Philip's Crime and Blunder
The present affair was an instance of this. He
imagined that he was doing nothing wrong in giving the rein
to his anger, and retaliating upon the impious acts of the
Aetolians by similar impieties, and "curing ill by ill"; and
while he was always reproaching Scopas and Dorimachus with
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depravity and abandoned wickedness, on the grounds of their
acts of impiety at Dodona and Dium, he imagined that, while
emulating their crimes, he would leave quite a different
impression of his character in the minds of those to whom he
spoke. But the fact is, that whereas the taking and demolishing
an enemy's forts, harbours, cities, men, ships and crops, and
other such things, by which our enemy is weakened, and our
own interests and tactics supported, are necessary acts
according to the laws and rights of war; to deface temples,
statues, and such like erections in pure wantonness, and without
any prospect of strengthening oneself or weakening the enemy,
must be regarded as an act of blind passion and insanity.
For the purpose with which good men wage war is not the
destruction and annihilation of the wrongdoers, but the
reformation and alteration of the wrongful acts. Nor is it
their object to involve the innocent in the destruction of the
guilty, but rather to see that those who are held to be guilty should
share in the preservation and elevation of the guiltless. It is the
act of a tyrant to inflict injury, and so to maintain his power
over unwilling subjects by terror,—hated, and hating those
under him: but it is the glory of a king to secure, by doing
good to all, that he should rule over willing subjects, whose
love he has earned by humanity and beneficence.
But the best way of appreciating the gravity of Philip's note
mistake is to put before our eyes the idea which
the Aetolians would probably have conceived of
him, had he acted in an opposite way, and destroyed neither colonnades nor statutes, nor done injury to any
of the sacred offerings. For my part I think it would have
been one of the greatest goodness and humanity. For they
would have had on their consciences their own acts at Dium
and Dodona; and would have seen unmistakably that,
whereas Philip was absolutely master of the situation, and
could do what he chose, and would have been held fully
justified as far as their deserts went in taking the severest
measures, yet deliberately, from mere gentleness and magnanimity, he refused to copy their conduct in any respect.