and joining the mercenaries to these forces made an incursion upon Elis. Arrived at a place called Phyxium, they allowed their light-armed troops and their horse to plunder the country, but kept their hoplites concealed near this place: and when the Eleans had sallied out in full force to attack the foraging parties, and were

pursuing them as they retreated, the hoplites with Lycus rose from their hiding-place and charged them as they rushed heedlessly on. The Eleans did not stand against the attack, but fled at the mere appearance of the hoplites: who killed two hundred of them and took eighty prisoners, and carried off with them in safety all the booty that had been driven in from the country. At the same time the Navarch of the league made numerous descents upon Calydonia and the territory of Naupactus; and not only overran the country, but twice annihilated the force sent out to resist him. Among others he took Cleonicus of Naupactus prisoner: who owing to this being a proxenus of the Achaeans was not sold on the spot, and after some little time was set free without ransom.

About the same time Agetas, the Strategus of the ^note Aetolian league, proclaimed a general levy of Aetolians, and went a foraging expedition into the territory of the Acarnanians. He marched through all Epirus, plundering as he went without let or hindrance; after doing which he returned home, and dismissed the Aetolian levy to their own cities. But the Acarnanians, upon making a retaliatory invasion of the territory of Stratus, were seized with a panic: and returned with disgrace, though without loss; because the people of Stratus did not venture to pursue them, believing that their retreat was a ruse to cover an ambuscade.

An instance of counter treachery occurred also at Phanoteus. ^note Alexander who had been appointed governor of Phocis by Philip, entered into a plot against the Aetolians, through the agency of a certain Jason, who had been appointed by himself to command the city of Phanoteus. This man sent a message to Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian league, agreeing to hand over to him the citadel of Phanoteus; and he confirmed his offer by a regularly sworn treaty. On the appointed day Agetas came with his Aetolian levy to Phanoteus under cover of night; and concealing the rest at some little distance, he selected a hundred of the most active men and sent them towards the citadel. Jason had Alexander all ready with his soldiers, but duly received the Aetolians as he had sworn into the citadel. Immediately Alexander and his men threw themselves into the citadel also:

the Aetolian hundred picked soldiers were made prisoners; and when daylight showed Agetas what had taken place, he drew off his troops,—baffled by a ruse very like what he had on many occasions practised himself.

About this same period King Philip captured Bylazora, ^note the largest town of Paeonia, and very favourably situated for commanding the pass from Dardania to Macedonia: so that by this achievement he was all but entirely freed from any fear of the Dardani, it being no longer easy for them to invade Macedonia, as long as this city gave Philip the command of the pass. Having secured this place, he despatched Chrysogonus with all speed to summon the upper Macedonians to arms; while he himself, taking on the men of Bottia and Amphaxitis, arrived at Edessa Waiting there until he was joined by the Macedonians under Chrysogonus, he started with his whole army, and on the sixth day's march arrived at Larisa; and thence by a rapid night march he came before daybreak to Meliteia, and placing scaling ladders against the walls, attempted to take the town by escalade. ^noteThe suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack so dismayed the people of Meliteia, that he would easily have taken the town; but he was baffled by the fact of the ladders proving to be fat too short.

This is the kind of mistake which above all others reflects discredit on the commanders. For what can be more culpable than to arrive at a town which they mean to carry, in an entirely unprovided state, without having taken the precaution of measuring walls, cliffs, and the like, by which they intend to effect their entrance? Or again, while satisfying themselves as to these measurements, to entrust the construction of ladders and all such machinery, which, though taking little time to make, have to stand the test of a very critical service, without consideration, and to incompetent persons,—is not this deserving of censure? For in such actions it is not a question of succeeding or failing without ill consequences; but failure is followed by positive damage in manifold respects: danger to the bravest of the men at the actual time, and still greater danger during their retreat, when they have once

incurred the contempt of the enemy. The examples of such disasters are numerous; for you will find that of those who have failed in such attempts, many more have perished, or have been reduced to the last extremity of danger, than have come off scatheless. Moreover, no one can deny that they arouse distrust and hatred against themselves for the future, and give all men warning to be on their guard. For it is not only the persons attacked, but all who know what has happened, who are thereby bidden to look out for themselves and be on the watch. Wherefore it is never right for men in places of trust to conduct such enterprises inconsiderately. The method also of taking such measurements, and constructing machines of this kind, is easy and liable to no mistakes, if they are taken in hand scientifically.

For the present, however, I must resume the thread of my narrative; but I shall take another fitting opportunity in the course of my work to speak of these matters, and will endeavour to show how mistakes may best be avoided in such undertakings.

Thus baffled in his attempt upon Meliteia, Philip encamped upon the bank of the Enipeus, and collected from Larisa and the other cities the siege train which he had caused to be constructed during the winter. For the chief object of his campaign was the capture of the city called Phthiotid Thebes. ^noteNow this city lies no long way from the sea, about thirty stades from Larisa, and is conveniently situated in regard both to Magnesia and Thessaly; but especially as commanding the district of Demetrias in Magnesia, and of Pharsalus and Pherae in Thessaly. From it, at that very time, much damage was being inflicted upon the Demetrians, Pharsalians, and Larisaeans; as the Aetolians were in occupation of it, and made continual predatory expeditions, often as far as to the plain of Amyrus. Philip did not regard the matter as at all of small importance, but was exceedingly bent on taking the town. Having therefore got together a hundred and fifty catapults, and twenty-five stone-throwing balistae, he sat down before Thebes. He distributed his forces between three points in the vicinity of the city; one was encamped near

Scopium; a second near a place called Heliotropium; and the third on the hill overhanging the town. The spaces between these camps he fortified by a trench and double palisade, and further secured them by towers of wood, at intervals of a hundred feet, with an adequate guard. When these works were finished, he collected all his siege train together and began to move his engines towards the citadel.

For the first three days the king was unable to make ^note any progress in bringing his machines against the town, owing to the gallant and even desperate defence which the garrison opposed to him. But when the continual skirmishing, and the volleys of missiles, had began to tell upon the defenders, and some of them were killed and others disabled by wounds; the defence becoming a little slacker, the Macedonians began sinking mines, and at last after nine days' work reached the walls. They then carried on the work by relays, so as never to leave it off day or night: and thus in three days had undermined and underpinned two hundred feet of the wall. The props, however, proved too weak to support the weight, and gave way; so that the wall fell without the Macedonians having the trouble of setting fire to them. When they had worked energetically at clearing the debris, and had made every preparation for entering by the breach, and were just on the point of carrying it, the Thebans in a panic surrendered the town. The security which this achievement of Philip's gave to Magnesia and Thessaly deprived the Aetolians of a rich field for plunder; and demonstrated to his army that he had been justified in putting Leontius to death, for his deliberate treachery in the previous siege of Palae. Having thus become master of Thebes he sold its existing inhabitants into slavery, and drafting in some Macedonian settlers changed its name to Philippopolis.

Just as the king had finished the settlement of Thebes, ambassadors once more came from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and King Ptolemy to negotiate terms of peace. He answered them in much the same terms as he had the former, ^note that he was not averse to peace; and bade them go and find out

what the feelings of the Aetolians were. Meanwhile he himself cared little about making peace, but continued steadily to prosecute his designs.

Accordingly, when he heard that the galleys of Scerdilaidas were committing acts of piracy off Malea, and treating all merchants as open enemies, and had treacherously seized some of his own vessels which were at anchor at Leucas, he fitted out twelve decked ships, eight open vessels, and thirty light craft called hemioliae, ^note and sailed through the Euripus in hot haste to come up with the Illyrians; exceedingly excited about his plans for carrying on the war against the Aetolians, as he knew nothing as yet of what had happened in Italy. For the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal in Etruria took place while Philip was besieging Thebes, but the report of that occurrence had not yet reached Greece. Philip arrived too late to capture the galleys: and therefore, dropping anchor at Cenchreae, he sent away his decked ships, with orders to sail round Malea in the direction of Aegium and Patrae; but having caused the rest of his vessels to be dragged across the Isthmus, he ordered them to anchor at Lechaeum; while he went in haste with his friends to Argos to attend the Nemean festival. ^note Just as he was engaged in watching the gymnastic contest, a courier arrived from Macedonia with news of the Romans having been defeated in a great battle, and of Hannibal being in possession of the open country. ^note Philip showed the letter to no one at the moment, except to Demetrius of Pharos, enjoining him not to say a word. The latter seized the occasion to advise Philip to throw over the war against the Aetolians as soon as possible; and to concentrate his efforts upon Illyria, and an expedition into Italy. "For Greece," said he, "is already entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine affection; the Aetolians from the with terror which their disasters in the present war have inspired

them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a reverse."

By using such arguments he found no difficulty in firing Philip's ambition: as was natural, I think, considering that he was but a youthful monarch, who had as yet been successful in all his undertakings, and was in any case of a singularly daring character; and considering too that he was sprung from a family which above all families has somehow a tendency to aim at universal monarchy.

At the moment then, as I said, Philip communicated the news conveyed by the letter to Demetrius alone; and afterwards summoning a council of his friends consulted them on the subject of making peace with the Aetolians. And when even Aratus professed no disinclination to the measure, on the ground that they would be making peace as conquerors, the king without waiting for the ambassadors, who were officially engaged in negotiating its terms, sent Cleonicus of Naupactus at once to Aetolia, whom he found still awaiting the meeting of the Achaean league after his captivity; ^note while he himself, taking his ships and land force from Corinth, came with it to Aegium. Thence he advanced as far as Lasion and took the Tower in Perippia, and pretended, in order to avoid appearing too eager for the conclusion of the war, that he was meditating an invasion of Elis. ^note By this time Cleonicus had been backwards and forwards two or three times; and as the Aetolians begged that he would meet them personally in conference, he assented; and abandoning all warlike measures, he sent couriers to the allied cities, bidding their commissioners to sit in the conference with him and take part in the discussion of the terms of peace: and then crossed over with his army and encamped near Panormus, which is a harbour of the Peloponnese, and lies exactly opposite Naupactus. ^note There he waited for the commissioners from the allies, and employed the time required for their assembling in sailing to Zacynthus, and settling on his own

authority the affairs of the island; and having done so he sailed back to Panormus.

The commissioners having now assembled, Philip sent Aratus and Taurion, and some others who had come with them, to the Aetolians. They found them in full assembly at Naupactus; and after a short conference with them, and satisfying themselves as to their inclination for peace, they sailed back to Philip to inform him of the state of the case. But the Aetolians, being very eager to bring the war to a conclusion, sent ambassadors with them to Philip urging him to visit them with his army, that by a personal conference the business might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Moved by these representations, the king sailed across with his army to what is called the Hollows of Naupactus, about twenty stades from the town. Having pitched a camp there, and having caused both it and his ships to be surrounded by a palisade, he waited for the time fixed for the interview. The Aetolians came en masse without arms; and keeping at a distance of two stades from Philip's camp, interchanged messages and discussions on the subjects in question. The negotiation was begun by the king sending all the commissioners of the allies, with instructions to offer the Aetolians peace, on the condition of both parties retaining what they then held. This preliminary the Aetolians readily agreed to; and then there began a continuous interchange of messages between the two, most of which I shall omit as containing no point of interest: but I shall record the speech made by Agelaus of Naupactus in the first conference before the king and the assembled allies. It was this.

"The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not ^note go to war with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible, in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast

proportions assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis, and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes."

This speech of Agelaus greatly influenced the allies in favour of peace; and Philip more than any one: as the arguments employed chimed in with the wishes which the advice of Demetrius had already roused in him. Both parties therefore came to terms on the details of the treaty; and after ratifying it, separated to their several cities, taking peace with them instead of war.

These events all fell in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. ^note I mean the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus for Coele-Syria, and lastly the treaty between Philip and the Aetolians.

This then was the first point of time, and the first instance ^note of a deliberation, which may be said to have regarded the affairs of Greece, Italy, and Libya as a connected whole: for neither Philip nor the leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all fixing their eyes upon Italy. Nor was it long before the islanders and inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way; for those who were displeased with Philip, or who had quarrels with Attalus, no longer turned to Antiochus or Ptolemy, to the south or the east, but from this time forth fixed their eyes on the west, some sending embassies to Carthage, others to Rome. The Romans similarly began sending legates to Greece, alarmed at the daring character of Philip, and afraid that he might join in the attack upon them in their present critical position. Having thus fulfilled my original promise of showing when, how, and why Greek politics became involved in those of Italy and Libya, I shall now bring my account of Greek affairs down to the date of the battle of Cannae, to which I have already brought the history of Italy, and will end this book at that point.

Directly the Achaeans had put an end to the war, ^note they elected Timoxenus Strategus for the next year ^note and departed to take up once more their regular ways and habits. Along with the Achaeans the other Peloponnesian communities also set to work to repair the losses they had sustained; recommenced the cultivation of the land; and re-established their national sacrifices, games, and other religious observances peculiar to their several states. For these things

had all but sunk into oblivion in most of the states through the persistent continuance of the late wars. It has ever somehow been the case that the Peloponnesians, who of all men are the most inclined to a peaceful and civilised way of life, have hitherto enjoyed it less than any other nation in the world; but have been rather as Euripides ^note says "still worn with toil and war's unrest." But to me it seems clear that they bring this upon themselves in the natural course of events: for their universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate love of freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike being resolutely set upon occupying the first place. The Athenians on the contrary had by this time freed themselves from fear of Macedonia, and considered that they had now permanently secured their independence. ^note They accordingly adopted Eurycleidas and Micion as their representatives, and took no part whatever in the politics of the rest of Greece; but following the lead and instigation of these statesmen, they laid themselves out to flatter all the kings, and Ptolemy most of all; nor was there any kind of decree or proclamation too fulsome for their digestion: any consideration of dignity being little regarded, under the guidance of these vain and frivolous leaders.

Ptolemy however immediately after these events became involved in a war with his Egyptian subjects. For in arming them for his campaign against Antiochus he had taken a step which, while it served his immediate purpose sufficiently well, proved eventually disastrous. Elated with their victory at Rhaphia they refused any longer to receive orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on the ground that they were quite able to maintain their independence. And this they succeeded in doing before very long.

Antiochus spent the winter in extensive preparations for ^note war; and when the next summer came, he crossed Mount Taurus and after making a treaty of alliance with King Attalus entered upon the war against Achaeus.

At the time the Aetolians were delighted at the settlement

of peace with the Achaean league, because the war had not answered to their wishes; and they accordingly elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their Strategus, because he was believed to have contributed more largely than any one to the success of the negotiations. ^note But this was scarcely arranged before they began to be discontented, and to find fault with Agelaus for having cut off all their opportunities of plundering abroad, and all their hopes of gain for the future, since the peace was not made with certain definite states, but with all Greeks. But this statesman patiently endured these unreasonable reproaches and succeeded in checking the popular impulse. The Aetolians therefore were forced to acquiesce in an inactivity quite alien to their nature.

King Philip having returned, after the completion of ^note the treaty of peace, to Macedonia by sea, found that Scerdilaidas on the same pretext of money owed to him, on which he had treacherously seized the vessels at Leucas, had now plundered a town in Pelagonia called Pissaeum; had won over by promises some cities of the Dassaretae, namely, Phibotides, Antipatria, Chrysondym, and Geston; and had overrun much of the district of Macedonia bordering on these places. He therefore at once started with his army in great haste to recover the revolted cities, and determined to proclaim open war with Scerdilaidas; for he thought it a matter of the most vital importance to bring Illyria into a state of good order, with a view to the success of all his projects, and above all of his passage into Italy. For Demetrius was so assiduous in keeping hot these hopes and projects in the king's mind, that Philip even dreamed of them in his sleep, and thought of nothing else but this Italian expedition. The motive of Demetrius in so acting was not a consideration for Philip, for he certainly did not rank higher than third in the calculations of Demetrius. A stronger motive than that was his hatred of Rome: but the strongest of all was the consideration of his own prospects. For he had made up his mind that it was only in this way that he could ever recover his principality in Pharos. Be that as it may, Philip went on his expedition and recovered the cities I have named, and took besides Creonium

and Gerus in Dassaretis; Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, Boei, round the Lychnidian Lake; Bantia in the district of the Calicoeni; and Orgyssus in that of the Pisantini. After completing these operations he dismissed his troops to their winter quarters.

This was the winter in which Hannibal, after plundering ^note the fairest districts of Italy, intended to place his winter quarters near Gerunium in Daunia. And it was then that at Rome Caius Terentius and Lucius Aemilius entered upon their Consulship.

In the course of the winter, Philip, taking into ^note consideration that he would want ships to carry out his designs, and men for rowing, not for fighting,—for he could never have even entertained a hope of fighting the Romans at sea,—but rather for the transport of soldiers, and to enable him to cross with greater speed to any point to which he might desire to go, and so surprise the enemy by a sudden appearance, and thinking that the Illyrian build was the best for the sort of ships he wanted, determined to have a hundred galleys built; which hardly any Macedonian king had ever done before. ^note Having had these fitted out, he collected his forces at the beginning of the summer; and, after a brief training of the Macedonians in rowing them, put to sea. It was just at the time that just at the time that Antiochus crossed Mount Taurus when Philip, after sailing through the Euripus and rounding Cape Malea, came to Cephallenia and Leucas, where he dropped anchor, and awaited anxiously the movements of the Roman fleet. Being informed that it was at anchor off Lilybaeum, he mustered up courage to put to sea, and steered for Apollonia.

As he neared the mouth of the Aous, which flows ^note past Apollonia, a panic fell upon his fleet such as happens to land forces. Certain galleys on the rear of the fleet being anchored at an island called Sason, which lies at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came by night to Philip with a report that some men who had lately come from the Sicilian Strait had been anchored with them at Sason, who

reported that they left some Roman quinqueremes at Rhegium, which were bound for Apollonia to support Scerdilaidas. Thinking this fleet must be all but upon him, Philip, in great alarm, promptly ordered his ships to weigh anchor and sail back the way they came. They started and got out to sea in great disorder, and reached Cephallenia, after sailing two nights and days without intermission. Having now partially recovered his courage, Philip remained there, covering his flight under the pretext of having returned for some operations in the Peloponnese. It turned out that it was a false alarm altogether. The truth was that Scerdilaidas, hearing in the course of the winter that Philip was having a number of galleys built, and expecting him to come to attack him by sea, had sent messages to Rome stating the facts and imploring help; and the Romans had detached a squadron of ten ships from the fleet at Lilybaeum, which were what had been seen at Rhegium. But if Philip had not fled from them in such inconsiderate alarm, he would have had the best opportunity possible of attaining his objects in Illyria; because the thoughts and resources of Rome were absorbed in the war with Hannibal and the battle of Cannae, and it may fairly be presumed that he would have captured the ten Roman ships. As it was, he was utterly upset by the news and returned to Macedonia, without loss indeed, but with considerable dishonour.

During this period Prusias also did a thing which ^note deserves to be recorded. The Gauls, whom King Attalus had brought over from Europe to assist him against Achaeus on account of their reputation for courage, had separated from that monarch on account of the jealous suspicions of which I have before spoken, and were plundering the cities on the Hellespont with gross licentiousness and violence, and finally went so far as actually to besiege Ilium. In these circumstances the inhabitants of the Alexandria in the Troad acted with commendable spirit. They sent Themistes with four thousand men and forced the Gauls to raise the siege of Ilium, and drove them entirely out of the Troad, by cutting off their supplies and frustrating all their designs. Thereupon the Gauls seized Arisba, in the territory

of Abydos, and thenceforth devoted themselves to forming designs and committing acts of hostility against the cities built in that district. Against them Prusias led out an army; and in a pitched battle put the men to the sword on the field, and slew nearly all their women and children in the camp, leaving the baggage to be plundered by his soldiers. This achievement of Prusias delivered the cities on the Hellespont from great fear and danger, and was a signal warning for future generations against barbarians from Europe being over-ready to cross into Asia.

Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. Meanwhile the greater part of Italy had joined the Carthaginians ^note after the battle of Cannae, as I have shown before. I will interrupt my narrative at this point, after having detailed the events in Asia and Greece, embraced by the 140th Olympiad. In my next book after a brief recapitulation of this narrative, I shall fulfil the promise made at the beginning of my work by recurring to the discussion of the Roman constitution.